# Transporters and the destruction of the self: What am I missing here? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [February 24, 2012, 11:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894 "2012-02-24T23:36:25Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 6
**Author:** ![gurujulp](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/ba9def/32.png) [@gurujulp](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/gurujulp)\ **Post date:** [February 28, 2012, 9:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/101 "2012-02-28T21:33:50Z")
> [@Scumpup](#): > > Okay, then let’s address the idea floated in this and similar threads that “they are both me.” If one of them is not killed, they both cannot have the same numerical identity. Therefore, there must be one that is the “real” me and one that is the copy, your inability as an observer to tell them apart notwithstanding. Sounds good to me. But I guess we aren’t arguing. ---
**Author:** ![Mangetout](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mangetout/32/19_2.png) [@Mangetout](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mangetout)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 12:07am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/102 "2012-02-29T00:07:14Z")
> [@Acsenray](#): > > We call it “unconsciousness” as a result of linguistic accident. But your brain remains constantly active while you sleep. There’s no point at which your point-of-view/perspective/consciousness is actually interrupted. I don’t believe it matters, because in the case of this hypothetical transporter machine, you would not experience any interruption either - at the moment, there is a chain of states that happens each caused by and dependent upon the states preceding it, and this all happens on (what we can more or less consider to be) a single apparatus. But if that sequence of states proceeds so far on one apparatus, then is instantaneously transferred to the second apparatus, in such a way that the chain and inheritance of states proceeds the same way, then there is no difference, from the point of view of the process. > [@](#): > > If you kill one of a pair of identical twins, does the murdered one live on? Not even relevant. > [@](#): > > Whether you can call into question continuity of first-person awareness through sleep is one thing. But it’s not even analogous to destroying that identity and creating an identical. Whatever we might not know about identity in a philosophical sense, we know that killing ends it. I’m not saying that killing something doesn’t end it. If you create a perfect copy of me on Mars, then feed the original to hyenas, that’s horrible for the original, and it’s death in a very real sense, but the copy experiences a forked continuity of being me, which is every bit as valid as the continuity of experience of being me, that I experience every morning on waking. > [@](#): > > Just the same as if you were fired and your boss hired a replacement, it would “function as” you. But it wouldn’t be you. Deliberate misreading of something I already clarified - to repeat; it would function as you in the way YOU function as you (and that’s _all_ of what you do) ---
**Author:** ![Trinopus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/2bfe46/32.png) [@Trinopus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Trinopus)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 12:12am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/103 "2012-02-29T00:12:20Z")
> [@Grumman](#): > > Your understanding of the test is wrong. The “good” result is a teleporter that does not create a new copy of your consciousness and destroy the old. A teleporter that is _incapable_ of creating a new copy of your consciousness, even when common sense would suggest it would, is thus the desired outcome. . . . For legal purposes, sure. For convenience, obviously. For scientific purposes? And for philosophical ones? Who’s to say? The duplication of a conscious entity would be an ethical problem of vast complexity, but, if it could be accomplished, it would compel us to revisit a great many of our conventional definitions. Einstein made us do the same thing. The Big Bang made us do it also. Scientific advances sometimes have that effect. Simply declaring “it can’t be done” isn’t a satisfying answer. It may end up being correct, but that needs to be demonstrated, not simply asserted. ---
**Author:** ![Trinopus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/2bfe46/32.png) [@Trinopus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Trinopus)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 12:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/104 "2012-02-29T00:15:36Z")
> [@Acsenray](#): > > Can you have a consciousness that can experience being in two different places at once? So long as two consciousnesses experience the world differently, they cannot be the same individual. . . . This is why the word “individual” would have to be redefined if a duplicating machine were invented. It’s a cop-out to say, “The word is defined to mean only one, unique individual.” Well, sure, that’s the way the word is defined, because we haven’t yet invented a duplicating machine. You’re engaging in circular reasoning. Sometimes, the dictionary has to be changed. ---
**Author:** ![Trinopus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/2bfe46/32.png) [@Trinopus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Trinopus)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 12:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/105 "2012-02-29T00:17:49Z")
> [@Scumpup](#): > > No. It is an indistinguishable copy of Bubbles. While it may offer the bereaved some comfort, the real Bubbles is still dead and got flushed down the toilet. The other real Bubbles is gone, The current real Bubbles is in the fish bowl. The word “real” is redefined in a world with duplicating machines. ---
