Thank you for your civility. A transgressor is anyone who violates a law, command, moral code, etc. I almost invariably operate with definitions already established by common use or specialists.
Who is this “I” of which you speak? And why do you speak of this “I” making decisions, as opposed to simply stating that decisions are made? Is there an “I” involved that has any interaction with the rest of the system, or can the decisions made by this alleged “I” entity be completely attributed to the rest of the system?
I can’t speak for what other people who think in terms of free will may mean when they use that phrase, but I use the term to refer to the notion that there is indeed an “I” and that the “I” does indeed interact, consciously, with the rest of the system, and that the rest of the system does not determine the entire system (i.e., the system including me) any more than I determine it all by myself. I am no more determined by the rest of the system than any other part of it; I am no more determined by the rest of the system than the rest of the system is determined by me. It’s interactive, and I’m a volitional agent making choices.
Definitions of free will have been around since the beginning of Wester philosophy (over 2,500 years ago). Pythagoras, for instance, considers human freedom to be the ability to subordinate passions to reason.
Thank you for your civility. A transgressor is anyone who violates a law, command, moral code, etc. I almost invariably operate with definitions already established by common use or specialists.
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But we were talking about conscience, which would seem to operate identically for ndividual whether they are violators of laws etc or nonviolators thereof. Indeed, many people violate laws as a consequence of conscience. Hence my request that you elaborate on it without refernece to external authority (such as laws, commands, etc). I was indicating that yon herring is quite red.
And what is that?
It’s surprisingly hard to define “free”, “will” and thus “free will”. Obviously we feel the freedom to make any decision we want to. We also know that that freedom isn’t entirely imaginary, as humans tend to make a variety of decisions, some remarkably smart, many remarkably stupid.
Anyone here care to argue that because there is no free will we shouldn’t punish criminals?
Or send kids to school, for that matter?
Or do anything, really?
Did you read my previous posts?
I identify an “I” in a similar way that I identify an agent in Game 2.0. And in fact, that agent can do a primitive form of identifying itself compared to other agents in the game. It can have a model of its world, and it can have a model of how its own self and its actions fit into the world it inhabits. If you program in enough game theory, this kind of stuff can very quickly soak up the processor cycles.
And it’s still all deterministic.
The agent is part of the system. The system consists of everything inside it, including the agents. The system would be different without those agents. We can try to narrow down our view of the system, instead of looking at the whole thing, and try to identify subsystems. But this won’t be a complete description. It can’t possibly be a complete description of 1) the system as a whole which is more more than the agent, nor can it be a complete description of the 2) the agent embedded within the system, because the agent’s behavior changes as it learns new things when interacting with the rest of the system. All we can do when identifying a “deciding self” is to identify patterns and draw some fuzzy lines.
We can evaluate the usefulness of the lines we draw – including the line around “self” for an agent – based on how much the lines help us make decent guesses with our limited information.
None of this means anything to me if you can’t describe specifically how you’re different from a learning-agent embedded within Game 2.0 or even the theoretical Game 3.0.
There’s a reason computer analogies are so common in these sorts of discussions. Computers demand precision. They force us to explicitly define the terms we’re talking about in a way that makes the machine work. When we can talk about programming something like a Game 2.0, then we’ve proven that we have the precise vocabulary to talk about learning agents within deterministic systems. That gives us a standard for comparison for anyone who would deny determinism.
Sure. Negative reinforcement works in an immediate time frame. The more removed an action is from its consequence, the less likely the consequence is to figure in the decision to act. The miscreant/criminal will focus on avoiding what precipitates the consequence, i.e., getting caught, rather than not acting. “Justice” is too far from the problem to be effective, the way to deal with criminals is to exact due recompense, if possible, and to make a genuine attempt to reform them, with minimal retribution.
Huh? Now you are just not making sense.
Well, you’ve defined the agents in Game 2.0 as utterly deterministic. I’ve defined myself as not. 
How do you know your learning-agents are not acting volitionally? Or, more usefully, do you hold it to be true that the behaviors of the learning-agents can be attributed to the rest of the system, i.e., is “caused by” the rest of the system, as contrasted with my assertion vis-a-vis myself that my behavior is no more caused by the rest of the system than any other component of it is caused by the system, or than the rest of the system is caused by me?
If you don’t see any meaningful distinction, then I do not hold myself to be different from your Game 2.0 learning agents, but I differ with you in your use of “determined” and would consider that “free will”.
