Well, I think that whatever consciousness is, it must be robust enough to make allowances for random changes caused by entropy. Just because we are warm objects the molecules in our bodies are moving about at random over time, becoming displaced and destroying stored information; if the second-to-second randomisation that occurs in our bodies under normal circumstances is comparable to the randomisation that occurs during a teleport jump, then consciousness (as a pattern) can survive it.
Two schools of thought can perhaps be discerned here;
1/ the Continuous Identity theory, which supposes that consciousness is a continuous process, and must continue to exist in a particular physical body an cannot be copied or transferred. One thought experiment that seems to argue against the continuity theory is Mangetout’s stasis box experiment; but since stasis boxes don’t exist, it doesn’t really prove very much.
2/ the Pattern Identity theory, which says that consciousness is a pattern of memories and programs inside the body, mostly but not all in the CNS, and like any other collection of programs and memories it could in theory be copied exactly. If you have a perfectly working teleporter the pattern can be transferred perfectly (or within an acceptable margin of error-see above) to another location, and it will have the same identity as before. If the teleport goes wonky and produces copies, both inherit the same identity, but as dididuals they instantly start to diverge from each other.
But since we don’t have a teleport machine we can’t prove this one way or the other, and I suspect that even if we did the whole issue would still be unresolved.
One atom? You’d never be able to tell the difference. In the last microsecond, some number of Carbon 14 atoms have decayed, and you were never aware of it. You’ve got to set the bar a bit higher than just one atom.
The trouble is, I’m in the “it’s still really you” camp, so, alas, my opinion only serves my opinion, if you see what I mean…
I’d say that so very many atoms would have to be awry as to make the copy clearly flawed. To the point where the poor duplicate suffers from mental degradation. He can’t answer questions accurately, etc.
But at that point, it seems that the premise of the thought-experiment is changed: such a crude, inaccurate transporter is clearly not ready for human use. We might send inanimate objects through it, in emergency situations, but never people.
My own personal philosophic opinion is that massive degradation would occur before meaningful loss of “self” would occur – because this is what happens in real life. If a nice elderly gentleman has a massive cerebral stroke, and loses a significant portion of his mental faculties, we still hold him to be “the same person” he was before the stroke.
So, if the Transporter is stipulated to be “as good as it is on Star Trek” – Captain Kirk comes out of it so close to unchanged that no physical test exists that can discern whether he is pre- or post-Transport – then how can he be said to be “someone else” than the person he feels himself to be?
FWIW, I had a nice discussion group going on this topic at a small local sf convention, and opinions were split right down the middle! This is one of those puzzles that people form opinions on, and where rational debate seems to make almost no headway at all in changing those opinions.
i think all these discussions on the fidelity of the copy is moot. it seems to me if you’re on the camp willing to use a transporter, the requirement would not be to make the perfect copy, but to make one that you can convince the users (both the doomed original and duplicate) that it is still them.
thus you can advertise on the machine being able to make perfect copies, if you feel that is what your targeted demographic would require to use your product. perhaps after the inevitable widespread acceptance you can start promoting the future generation of transporters in baby steps to maximise profits. let’s start with cosmetics. step through in the morning straight out of bed naked and disheveled and step out ready for work. clothes, makeup, and even your hair will be as you have chosen it to be.
next, Medical Transporters. everytime you step through, it will screen you for any malaise and fix you up instantly. regular use would also mean you’ll only age as much as you’re willing to. if you sign up for our Ridiculously Expensive package, we’ll even store your latest step-through in our files and you’ll be immortal.
once your customers are weened out of the need to make perfect copies, you can start selling upgrades. come out the other side faster, stronger and better than before!
???
eventually you’ll get to the Halloween Transporters. tired of your old body? design a brand new you! be anyone. be anything. you can even choose to step out the other side as energy with no corporeal form. after all, if you believe in souls or life after death, you should have no trouble accepting the fact that that ghostly form stepping out from the other side is you.
did you say no? that that ghost is not you? here, take a look at this picture. that stranger is you - before you ever stepped into a transporter.
shijinn: Nifty set of extrapolations! I would happily use a medical transporter: it’d be wonderful if I could be moved across the room…but all the little viruses in my throat and lungs and sinuses were left behind! Since I am not under any apprehension that they are really me, I’ll shed them without a qualm!
The Halloween transporter is a bit more scary, but, after it has been in common use for a while, I might manage to work up my courage to use it.
To make the philosophical conundrums even more quirky: what if these super-advanced systems can analyze your DNA, and use this as a blue-print to re-build a missing arm or leg? (Or, it might simply duplicate your left arm, reverse it, and graft that to replace one that is missing… But, no, I want the ultimate advance in technology!) This invites Plato’s (?) question of what a person is: how much can you take away – arms, legs, etc. – and still have “the same person” remaining? In this case, how much can you replace and still be “the same person.”
Why bother doing that, when you can just move the viruses across the room without you? You don’t even need to bother putting them back together again - far better to leave the infectious diseases as a smear of carbon, oxygen and other elements than as something capable of replicating.
This is precisely the point to consider. And, you need to flip the problem around to see it clearly.
The obvious question is, “do ‘you’ have a future in in your transported self?” The more significant question is, “do ‘you’ have a future in your non-transported self?”
