RTF: sorry, not going to take the bait. But I will happily educate you on how adjectives in the English language work.
As a quick hint ponder why “suicidal” doesn’t mean “already committed suicide” and “homicidal” doesn’t have to mean “already committed homicide”. Based on that pattern, try to recognize whether or not “genocidal” can be used to describe a group committed to genocide but which hasn’t achieved their goal.
If you’re still confused, ponder whether or not the phrase “genocidal ambitions” has semantic value and is grammatically correct.
If you manage to understand that, try to understand why having a desire to exterminate an ethnic group might be described as “genocidal”, if, for instance, the Final Solution was a genocidal plan even before it was put into effect, or if it was non-genocidal at that point.
Or talk about pie.
Same difference.
Whether, when you come back, you bring pie or not? I’m still done feeding your attempts to hijack this debate with your typical debating tactics. Hope your war against Eurasia goes well.
Adios.
Anyways…
DSeid:
There are, of course, obvious political dimensions to the ceasefire itself. To some, the situation will itself be seen as an indication of weakness. Of course, that’s a neat double bind whereby if the IDF continued the campaign they were inhuman monsters, and if they withdrew they were cowards and beaten. Narratives of that sort, of course, will be common amongst certain fellow travelers. How effective Hamas’ media network will be, of course, is another matter. We can assume, as well that as long as Israel doesn’t use pixy dust bombs and ninjas, there will always be some who demonize its self defense and/or who claim that as long as Hamas uses human shields Israel cannot retaliate and/or who claim that rockets falling on civilian neighborhoods does not rise to the level of something that should be dealt with by war if there aren’t pixy dust bombs available. I think we can safely assume that the usual suspects will be a fairly consistent variable, and their actual impact, as always,
will be fairly minimal.
We might expect some more calls for academic boycotts or divestment or what have you, but with the importance of Israel’s tech sector to the global economy, I don’t think we’ll see anything come out of those types of tactics.
That Fatah seems to have warmed considerably to Israel due to this offensive might actually mean that not only does Hamas no longer control the narrative, but Hamas’ citizens in Gaza will be able to see the potential fruits of compromise and negotiation played out in the West Bank. Time will tell, but the situation certainly is ripe. The brutality of Hamas’ takeover of Gaza seems to have left a lot of Fatah with some serious grudges… and we’ve all seen how grudges play out in that part of the world. If anything, theh main challenge in the future will be figuring out how to mate a sovereign West Bank with the theocratic thugocracy in Gaza. The next time we see an invasion like this, it may very involve Fatah, although obviously there are ideological as well as practical concerns for how such conflict would actually play out.
Meanwhile, the truce itself seems to be holding, sorta, for now at least. I’d wager that if it holds long enough for the IDF to redeploy its forces, it’ll take something fairly major to get them to roll back in with any significant force. I really would be surprised if any future skirmishing isn’t carried out with drones. For now, Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel said that the operation hadn’t ended but that “It has just transitioned to a new phase, to hold fire. To give a chance to a cease-fire to take over and end this operation.”
Once the momentum has gone down, it seems unlikely that it would start back up without something major. Interestingly enough, the war against Hamas had (IIRC) something like a 90% approval rating with many Israelis strongly supporting it. This is in stark contrast to the war against Hezbollah which had markedly diminished levels of support. If nothing else, this indicates that there is definitely the political will to deal with Hamas, and Israeli politicians are unlikely to forget that fact.
It’s also worth noting that even the UN seems to be moderating its stance a bit, as a more vitriolic resolution was actually recently rejected in favor of a more moderate one. It’s probably a bit too soon to expect true change on the part of many UN agencies and member states, but this is at least an interesting first step. The UN might (might) even be willing to take real notice of Hamas’ actions if Hamas starts launching barrages again.
Further, regional tensions will play out interestingly over the next few months. Egypt, which controls its own border with Gaza and maintains its own blockade, has been talking about “opening its borders and choking off the flow of weapons into Gaza across Egypt’s border and at sea — perhaps with an international naval force”.
Although it must be noted that the meetings “failed to deliver specifics on international monitors to stop weapons from reaching Gaza’s Hamas rulers. Israel wants monitors, but Egypt has refused to have them on its side of the border.” As already belabored, open borders mean that Iran can import as much weaponry as it feels like sending. While a policed maritime border would ensure that something like the Karine A would most likely not get through, an open Egyptian-Gazan border would allow Hamas to rearm much more quickly.
How any international coalition handles the peace will determine how likely we are to have another war. If, for example, UN troops could be placed at the Gazan side of the Egyptian border and would operate with more efficiency than UNFIL, then the world actually have a chance of delaying Hamas’ reemergence long enough for Israel to work something out with Fatah.
On preview: damnit! Well… I wrote out the post and it’s going to stand. 
I will add though that if the claims are accurate and Hamas soldiers in Gaza actually disobeyed orders to attack… wow. Either they’re scared or we can expect to see a significant change in leadership within the next little bit.
It will also be very interesting to see how the casualties break down as we learn more. I’m still surprised by the implicit assumptions some people make. Hamas does employ both women and, in some cases, children as human shields. or even soldiers and suicide bombers. We may never know the exact totals of the civilians vs the militants who were killed, but as always, some will be tempted to play morality-via-etch-a-sketch. I wonder if an in depth investigation will be launched at some poitn.