Human beings are social animals. Society necessitates normative standards to exist and function. Internalization of norms results in conscience. Thus, human beings’ conscience stands for moral behaviors, attitudes and beliefs regarding past, present and future actions (due to perception of time) or even hypothetical ones (as in thought experiments).
Could you please enunciate the red herring and mention its relevance to the question in the OP?
This pushes it back to another word. What’s “volitionally”?
The agents consider things. They look at their world, run a calculation that takes time, make a decision based on the result of the calculation. Is that volitional? Depends on what you mean. It’s definitely deterministic, though: They make the same decision every time the program is run. That’s part of what determinism entails. And I believe that if our universe could be returned to its original starting conditions, our universe would play out the exact same way again. We’d make the same decisions, too.
Everything causes everything else.
The system isn’t the same without you. You aren’t the same without the rest of the system as it is. The system as a whole is about not just the pieces but the interactions.
If you look at basic chaos theory with the Lorentz system (interesting picture at that link), you can see from the equations that you have x, y, and z over time. The change in x is influenced by y and x; the change in y is influenced by x, y, and z; and the change in z is influenced x and z. The causation is recursive. Everything ends up causing everything else.
The pieces are pure simplicity by themselves. But the system as a whole isn’t just the pieces but their interactions. It’s like a science-fiction jigsaw puzzle, where the ink merges together based on what pieces have been combined. Take the pieces apart, and the ink again looks like it did out of the box. Put all the pieces together and make the complete puzzle, and you will see an image you could not have anticipated because the whole puzzle isn’t just the stationary ink – the whole puzzle includes the interactions between the pieces as they were placed together.
It’s still fully deterministic. It follows strict rules. But speaking of causality is a little harder because everything is influencing everything else all the time. The system isn’t just the pieces, the system is the recursive interactions.
Well, determinism isn’t up for grabs. It’s clearly and coherently defined.
But there are plenty of people who advocate a deterministic “free will”. They’re called compatibilists. If you believe that, then there’s no disagreement. I don’t really have any problem with compatibilsm (except maybe along a different axis of discussion not relevant here).
It’s non-determinism where I draw a line.
The line I draw is NOT: “The universe must be deterministic and anyone who says otherwise is wrong!” But rather: “The things we see can be explained with deterministic processes. Further, I haven’t seen any coherent explanation of a non-determinsitic universe, I don’t know what it would look like, and the people who claim to advocate for it either show clear misunderstandings of what determinism is, are relying entirely on subjective “evidence”, or just don’t make any sense at all.”
But if your definition of free will is compatible with determinism, then you’re in good company.
Ah, but the discussion was about free will. If everything is predetermined, what’s the point of reinforcement? And how is it fair to punish someone if they weren’t free to not commit the crime?
[not sending kids to school]
Well, if everything is predetermined, then what’s the point of school?
Of course this line of argument has the inherent inconsistency that it assumes that we can choose to punish criminals and/or send kids to school. If everything is predetermined, us punishing criminals and kids (by sending them to school) is predetermined, too. But then, why are we spending so much time trying to decide these things?
And to those saying the universe is deterministic: please tell me when the potassium-40 atoms in the banana I have here are going to decay.
I apologize, for I never really seem to “get” this. The distinction doesn’t make any sense to me. I vote with “some philosophers” who define “free will” as that ability (far from absolute, I hasten to say!) we have to make difficult decisions.
You find your kid has committed a felony. Do you hide him from the cops…or turn him in? It’s a choice. Real people make it in the real world. I do not believe that the evidence shows that the decision is pre-determined from the instant of the Big Bang (nor even pre-determined as of twenty minutes ago.)
The recently-discovered evidence that the decision may have been made a few seconds before you are aware of what the decision is, is fascinating! It tells us a lot about the mechanism of choice. But it’s still “you” who made the decision.
Or, as I always ask, explain the mechanism by which those atoms know when to decay. Where is the information stored? What kind of “countdown timer” is involved? A burning fuse? A little clockwork thingie? How does it know what time it is now, and how does it compare it to “M-Microsecond?”
This question has already been addressed in the thread.
Anticipated and answered.
We don’t have perfect knowledge. Our brains are much smaller than the universe. We cannot possibly know everything, including when your banana’s potassium-40 will decay. That is not an argument against determinism. A demonstration of our ignorance doesn’t decide between quantum interpretations. We’re ignorant of that answer in every quantum interpretation, both the deterministic and the non-deterministic. Yours is not a question that can divide one from the other.