**Author:** ![Trinopus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/2bfe46/32.png) [@Trinopus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Trinopus)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 12:19am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/106 "2012-02-29T00:19:38Z")
> [@Acsenray](#): > > We call it “unconsciousness” as a result of linguistic accident. But your brain remains constantly active while you sleep. There’s no point at which your point-of-view/perspective/consciousness is actually interrupted. . . . Your personal experience is vastly different from mine! In the deepest of sleep, I have absolutely no point of view, consciousness, perspective, or self-awareness. In the deepest sleep, I have no experience of my own existence. ---
**Author:** ![Trinopus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/2bfe46/32.png) [@Trinopus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Trinopus)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 12:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/107 "2012-02-29T00:21:16Z")
> [@Scumpup](#): > > How is possible, for even the briefest of instants, for them both to be me? That would mean that, for however a short interval, two would be numerically identical to one. . . . Yep. See the point? You can’t win this argument by appealing to dictionary definitions. ---
**Author:** ![Acsenray](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/acsenray/32/4519_2.png) [@Acsenray](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Acsenray)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 2:33am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/108 "2012-02-29T02:33:26Z")
I, for one, haven’t appealed to any dictionary definitions. ---
**Author:** ![Grumman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/43a26b/32.png) [@Grumman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Grumman)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 4:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/109 "2012-02-29T04:15:54Z")
> [@Trinopus](#): > > For legal purposes, sure. For convenience, obviously. > > For scientific purposes? And for philosophical ones? Who’s to say? The duplication of a conscious entity would be an ethical problem of vast complexity, but, if it could be accomplished, it would compel us to revisit a great many of our conventional definitions. > … > Simply declaring “it can’t be done” isn’t a satisfying answer. It may end up being correct, but that needs to be demonstrated, not simply asserted. I’m not declaring “it can’t be done”. I’m saying if it _can_ be done, it _shouldn’t_ be done, not without the informed consent of the person stepping onto the platform. If the teleporter duplicates the consciousness and destroys the original, and they do not understand that this _will_ kill them, they are not mentally fit to make the decision. ---
**Author:** ![Trinopus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/2bfe46/32.png) [@Trinopus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Trinopus)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 4:20am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/110 "2012-02-29T04:20:42Z")
> [@Acsenray](#): > > I, for one, haven’t appealed to any dictionary definitions. You said, “So long as two consciousnesses experience the world differently, they cannot be the same individual. . . .” That’s simply arguing from a definition. Why can’t they be the same individual? It’s been acknowledged that, over time, the two will diverge, on the basis of their different experiences. But at the moment of duplication, the two have the identical conscious experience, and are thus the “same.” Take an example from diverging experiences. Suppose, right now, you won the lottery. That would make a rather large change in your life and your experience. Now, suppose you didn’t win the lottery. Since the two experiences are different, does that mean that one of the two of you “isn’t real?” That winning the lottery “destroys the real you,” and “produces a duplicate for whom the money changes the point of view?” I’d simply say that both are “really you,” just involved in different, possibly life-altering experiences. ---
**Author:** ![Grumman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/43a26b/32.png) [@Grumman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Grumman)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 4:59am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/111 "2012-02-29T04:59:47Z")
> [@Trinopus](#): > > You said, “So long as two consciousnesses experience the world differently, they cannot be the same individual. . . .” That’s simply arguing from a definition. Why can’t they be the same individual? It doesn’t matter what you call it, the sentence you quoted is the important part. Everything else is meaningless - if it is _possible_ for you to be copied, and for your copy to live a long and fruitful life without your knowledge, then what you experience does not matter to him and what he experiences does not matter to you. His continued life does not mean you did not die on the teleporter platform. > [@](#): > > Take an example from diverging experiences. Suppose, right now, you won the lottery. That would make a rather large change in your life and your experience. > > Now, suppose you didn’t win the lottery. > > Since the two experiences are different, does that mean that one of the two of you “isn’t real?” That winning the lottery “destroys the real you,” and “produces a duplicate for whom the money changes the point of view?” > > I’d simply say that both are “really you,” just involved in different, possibly life-altering experiences. I’m just going to say this outright: this is an incredibly stupid argument. The “You-who-won-the-lottery” cannot experience what the “You-who-didn’t-win-the-lottery” is experiencing because the “You-who-didn’t-win-the-lottery” _does not exist and has never existed_. We’re talking about a relationship between two people who would actually exist, not this many-worlds garbage. ---
