True enough ( assuming Harald and his heirs could hold on ).
Significant, yes, but as you say not critical. It didn’t break the Eastern Empire ( the proximate army defeated ) and the Western’s fall was due to a whole confluence of factors, not just the Goths.
Even less significant than Tours( 
), for exactly the reasons you stated. Attila was not looking to move his horde west, he just wanted plunder. If anything the Germanic hosts that helped win the victory as allies were far more of a threat. I’d say it ranks right about with, or perhaps a bit behind, Otto I’s victory over the Magyars at Lechfeld.
Hmmm…interesting possibility.
Ah, more a symptom than a decisive moment I think. It hurried things along, but the Crusading states were probably always doomed. Really relatively few pitched battles were fought in the Levantine Crusades anyway. It was simply a matter of the Muslim forces have vastly superior resources locally if unified. Once a strong central authority reasserted itself in the region, the balance tipped heavily in its favour.
I think Philip of Swabia’s death ( Otto’s assassinated rival and predecessor ) was what really broke the HRE. Otto IV was already a weak reed with a limited power base… Bouvines was significant, but considering the erosion of Angevin influence on the continent by that point, I’m not sure if anything less than the death of both Philip II and his son Louis on the field could have retrieved the situation much.
I’m reluctant to give too much global significance to any of the battles of the Hundred Years War. Calvary continued to be the arm of decision right down into the early 18th century at least and the English learned their tactics from the Scottish wars ( Bannockburn, and even more importantly the Scottish campaigns of Edward III certainly predicted Crecy ). Crecy was less about the battlefield supremacy of the longbowman ( which ultimately didn’t last all that long ) than it was about the folly of lauching a frontal assault against a prepared defensive position.
But I will agree that Crecy definitely revised the previously low opinion of English arms.
Silenus just covered this, but the Spanish Armada was almost certainly a lost cause even before they set out, a victim of poor coordination and ( despite all the prodigious effort that went into it ) planning. Farnese’s army was probably incapable of boarding and making the trip to England intact under the circumstances ( which had little enough to do with England and far more with the situation in the Low Countries ), thus no invasion was really possible.
I agree with Sturmhauke - it was more a matter of under who, not if a new Shogunate would be established.
As it happens I’m currently reading Austin Woolrych’s Battles of the English Civil War: Marston Moor, Naseby, Preston ;). A victory at Naseby would have revived and strengthened the Royalists, but I doubt it would have decisively won the war - they were already in the hole after having lost the north after Marston Moor. Even if it had been decisive I think far too many of the ‘Royalists’ were moderates, former supporters of Pym alienated by the extremists, for the situation to return to the unfettered absolutism of the 1630’s. A return to the compromised of 1641 or something like it I suspect is more likely.
The American ones are hard to quantify - it has been argued that the British were incapable of winning at all due to logistic issues and that anyway it wasn’t pitched battles that won the war, but attrition. I’m not sure I agree with the first point, but Washington may have performed his greatest service by just holding the army together at Valley Forge. As a tactician he was nothing special, but as a charismatic leader he certainly was.
I’m dubious that Napoleon’s campaigns in the Middle East would have amounted to all that much for Napoleon or Britain. Locally it might have toppled the Ottoman government, but its hard to see how Nappy could have engineered that to benefit him that much. India I think was simply too far away to be threatened overland - the British might have actually done him a favor by crushing that pipedream ;). A march on India from Syria brings to mind Alexander the Great and not in a good way.
Minor, I think, other than locally.
This one I can go along with, as in an earlier post.
But “they” still won in the end. Of short-term importance only, other than as another example of the vulnerability of surface ships to air attack.
Midway was the turning point, but it was also a roll of the dice for Yamamoto, who I think had the right of it in his pessimism over Japan’s ability to win a long war. A major victory would have a terrific gut punch and delayed a U.S. recovery even further, but change the course of the war? I’m sceptical
The Suchow campaign was the death blow, but the KMT were already back on their heels. Pushing the PLA back would have meant a continuation of the war, but still on inferior footing.
A brilliant campaign, but not ultimately decisive due to the Chinese entrance shortly thereafter.
Too early to quantify, but given the aftermath I don’t think you can call it decisive.
The plague was coming anyway. Even if that interesting tactic led to its quicker spread ( arguments have been raised against it ), it would still have been there eventually. The Mongols certainly do get credit for a lot of spectacular victories though.
Interesting thought - he might have been able to bring an earlier ( much earlier ) close to the war. On the other hand maybe not and it likely wouldn’t have vastly changed the landscape by that point anyway. You’d still probably end with a fractured Germany, an empowered Sweden ( but still an inherently unstable empire due to lack of base resources ), an independent Hapsburg empire in the south, an eventually enfeebled Spain and an at least strengthened ( if perhaps not quite as dominant as it turned out ) France.
I really don’t think Henry VII was all that much more clever or competent than Richard III - Henry just happened to win by the skin of his teeth when Richard gambled wrong on the battlefield. Richard III was curious in that he was essentially the only English king whose power base was primarily in the north, something that probably contributed to the instability of his short reign. But long term I don’t know that this would have been a crippling deficit, especially if his last major rival were eliminated.
- Tamerlane