In another thread, you claimed to be “almost certain” that the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct.
But of course, the many-worlds interpretation is deterministic. The purpose of it was to be a deterministic alternative to Copenhagen. If you are almost certain that it’s true, then you are by necessity almost certain that we live in a deterministic universe.
To answer your question, using the same quantum interpretation that you have yourself stated is most likely to be true: the “countdown timer” is the (deterministic) evolution of the universal wavefunction.
Emphasis added.
There is, in fact, a decent chunk of physicists who believe this to be true. They claim that it’s the simplest interpretation that is cleared defined.
I don’t see how that vague quote is an answer to my question.
I specifically brought up the decay of radioactive elements because (AFAIK) it’s not a quantum thing and also a very constrained event that doesn’t require full knowledge of a huge system. It’s just that statistically, we know something will happen with a certain probability, but we have no way of predicting any particular instance.
Without a way to at least theoretically predict when an atom decays (even if the facts needed for this prediction are beyond our capabilities to determine), we can’t assume that we live in a deterministic universe.
It is a quantum thing.
The quote wasn’t vague. It spoke directly to your question.
I never suggested that punishment for crimes is fair, or even useful. We do it because we, as a group, seem to think it works – like prayer, or torture – and it makes us feel better, I guess.
I, personally, am not arguing in favor of determinism. However, the choices we make are governed by who we are (a product of environmental and social influences), by what we expect or hope the outcomes will be, and, outside the intellectual realm, by biochemistry (emotions and urges). It may or may not be deterministic, but in order to, uh, determine that, we would need far more information than we may ever be able to acquire. For all intents and purposes, we may as well proceed as though it is not deterministic, otherwise we will just want to lie down and die.
And thus that there is no “countdown clock” on an atom determining when it will decay.
Only if you change the word “deterministic” to mean something else that what it means in ordinary language.
In ordinary language, a “deterministic” model means that this here atom has an “expiration date” attached to it somehow, and that when that time comes, the atom will decay. This means there has to be some kind of timing mechanism, some internal clockwork, and a means of measuring time.
“Deterministic” in this sense is according to the “predestination” idea. It was fated from the origin of the cosmos that I would stub my toe against the chair leg on this date at this time. Ouch.
You seem to be using the word “deterministic” in a way that doesn’t mean that. I think it’s damn shoddy of physics to make use of words in ways that contradict their “ordinary world” meaning.
The “many worlds” model is not deterministic in the ordinary meaning of the world, since we have no way of knowing if we’re in the world where that atom decays today, or in the world where that atom decays a year from today.
In ordinary language, that definition absolutely contradicts the word “deterministic.”
Can you explain, clearly, what “deterministic” means to you, such that it is compatible with “random” and “impossible to predict?”
There is no “ordinary language” here.
This is a technical word. It has a technical definition. Ordinary people don’t use the word. Only people who appreciate the technical definition become advocates for the idea. If you have misunderstood until this point, that is unfortunate, but it is not incumbent on physicists or philosophers to make sure every interested lay reader is fully up-to-speed on every definition. You have to do the reading yourself.
The many-worlds interpretation has always been called deterministic. From literally the beginning.
The entire point of the MWI was to create a deterministic alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation. That it is deterministic was explicitly written in Everett’s original PhD thesis when he discovered/created it.
Your misunderstanding is personal. It is your mistake, not a mistake in the “ordinary meaning” of the word. I understand that it feels to you personally as if your meaning is the ordinary meaning, since you’ve been carrying it around in your head all this time and it’s been perfectly ordinary to you. But it’s not. You’ve been carrying around a misconception, and it is not a generally held misconception because this is not a generally discussed topic. Among the select people who are highly interested in the disputes about interpretations, it is perfectly common knowledge that the MWI is deterministic by the standard meaning of deterministic.
That was the “radioactive decay” article and it wasn’t written from the perspective of the MWI or any other deterministic interpretation. Copenhagen is still the most common interpretation. As with many Copenhagen-based explanations, it would have to be “translated”. The probabilistic predictions remain the same for all interpretations, but the underlying belief about the universe is different. I cited the article not for determinism, but to show another poster that radioactive decay is in fact a quantum process.
I can give you my own “translation” later if you’re interested. (But keep in mind, I’m not a physicist.)
In the meantime, here’s Sean Carroll talking about various interpretations. A 14-minute video.