Uhm... Hey, guys? I think I figured it out.

Well, then we interpret Muad’Dib’s OP differently. I read it as him having had an epiphany over “finding the right answer” (that answer being, in his words, “cultivating the mind”). I am suggesting that these exhilarating “finding the right answer” feelings are demonstrably neurologically similar to other significance-judgement outputs which evolution has endowed us with, and so subjecting oneself to a wider range of possible “answers” (ie. reading lots of books, or however one might go about “cultivating”) would very likely elicit more mini-epiphanies of this kind, perhaps even in an experimentally accessible manner. You say I’m not addressing what you’re defining as “meaningful” (ie. live-your-life-by meaningful). I still think I am, actually, but your disagreeing output is noted.

If you did improve your expertise, you might become less convinced that eg. justice is so categorically un-empirical: like I say, the Cheater Detection Module hypothesis has neurologically and psychologically testable consequences which we can indeed tackle experimentally. Of course science can’t answer every question, but note that many questions are nonsensical category errors - a grounding in cognitive science could, at least, show questions you currently think are valid to be similar.

And now you are talking about eliminativism, not just materialism/physicalism or reductionism. While I’m sympathetic to its general aims and direction, I don’t think it’s helpful to say there’s no such thing as what it seems like I’ve got (ie. a “mind”, whatever it is). It’s really just a semantic preference IMO, but yet again, this is a different issue entirely.

Well, the OP is undoubtedly about both, right? You seem to have explained why he felt exhilarated for having discovered an answer. Cool, interesting even. But you haven’t yet shown how it relates to finding “The Meaning of Life”–which is the phrase the OP uses.

Why the hubris?

Anyway, surely your gigantic brain can see that a desire for justice and justice are not the same thing–that justice goes beyond game theory and primal desires. And yes, some historical philosophical questions are category errors. Are you in the camp that thinks ethics is such a category error?

You agree, I assume, that if “what is the meaning of life” is not an empirical question, then cognitive science cannot answer it. So your position must be that it is an empirical question. Can you not see how this is a radical postion, not one to be presented with the self-righteousness of a father answering a child?

No, it’s not a different issue. It’s me trying to narrow down where you stand without resorting to philosophical jargon.

If I’ve shown how strong feelings of significance arise (ie. how the answer “cultivation of mind”, or whatever, is meaningful to Muad’Dib compared to other answers which might push my cognitive buttons), such that there are consequences which change his future behaviour or significance-judgements of other sensory inputs or ideas, then it’s difficult to see much of a distinction, bearing in mind the No True Scotsman fallacy. Perhaps a different, synonymous phrase to “Meaning of Life” might be useful in pointing out what you think I’m not addressing, since I can’t for the life of me see how the mechanism of finding things meaningful isn’t even relevant. Any suggestions?

Why the obtusity?

Only in the same way that weather and water, or life and proteins, or computer hardware and software are not identical. One can still propose that the abstract generalisation “weather” emerges from water, that life is ultimately proteins, that some computer application is explained by many individual switches. The consequences can then be tested and parts of the proposal falsified or verified. Examining the generalised abstract “justice” in terms of the computational modules embodied in the cranial offal of each individual homo sapiens is no less hubristic.

Hmm, elements of it, yes (especially asking “What is justice?” and expecting an answer at the level of nerve cells: that would be lie asking “What is a computer virus?” and expecting an answer at the level of RAM flops.) But it is still a phenomenon to be explained, so not a category error in toto. In any case, you introduced the “justice” bifurcation when I was talking about meaning, so I don’t quite understand the numerous “Surely you’re not saying … ?!” charges I’m receiving throughout this thread.

I think it’s a very poorly constructed question (at least verging on category error) about things which can be examined empirically. So no, it’s not quite an empirical question per se. But cognitive science can IMO answer the eminently empirical questions “What is the nature of meaning and significance?” and “Do those same explanations still apply to ideas we find so ‘meaningful’ that we ‘live our life’ according to them?”.

Throughout the thread you have been running round the radical edges of the field constructing scarecrows to fight, with me continually calling “Hey Richard, actually, I’m over here! Near the centre! Pretty reasonable and non-radical! Perhaps not so far from you, even!”. I apologise if I’ve made you feel immature or uninformed.

I am honestly trying to answer your questions according to the words you actually use:[ul][li]You charged me with being fully satisfied with materialist explanations. So I told you I’m not.[/li][li]You said materialism is a scientific/philosophical minority position. So I told you it isn’t.[/li][li]You asked if the position that the mind can be reduced to neurons was a minority one. So I told you I’m not a reductionist.[/li][*]You asked if I’m taking the position that there is no such thing as the mind. So I told you I’m not strictly an eliminativist, either.[/ul] Continue to try to paint me as some kind of aberrant crackpot if you wish, but all this straw is rather a fire hazard.

Let me try to be clearer for you. You have a definition of meaningful, something like, “that which causes a sensation of significance.” Other people have a definition of meaningful, something like, “that which is a worthy pursuit in this life–the reason we are here.” I agree that the question “What is the meaning of life,” is not a very rigorously constructed question, but we’re talking about everyday language here. I’m pretty sure you agree with me up to this point.