If the answer to both of those questions is the same, then you incur no additional liability using a transporter; if the answers are different, you’d better think twice.
Remember what we’re talking about here is not whether the duplicate has the same memories as me, or looks like me or whatever, but whether he is me.
Earlier you (rightly) dismissed the idea of me dying and waking up in some arbitrary person’s body e.g. Barack Obama’s.
But now you’re saying it’s possible for the copy to differ to me and yet still be me. How is that possible? What associates me to the copy?
And since my consciousness is either continuing or not, the implication is that at some point of difference between me and the copy I suddenly go from living on in the copy to simply dying. This seems absurd to me.
Well, frankly, IMO, when it comes to consciousness a lot of people at first don’t “get it” because they are unaccustomed to thinking about subjective phenomena.
For example, if you were to ask a group of people with very little philosophy background whether colour is “out there” in the world or just within the mind (not different frequencies of EM radiation – the actual visual appearance of redness, blueness etc), many would assert that colours are out there. Not only that, they will often think the answer is obvious and fail to appreciate how anyone could even have any other opinion.
I think this hypothetical is similar. I think some people are looking at this in a purely third-person way and not appreciating why that is inadequate here.
This is the crux of the whole debate - what do we mean by ‘is me’? Is there anything special about being me that is present in the current version of me, but would not be present in a perfect copy of me?
You’re different to you. Your physical makeup is in a constant state of change - in composition, configuration, etc. Clearly there isn’t only one configuration of matter that can ever be you, because you’re not currently configured the same as you were yesterday.
Well quite, but one significant difference here is how the consciousnesses are causally linked.
Old_me became New_me because of events which happened to Old_me.
But if a teleporter makes a consciousness that differs from Old_me, the differences between Old_me and Teleporter_man are “invented” – they are not a result of events happening to Old_me.
Disagree. The teleportation is an event that happened to “old” you. You at the destination will have memory of being teleported, so the events maintain their links. The fact that the physical matter comprising you is different is immaterial to this facet of the debate. You’ll have to establish first that the “Interruption” in consciousness is more severe than that of a person under deep anesthesia, one who has been knocked out, or one that has been revived after clinical death. AFAIK those are our only decent analogues to the process. Our teleport traveler hasn’t lost any measurable time, yet all of the other people who underwent the other process mentioned have.
Exactly the point a ‘pattern identity’ adherent would make. Since the teleported person has the same subjective impression about her own consciousness as a non-teleported person (apart from the discontinuity of the jump itself), the transfer of consciousness has been achieved as far as they are concerned. The same applies to a duplicated person. Assuming consciousness is a subjective phenomenon seems to favour the pattern identity theory rather than the continuity-identity theory.
It seems quite possible that no real difference exists between these two positions. Adherents to Continuity Identity theory might still make full use of teleportation and copying technology, believing that they were creating new, unique individuals rather than creating dividuals who inherit their consciousness.
Even if the original dies during the uploading process, the use of copied data ensures that the universe gains new versions of the original, ones which can themselves be copied. I can imagine that some, or many, Continuity Identity theory adherents would copy themselves anyway.
It hasn’t been conclusively proven, at least to my satisfaction, that the physical matter involved is immaterial. All that we have on that account is the stipulation that *some *matter is constantly being exchanged over time. Consciousness is, it seems to me, a process rather than an event. Is there some reason I should not hypothesize that the consciousness process is linked to matter that is, itself, undergoing a process? IOW, two processes are linked to produce an ongoing process that I perceive as “me.”
Understood, however, if all of the physical properties of the system being copied are copied faithfully, then all that’s really happening is the novel situation where one cause can propagate to multiple sets of effects.
Old_me is gone - vanished into history and memory - in either case.
Let’s say someone slaps me, and I have a red, sore area on my face. An event has happened to the entity Mijin to change him from having a face that wasn’t sore to a face that is.
Now contrast that with (unslapped) Mijin being teleported, and the teleporter creating a Mijin identical except for having a sore face. There’s a reason why the teleporter did that, sure.
But there was no event which happened to an unslapped Mijin to make that transition: the old Mijin has not been slapped and the new Mijin has just been created.
What it all boils down to, I think, is these two question:
Is there anything about me as I exist now that is not a function of my physical body?
Is there anything about the processes that sum up to sustaining ‘me’ that does not flow as a natural cause/effect relationship from the previous states of the system?
Granted, I think it can be argued that we don’t know for sure (and perhaps will not ever know) - but if we believe ourselves to be wholly material beings, then I don’t see where we would find the option to deny that an identical material being would be ‘me’ in any valid sense that I am me.
Why would it matter? That slap doesn’t exist as an event any more - you can’t travel back to it - all that exists is the effect - the state of having been slapped, comprising solely of memories and a collection of physical symptoms.
Consciousness by definition is a subjective phenomenon, but most philosophers do not believe that this in itself proves one particular identity theory (otherwise the other theories would not have supporters).
My original point was that if the teleporter makes imperfect copies, the question of whether the copies are “you”, and where we draw the line, is difficult to answer for proponents of the view that consciousness can be transferred.
The defence was floated that we are continuously changing anyway, so in the sense we are “imperfectly copied” from moment to moment. I was explaining why this isn’t the same thing and hence why this defence doesn’t work.