**Author:** ![Mangetout](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mangetout/32/19_2.png) [@Mangetout](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mangetout)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 8:24am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/112 "2012-02-29T08:24:53Z")
> [@Grumman](#): > > I’m just going to say this outright: this is an incredibly stupid argument. The “You-who-won-the-lottery” cannot experience what the “You-who-didn’t-win-the-lottery” is experiencing because the “You-who-didn’t-win-the-lottery” _does not exist and has never existed_. We’re talking about a relationship between two people who would actually exist, not this many-worlds garbage. I think **Tronopus** ’ point is that this hypothetical transporter/duplicator machine makes it possible for a single narrative to branch into two - forcing us to think about what we really are in a different way. However, I agree with what you said here: > [@](#): > > It doesn’t matter what you call it, the sentence you quoted is the important part. Everything else is meaningless - if it is _possible_ for you to be copied, and for your copy to live a long and fruitful life without your knowledge, then what you experience does not matter to him and what he experiences does not matter to you. His continued life does not mean you did not die on the teleporter platform. I may have appeared to be arguing that once we make the copy, it doesn’t matter what we do to the original (I may even have accidentally stated that). I’m going to reconsider and redefine my position… If we acquired the technology to perfectly duplicate a human, then we would create a branch in the life story of the subject - leading up to the moment of pressing the button, there is one person. After pressing the button, there are two people - each of them having equally valid claim upon being the real owner of the Story So Far - because all that remains of yesterday is memories, etc - and we’re saying that can be perfectly duplicated. I’m saying there is no meaningful distinction between a ‘real’ memory and a perfect copy of a ‘real’ memory. Neither is any kind of tangible thing like a dollar bill or an oil painting that can exist in ‘real’ and ‘identical, but not real’ versions. They’re not the same person as each other. If we kill one of them, we’re murdering a person, whose life consists of the life before and since the duplicator event, in an equally valid sense for either of them, in any way that really matters - and since in general, nobody wants to be murdered, this represents a horror and tragedy for either one. ---
**Author:** ![Scumpup](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ce73a5/32.png) [@Scumpup](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Scumpup)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 2:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/113 "2012-02-29T14:03:35Z")
> [@Trinopus](#): > > Yep. See the point? You can’t win this argument by appealing to dictionary definitions. This is a matter of basic logic, not a dictionary definition. ---
**Author:** ![eburacum45](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/eburacum45/32/8690_2.png) [@eburacum45](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/eburacum45)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 8:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/114 "2012-02-29T20:48:20Z")
The ‘many worlds garbage’ is only garbage because of the no-cloning theorem; if it were possible to create exact copies of quantum states, then you could have your exact duplicates. After all, in the double slit experiment a single particle spits into two then interferes with itself. In a quantum world we have to accept that things can sometimes be in two places at the same time. ---
**Author:** ![Acsenray](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/acsenray/32/4519_2.png) [@Acsenray](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Acsenray)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 8:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/115 "2012-02-29T20:51:33Z")
But unless it is one consciousness perceiving the experiences of both places simultaneously, they aren’t the same individual. ---
**Author:** ![eburacum45](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/eburacum45/32/8690_2.png) [@eburacum45](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/eburacum45)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 9:23pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/116 "2012-02-29T21:23:48Z")
> [@Acsenray](#): > > But unless it is one consciousness perceiving the experiences of both places simultaneously, they aren’t the same individual. We shouldn’t get too hung up on whether they are the same individual or not, since they would have been divided; they could with justification be called a ‘dividual’, which is a perfectly cromulent word… > **[Definition of DIVIDUAL](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dividual)** > > separate, distinct; divisible, divided; divided among or shared by a number… See the full definition …the important thing is if they both have _continuity of experience_, and I think it should be possible to devise a thought experiment where both dividuals experience the same measure of continuity of consciousness. ---
