Just a quick addition: the managers earning these outsized fees are managers who have earned their investors huge amounts of money. They aren’t earning only 1.4% over mutual funds. You won’t hear about those managers. Mr. Paulson, who earned $3.7 billion, had a one year return of 590% and 353% in the two funds he manages. However, incentive fees are a “what have you done for me lately” type salary. If Mr. Paulson’s $28 billion dollar fund loses 50% next year (down to $14 billion) there will earn $0 incentive fee, plus he will not earn an incentive fee again until he doubles his $14 billion back up to $28 billion (known as the “high water mark”).
[It’s a little more complicated than this. For those interested:
Each individual investor will have a high water mark, not the total fund, so if Mr. Paulson loses 50% of his investors due to withdrawal (down to $7 billion), the high water mark would then be $14 billion. But say that Mr. Paulson looses half his fund from withdrawals (-$7 billion), but gets $3 billion in new investments - the investors who have stayed with Mr. Paulson have a high water mark where they will pay no incentive fees until they recoup the highest level of their investment, while the new guys have no established high water mark, and will be eligible to pay incentive fees right off the bat.
To address Martin Hyde: Smart pension plans use hedge funds as a point of diversification, just as they use real estate, international investments, bonds, etc. Actuarial tables base predictions on a constant growth rate; down years wreak havoc on meeting actuarial predicitions, much more than simply underperforming, and may force a company to increase pension funding (which they are loathe to do). Pension plans look for investment options that are uncorrelated to each other. If the pension plan does its job correctly, it will look for hedge funds are the least correlated to their other investments.