Getting rid of the “security theater”, as you call it, seems like a reasonable alternative to me. That along with more secure cockpits, as you’ve also indicated, would go a long way in avoiding the opportunity of the following:
I believe we need to start with whatever government agencies and policy makers that insist that the current system is working and making us safer.
Getting back to my OP question -
So these random pat downs are just that… random; prompted mostly by unreliable scanner images?
The problem is that “whatever government agencies and policy makers that insist that the current system is working and making us safer,” is usually whatever suits their personal and financial interests rather than that of the taxpayers funding it. I’m sure TSA insists that all of their scanners and crackerjack legions of blue-shirted security guards have made great strides in protecting us from the barbarian hordes at the gates despite any supporting evidence and independent critical review to the contrary.
Stranger
It’s a combination of false positives and (I suspect) intentional markers by the scanners to keep TSA inspectors on their toes. To a certain extent, this is smart; it prevents the inspectors from getting too lazy by tasking them at a relatively constant rate, but it does little to actually address the root deficiencies in the process of looking for terrorists rather than purported devices they might use, and meanwhile sidetracks the effective measures that might actually be taken to enhance public safety. Like most gun control measures, it focuses on superficial but easily presented “successes” and pageantry over effective methods to reduce true hazards.
Stranger
Last fall I was targeted. It was an overwhelming busy time at TSA security. I did not absolutely remove everything from my pockets. I got dinged for forgetting to remove my wallet. The TSA person had to make a point and get in my face and yell at me. So I got re-scanned without the wallet and came up clean. As for my wallet, they never sent it through the X-ray machine. Yet, she made no mention of my Secure-ID (HSPD 12 PIV) around my neck; the same type every TSA person was also wearing.
But it still wasn’t good enough for Old Yeller. She ordered a manual scan of me by a subordinate. He grabbed the trays containing backpack carry-on, shoes, etc., and directed me to a wanding station. He wanded me, looked at my Secure-ID around me neck and said I was done. No hand check of my carryon, my shoes, etc. Nada.
I figured the senior TSA agent was on a power trip and had to make a point. Reasonableness set in away from her when the other TSA agents realized I was also a fed and I probably hold a higher clearance than they did.
If you don’t want to take over the plane for reasons of hijacking for profit or using the plane as a weapon, why do it in an airport at all? There are lots of places where masses of people assemble – sporting events, concerts, political events, the list is nearly endless. It seems that the fact that airports have a lot of security isn’t because airports are an attractive target, it’s because airports are the link between the world at large and the interiors of passenger jets.
Mall cops get two weeks of training, are required to remember nearly 200 pages of procedures, and are tested yearly to make sure they’ve maintained their skills? Did not know that.
I hardly ever travel, so I left metal items, keys coins and such, in my carryon last flight by mistake. The TSA guy reprimanded me then patted down my posterior before sending me on my way.
Wait, why was it a problem that you left keys and coins in your carryon luggage? That’s what you’re supposed to do.
Ooh, 80 whole hours of training in order to root through luggage, perform close body and partial undress searches, detain travellers indefinitely, and search for explosive, incindiary, and projectile devices. By comparison, the California Peace Officer Standards of Training (POST) requires a minimum of 664 hours of training in 42 different areas of law enforcement operations and regulations, and most departments exceed this by 200 or more hours of behaviorial assessment, conflict management, and safety/first responder training, and then a year or more of supervised in-field training under a senior officer. So let’s drop the pretense that TSA ‘agents’ are professional law enforcement or security agents, or indeed anything more than rent-a-cops in blue shirts that just happen to get a government paycheck.
Stranger
It takes that much training to achieve a 95% failure rate? :rolleyes:
Skills? What skills?
Ass grabbing:
Actually, I left them in my pockets instead of the carryon before going through the scanner, so I lit up like a christmas tree.
One time they confiscated a gag “hypodermic syringe” pen…then let me through when I showed them my I.D. and My Beloved’s ticket(accidentally).
For starters, there’s:
Knowing when a patdown is necessary and knowing how to do it correctly.
Knowing how to correctly test a bag for explosives residue.
Knowing how to properly search medical equipment, including wheelchairs.
Knowing how to read a x-ray image of badly packed luggage and spot dangerous items. And that’s not just guns.
See post #31.
Never said they remember it all. Just fighting ignorance by pointing out that being a good screener is a hard job requiring extensive training and isn’t just Paul Bart in a different colored shirt.
Hey, those Segways don’t just balance themselves…
Oh…
Any fool can do a bad job…and as far as your “Paul Blart” dig is concerned, if any security company had half the failure rate of the TSA they wouldn’t be in business for very long.