**Author:** ![Acid\_Lamp](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/d6d6ee/32.png) [@Acid\_Lamp](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Acid_Lamp)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 9:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/117 "2012-02-29T21:25:43Z")
> [@Acsenray](#): > > But unless it is one consciousness perceiving the experiences of both places simultaneously, they aren’t the same individual. That just brings us back to silly word games. The problem is that we don’t have a word for this particular scenario. It doesn’t matter though, because I rather specifically stated that duplication is not a possible outcome. Clones are just a distraction from the real issue. While we’ve been using them to talk around concepts that are difficult to understand, we’ve digressed to the point of absurdity. Using this device would be no different in perception than walking through a doorway at your home. The only difference is that in this case the door deconstructs you and reconstructs you somewhere else. The process is not able to be observed by the participant, and the process must destroy the user to be achieved. The “scan” or “record” is in the deconstruction. ---
**Author:** ![Frylock](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/ce7236/32.png) [@Frylock](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Frylock)\ **Post date:** [February 29, 2012, 9:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/118 "2012-02-29T21:36:24Z")
> [@Grumman](#): > > I’m just going to say this outright: this is an incredibly stupid argument. The “You-who-won-the-lottery” cannot experience what the “You-who-didn’t-win-the-lottery” is experiencing because the “You-who-didn’t-win-the-lottery” _does not exist and has never existed_. We’re talking about a relationship between two people who would actually exist, not this many-worlds garbage. I began this post intending to defend **Trinopus** ’s argument, but I am presently thinking it may fail. Not exactly for the reason you give, but for a related reason–I think the argument falls into modal confusion. I think the argument confuses the following two claims: A. No individual can have two different streams of experience at the same time. and B. There are no two different streams of experience (indexed to the same time) each of which an individual could have had. Trinopus’s argument shows that B is false–but he takes this to mean that A is false. That inference doesn’t work! B might be false while A remains true. I’ve used the argument myself before, so I need to do some rethinking… ---
**Author:** ![Grumman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/43a26b/32.png) [@Grumman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Grumman)\ **Post date:** [March 1, 2012, 12:22am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/119 "2012-03-01T00:22:31Z")
> [@eburacum45](#): > > The ‘many worlds garbage’ is only garbage because of the no-cloning theorem; if it were possible to create exact copies of quantum states, then you could have your exact duplicates. No, the “many worlds garbage” is garbage because _Trinopus_ was talking about what-might-have-been as if it was a living, breathing person. > [@Acid\_Lamp](#): > > That just brings us back to silly word games. The problem is that we don’t have a word for this particular scenario. It doesn’t matter though, because I rather specifically stated that duplication is not a possible outcome. Clones are just a distraction from the real issue. Copies are not a distraction, and that’s not a silly word game - they’re the whole problem. A Star Trek style teleporter does not move you, it creates a copy of you and kills you. > [@](#): > > Using this device would be no different in perception than walking through a doorway at your home. But the two parts are perceived by two different people! _You_ walk into the doorway and you are torn apart at the atomic level. You die. _Your copy_ turns around, looks at the doorway and thinks “Huh, that wasn’t so hard.” Your copies continued existence doesn’t change the fact that you died, with everything that entails. ---
**Author:** ![Trinopus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/2bfe46/32.png) [@Trinopus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Trinopus)\ **Post date:** [March 1, 2012, 1:57am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894/120 "2012-03-01T01:57:21Z")
> [@Grumman](#): > > It doesn’t matter what you call it, the sentence you quoted is the important part. Everything else is meaningless - if it is _possible_ for you to be copied, and for your copy to live a long and fruitful life without your knowledge, then what you experience does not matter to him and what he experiences does not matter to you. His continued life does not mean you did not die on the teleporter platform. Assertion noted. Do you have anything to back it up? > [@](#): > > I’m just going to say this outright: this is an incredibly stupid argument. Your discourtesy does your argument no credit. > [@](#): > > The “You-who-won-the-lottery” cannot experience what the “You-who-didn’t-win-the-lottery” is experiencing because the “You-who-didn’t-win-the-lottery” _does not exist and has never existed_. We’re talking about a relationship between two people who would actually exist, not this many-worlds garbage. Why not? Why is it “garbage?” By what logic do you reject the analogy? You aren’t debating; you’re just waving your arms around and saying, “Nope.” Well… Nope why? In fact, after thinking about this last night, I decided that winning the lottery would, in practice, “destroy” my and produce a very different “me” that would go forward in a totally different way than the original “myself” would have. The same is true if, say, my home town were hit by a large earthquake. It would change my point of view, my consciousness, my life. All of my plans would be changed. Many of my ethical values would be challenged. It would be a “life altering” experience, vastly more profound than simply using a Star Trek Transporter to go and visit Paris for an afternoon. Call it garbage, and you aren’t debating, you’re just being rude. Call it wrong…and say why. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894.md?page=5) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/transporters-and-the-destruction-of-the-self-what-am-i-missing-here/613894.md?page=7)