Now, some things will fit into both definitions, some will only fit into the first. I gave the example of penis size as something that might fit into the first definition, but not the latter. I’m sure we could together come up with a quite a few other things that humans deem significant, but which we can be pretty confident are not meaningful in the way Muad’Dib intends. Your reference to the Scotsman above, makes me think you might not be with me here. Are you saying that anything which we find significant and act on in our life fits the second definition of meaningful?

If you do agree with the above, that means that when the brain makes us feel like something is significant, it may or may not be because that thing is actually meaningful (again, in the **Muad’Dib **sense). Therefore it is mostly irrelevant to the question of “what is a worthy pursuit in this life.”
As for the rest, absent any intellectual charity from you, I think it’s not worth continuing on the sub-topics. When I ask, “what is justice,” I am obviously not asking for an answer at the level of nerve cells. I don’t think we can properly communicate, much less reason with each other, if you cannot entertain what I’m saying outside of the assumptions implicit in your worldview.

Hold on - those two are very different things, if I may say. Let’s keep to the former “worthy pursuit”. The reason we are here is clearly the purview of science, from cosmology through molecular biology to evolution (and let’s ignore for now those who dispute those scientific explanations for our existence)

Yes. I’m suggesting that the “pursuit you find worthy” is that which yields most significance-outputs in your amygdala. And those “pursuits” aren’t the same for everyone, just as we’re not all the same height.

And that’s where I see an NTS fallacy, ie. there’s “neurologically” meaningful and then there’s actually meaningful. I suggest that they’re both, ultimately, neurological by nature. I suspect that your position is that the Muad’Dib type is a rather ‘higher-level’ meaningfulness, which is why I suggested how abstract calculations could elicit meaningfulness just as immediate threats and family members do.

Which is why I directed you towards Cosmides & Tooby’s CDM hypothesis, in case you were interested, only to be accused of hubris. Heck, this whole thread has been me defending my philosophy from your snipes with not a word in attack of yours since I don’t even know what yours is. Am I really the one being uncharitable here?

I entertain the possibility of any old nonsense. If you make assumptions I disagree with, I’ll tell you so and leave it at that. I will always try to be as honest and direct as possible. I really don’t see what more anyone can ask for.

Suppose someone had opened this forum and posted the following post:

Hooray! I’ve discovered it: The MEANING OF LIFE. After much soul-searching, I’ve realized that the meaning of life is to pursue the purity of the white race. Whenever I think of white purity, my mind swells with the significance of it. I am going to devote myself to ethnic cleansing.

Your reply, from a philosophical standpoint, would be that yes, they have indeed discovered the meaning of life—one of many.

My position is that some things are “truly meaningful” and some just “neurologically meaningful.” If you reject this position, you reject the idea that someone can be wrong about what is meaningful in life.

I still suspect that this whole row is over the word “meaning.” As used by the OP, and as used in the common expression “the meaning of life,” it has more conditions than just that it cause a certain feeling in humans.

I accused you of hubris because of your self-righteous tone, not because you linked to an interesting article.

I’m not asking for more than that.

Yes: it pushes their cognitive buttons, but not mine, so I’d merely remark that I felt sorry for them that they get their neurological kicks from such silliness and leave it at that. (An attitude I have towards all kinds of significance-causers in other people, may I add.)

OK, I’ll leave it there then - I’ve already said that I think this is a No True Scotsman fallacy based on a dualism which most authorities consider ludicrous. Of course, I’ll leave you the last word on the matter.

Just as I reject the idea that someone can be wrong about what food tastes nice to them, or what painting looks nice to them, or which music sounds nice to them. If significance is an output, then one’s outputs can’t not be one’s outputs. If our outputs differ, all we can do is say so.

Which ones, and why can’t they be based on those same feelings applied to the abstract calculations (“thinking”) of the prefrontal cortex?

Then I apologise for my tone, unreservedly. But I do sincerely recommend having a go at some introductory cognitive science and philosophy of mind some time: Ramachandran is an absolute must, then maybe Pinker, Dennett, Fodor or whoever. It’s a shame that the idea that the mind is just utterly mysterious and impervious to scientific explanation, even in principle, is so widespread. I imagine it’s a little like reading On the Origin of Species in the late 1800’s, when most people who hadn’t read it were default vitalists at heart.

I’m not sure how it fits NTS, since I apply a meaningful distinction (no pun intended) between the two.

I suppose you must take this position if you don’t think there is the distinction I mention above.

I agree that the significance output no doubt differs from person to person, but I don’t yet see why I am obliged to believe that everyone’s significance output is equally correct in identifying that which is “truly meaninful.”

I appreciate the suggestion. I might equally suggest that you read more Kripke, but I suspect you already have–you just disagree. FWIW, I don’t believe the mind is impervious to scientific explanation. I do believe that questions about what is right and good, and the question of what one ought to do with his/her life, are not category errors. That is all.