This is not the first time I feel impelled to thank you for your honesty. I am firmly convinced you are far from the only participant here who believes this, but I think you’re the only one who is willing to eschew feigning adherence to a process and acknowledge that what you find valid is the liberal outcome, and as long as it’s reached, that’s correct.
But I don’t agree that’s true, especially when it comes to the courts.
The liberal outcome is not like physics or chemistry. Two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen form a water molecule, and no one who claims they form bronze or brass is correct. This isn’t a matter of any dispute.
But the liberal outcome is a matter of preference. It’s not unambiguously correct. It’s something that arises by accepting certain postulates about the proper role of government and the proper balances of individual freedom against the welfare of society.
In this country, we say that we vest ultimate sovereignty in the people, and that they exercise that power generally by electing leaders to act on their behalf. In this framework, we create a set of rules that are unchallengeable except by supermajority, other rules that are more susceptible to change by lesser majorities, and processes by which conflicts in these rules can be resolved.
Even if the liberal result is not reached, these processes should be honored. The reason is obvious: the liberal result is not correct in the same way as the molecular composition of water is correctly described. These processes, that framework, represent our collective agreement about how to handle disputes in ideas of governance.
Now, I readily admit that even those processes are not as well-defined as the composition of water. There is room for disagreement about the correct application of judicial philosophy.
But there should be something other than, “Determine the correct liberal result, then craft a rationale to adopt that result.” That philosophy means that judges become legislators, that the agents we have agreed would have the role of arbitrating conflicts in law are conceded to also be a super-legislator with the ability to create substantive law.
That’s not what we say we’re about.