Tracking A Nuclear Explosion

[Dingbang]

@Duckster

I disagree. If someone detonates a rouge suitcase nuke in NYC it would be in Russia’s own self interest to help us find who did it. One, because they could lose Moscow with a similar suitcase nuke. Two, because the heightened tensions could go from cold to hot. Same with China and other “honest” nuke countries.

I don’t see what you’re disagreeing with. Everything you just said makes sense and doesn’t contradict what I said.

[Sailboat]

@The_Great_Cornholio

Since the advent of ICBMs, aircraft aren’t likely to be used in any “tradititional” attack, there’s no need. Alas, ICBMs are such a good delivery system, the chances of them being “tracked” are minimal too, things like “the 4 minute warning” are utter bollocks. If they launch, they’ll be here before anyone can really sit and go through the options available and respond.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

I get rather infuriated at this kind of thread because it generally consists of people throwing around ideas and strategies that they believe they understand, based upon some sort of vague cultural knowledge, but haven’t actually spent even the minimal amount of time to have a cursory understanding of the topic.

I’d guess that maybe The Great Cornholio is confused by the fact that ICBMs are extremely difficult to target with an interceptor, an issue that’s frustrated the cutting-edge of ABM defense technologies (aka “missile shields”). The technology to detect launches is fairly well developed; in fact, the issue is oversensitivity causing false warnings (Google the aforementioned Stanislav Petrov), not a complete inability to detect.

@The_Great_Cornholio

So, the crucial part of defence strategy is, as ever, good Intelligence. Secret Squirrel will have warned the powers-that-be of impending attack, so in the event of any mushroom cloud appearing over a city one day, it won’t be too much of a shock - unless the Russians just wake up one morning and decide to attack, without any preparation. Chances of them doing that without alerting any spies out there are about zero.

Okay, um, this is even more baffling. Historically, actual spies (HUMINT as the trade calls them) are not only substantially less useful than technically-derived intelligence…by substantially, I mean “very much less useful to not useful at all.” In his book Intelligence in War, historian John Keegan discusses this, one of the few historical cases of really significant human-provided intelligence was the Oslo Report (curiously, also on ballistic missiles, the first ones).

But reporting back to base in real time – without getting caught – is VERY difficult for spies. hence all the nonsense about “dead drops” and so on. It’s difficult to imagine any circumstance where an individual could phone in a launch report and beat the extensive, sensitive worldwide satellite and ground-based-radar early warning systems.

[Wizard_One]

One thing missed from the OP that relates somewhat with tracking, detection of imported nuclear devices or components.
There are a number of layers of detection devices to prevent such a device from being imported into the continental US in the first place, up to and including detectors at airports.
Something I’ve considered a bit funny, as that suitecase nuclear warhead, which DOES exist, the KGB actually HAD a model for nuclear sabotage use, is a LOT on the heavy side. We’re not talking about someone carrying such a device one handed. We’re talking about cradling the thing in both arms and staggering with it.
While the fissionable mass isn’t exceptionally heavy, the tampers, explosives and other various components add up to a fairly substantial weight.
AND a well known radiation signature.