Depends. Are we positing a Russian invasion of Poland? If so, true. If the Baltic states or somewhere else then not so much. Poland probably has a good force structure to defend its own territory and project force in its own borders. Outside of that, though, they are pretty limited. That’s the point.
DinoR’s post just above this does a MUCH better job of saying what I’ve been trying to, however. 
Or you could check yours. Closer to 80-90%. Add in Turkey and they are bigger.
Do you have a link to some expert cite that shows Russia’s superior ability to deploy and sustain its forces compared to Europe?
Want a list? Not counting the NATO advisor contingent, 19 of 28 current and former NATO members sent troops to Iraq: US, UK, Romania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Albania, Denmark, Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Italy, Norway, Hungary, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Iceland.
Afghanistan? We can do that, too. 24 of 28. Bulgaria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK, US.
Hmmm from the numbers on wiki pulled from the think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2014 it was 68%. I also saw a 2017 estimate that includes the increased spending from Russia in the last few years supporting end strength growth to near 1 million. The IISS base source is expensive. Got a cite for near parity?
Ultimately that’s one tiny piece of the argument against using military personnel strength as the sole measure without knowing how effective that force is. It also doesn’t look at things like trained and equipped reserves that can, depending on the situation, have varying importance. Russia and Poland (NATO’s third largest member at full mobilization) both rely heavily on large reserve components. UK, France, and Germany that are active component dominated without much extra to call up. You picked one number that, may or may not even be the most relevant number, and pinned your argument to that. “Russia isn’t a problem because of this one metric.”
Nope and neither of us is likely to be able to find that information. We do know NATO struggled logistically with Libya there was public acknowledgement of issues at the time. My argument isn’t that Russia is necessarily better at being able to do it. Your argument makes a key assumption. You assume, in an absence of other information, that Russia is as at least as badly prepared so we can just look at active troop numbers to determine the threat. I’m saying in the absence of limited information that’s a dangerous assumption.
There is a group that has very good information. That’s the senior defense officials of NATO members. They unanimously agreed most of the alliance doesn’t spend enough when setting the guidelines Mattis called them out on. They set the spending and capability targets before any of us thought Trump would ever be President. Previous SECDEFs have called them out on not meeting their commitments. Apparently they think there’s a threat we can’t just handle without making changes.
I think its pretty safe to say Russia isn’t particular skilled, prepared and certainly not experienced in projecting power. Their last two adventures, Ukraine and Syria, were likely only feasible because they already had long standing bases in-country.
I’m not clear on what you’re saying here. If not all NATO countries sent troops to Afghanistan, then NATO members were dragged in against their will?
The problem with Europe letting its defense spending slip is that a modern military needs years and even decades to build up. Gone are the days when you could draft a million men, give them 6 weeks of training, and send them out to fight the enemy. Today, even an enlisted infantryman needs extensive training in weapons systems, high tech personal equipment, etc.
In WWII You could repurpose a tractor factory into making tanks, and employ A bunch of farmers and housewives to rivet together C-47s and Mustangs and Sherman tanks. Today, a new weapons system takes decades to come online, and requires bespoke advanced manufacturing facilities.
Therefore, military planners today have to try to anticipate the conflicts and weapons systems they are like to face 20-40 years from now. If you let your adversaries gain a decade of development on you, the time may come when suddenly you can’t counter them and won’t be able to for a decade or more.
This isn’t about what Russia did in Crimea, or what they might do in the Ukraine next year. It’s about the threats Europe might face a generation from now. That’s a hard sell to a public that would rather have more social spending today, but it’s absolutely critical to stay current with the kinds of weapons systems under development by other military actors around the world.
France and Germany are plenty damn advanced in weapons technology. Few are as advanced as them, in fact. They just don’t buy enough for their own armies.
Why the Europeans should follow the excessive defense spending of the United States is puzzling.
Rather than pushing the NATA to wastefully spend like theUSA as if the cold war never ended, you can simply become more modest and practical rather than yelling at the NATO for not following your crazy spending example.
I don’t think anyone is suggesting Europeans should spend as much as the United States on defense. Most of us are saying they should spend what they already agreed was a reasonable amount.
Trump’s botched diplomacy will not do much to encourage them to do what they should. While Germany and France are inherently safe from Russian aggression, unfortunately, the Baltic states will end up paying the highest price for poor European defense planning.
If Europeans do not want to spend 2% of their GDP on defense, then the reasonable policy is to not agree to sign up to do so. NATO countries all signed up to this deal, are you suggesting that Europe should not hold up its end of international agreements?
Isn’t this what everyone criticizes Trump for threatening?
No. A loose policy agreement is hardly the same as Article 5 of the actual treaty. And this argument comes perilously close to “You know who else liked dogs?”.
This is a Straw Man argument.
No, it’s a political argument in a time of austerity.
I don’t doubt that the NATO partners have good reason not to raise defense spending. But to say that the US is nagging NATO partners to increase defense spending because they should follow Washington’s example - as opposed to, this being something the NATO allies themselves agreed upon first - is a misrepresentation.
The US should drastically scale down its involvement in NATO, and it’s high time that the naive and freeloading Europeans fend for themselves.
The USA will not be bailing them out the next time they need serious help, like we did in the previous century.
As a matter of fact, a full realignment of our allies and enemies is needed, and I predict that in the future it is not unlikely that Germany will be a part of the Axis powers once again, just like they were before, if they continue down their current path.
Problem is, the NATO allies that face the greatest threat from Russia - such as Poland - are the ones who are taking their defense seriously.
It’s the other countries, who face little threat from Russia, who can be lackadaisical about it.
So your proposal would just leave the “good” NATO allies vulnerable.
This sounds great. Now sell it to those great supporters of US presidential candidates Northrop, General Dynamics, UTC, Raytheon, etc.
What does NATO actually do for the US that the US can’t do on its own anyway? Say no one really changes spending, so the US abandons NATO and enters single party alliances with the UK and NATO countries that keep up their spending (like Poland and Estonia) and/or that the US has a particular interest in. What does the US lose in this situation? It’s not like Western Europe (other than the UK) can meaningfully contribute to operations in Eastern Europe, the middle east (as shown by Libya), or even central Europe (as shown by Kosovo), and the US has more than enough nukes for MAD so doesn’t need France’s arsenal. I really can’t think of a scenario where being in NATO works to the US’s advantage, while the treaty commitment and pressure to support other alliance members is a drain on US resources.
Why you should be puzzled by something that no one here is advocating is, itself, puzzling.
I agree that there are some “good” European countries that are allies and like the USA and should be helped.
The question I think is what should be done about certain other European countries that I would certainly not characterize as allies, and I would go so far as to characterize them as potential future enemies.