US Anti-Terrorism tribunals would be pitifully hypocritical

I think before any Tribunal holds court the Pentagon, Congress, and the legal wonks at Justice will all have their say. In addition, I think Bush’s political senses are not so dulled that he’s deliberately court a public relations disaster.

As to Lincoln I merely used the example to try and mollify the semi-hysterical assertion that Tribunals were going to have us all careening into the abyss of despotism. Both Washington and Roosevelt also took strong and historically controversial actions during wartime. I simply find the “slippery slope” argument (it IS a logical fallacy, after all) to be without merit.

The point I was making is not that terrorist could fly a jet into a random building- they are willing to fly a jet into a hotel where they know the witnesses &/or juros are staying. Thus, the randomness is out. US Marshalls with guns, etc can likely protect a witness from a drive-by, but not from such a terrorist attack, or even just a very big bomb.

You dudes are all talking about all the rights these tribunals would trample- care to share your source as to exactly how these tribunals will work? I have seen nothing yet which gives exact details. Or are you just guessing?

And we should remember that it was “open, public trials” that cost us the WTC and some 4000 dead Americans. During the trial of the first WTC bombers the US was forced to disclose that they could listen in on Osama’s cell phone calls. Those calls stopped right afterward. We do not need that kind of secret info getting out- it costs too much.

DrDeth,

I cannot, unfortunately, recall which periodical had a description of what was proposed, but what I recall was that the tribunals would be conducted in secret, with no right of habeas (so people could be kept indefinitiely without being charged) or right of appeal, that the prosecution’s burden was not “beyond a reasonable doubt”, but something less (although I can’t remember if it is “preponderance of the evidence” or “clear and convincing evidence”), the federal rules of procedure and evidence do not apply, there is no grand jury and the tribunal may reach a conviction, including the death penalty, by majority vote rather than unanimous vote. I do now know whether the accused can be compelled to testify. My recollection may be flawed, so I apologize if I misstated something.

If any state court tried to apply any of the above rules to an ordinary criminal case (with certain exceptions), it would be readily reversed as violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The terrorism cases add a level of complexity because it is not certain that they are even entitled to these rights as an initial matter. Domestic terrorists presumably are, but the Quirin case throws some doubt on that for wartime.

The problem I have with the idea that we should not reveal sources because it costs us is as follows: you cannot convict someone without evidence. If you have to introduce a piece of evidence to establish an element of your case, then the defense has the right to examine how you got it, because the reliability of the evidence must be at issue. To take the cell phone example: if your aim is to prove that the defendant corresponded with bin Laden to show the defendant is part of a terrorist network, you have to prove each of the following: defendant spoke on W day in X location with Y member of the network on Z issue of network matters. You don’t simply get to have the witness say: “Well, they talked about Al Qaeda business that day, but don’t ask me how I know that. I just do.” It is entirely reasonable for the defense to ask how the witness came to be listening to the conversation and any other circumstances surrounding that piece of evidence. If what we propose is that the defense not be allowed to examine the evidence that can ultimately lead to a defendant’s death, then we really are brazen hypocrites. If the cost is great, then be damn sure you have a good case against the most culpable defendant.

But perhaps the proposal is only to prevent the public from attending the trials. I don’t really have much of a problem with that. Does it solve the problem you posed? Maybe, maybe not. Each defendant, for example, must be allowed to present evidence, including witnesses, in his defense. You can try to sequester witnesses all you want, and you may try to cut off any communication to and from an accused, but you can’t detain a witness, and you’ll find it very hard indeed to keep information seeping in and out of the courtroom or a jail cell.

Finally, I’d be interested in reading up on analyses of how the evidence presented in the first WTC trial led directly and inexorably to the 9/11 attack, so a reference would be appreciated. I’m not saying it didn’t; I’m just a little skeptical that the first trial could have been carried to a conclusion without the evidence, in a manner that not only comports with due process but completely shielded the evidence from the perpetrators.

http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/11/14/inv.military.court.doc/

The executive order itself.

For machete-ing my way through the legalese, I used:

http://www.cnn.com/LAW/greta.at.law/freedus.11.22/moreonthistopic.html

and the accompanying interview with former JAG Corps Attorney Matthew Freedus.

No one has yet responded to what I said about national security interests and trials at the end of my last post–that in civilian trials it seems certain information can be withheld. Why did the US not withhold the fact that they could monitor bin Laden’s calls? Could you provide us with a cite and some further info, please?

I agree, as I always have, that this line of argumentation is especially strong; in fact I think it’s the crux of the case for the tribunals. But I’d like to ask if rendering certain information in a trial confidential is a property solely of the military court system.

Moreover I would wonder about the purpose of the two-thirds majority rule and the suspension of a right to an appeal. Why the first? For a more expedited sentence without hung juries? Considering the alleged terrorist would be in US military custody anyway, why are we worried about what may ensue in the meantime? I like leisurely justice if it means fair justice. Why the second? Are we so arrogant as to presume that nothing in a secret trial will go wrong, and that we refuse to examine if it did?

The fact of the matter is that if we can’t review what happened in a military tribunal, then we can’t argue a posteriori that they were just or unjust either. In any case, society can’t just try anything in a judicial system and see if it works or not, so we sometimes have to make this sort of judgment a priori.

In this specific instance, I think there are enough relevant objections to at least question the propensity of military tribunals to produce a fair verdict–see specific problems two paragraphs up.

As for the comparison with US courts martial–if it works for them, it should work for us–the entire analogy is fallacious, leaving aside the issue of similarity. In joining the armed services, a person agrees to suspend certain rights–freedom of association (fraternization rules); freedom of speech (backtalking to an officer); freedom of movement (can’t leave)–etc. One of these involves being tried in a court martial instead of in a civilian court for the crimes that one commits while in the military. It is therefore a contractual suspension of right that is well-understood and agreed to by both parties–which is not analogous to what’s going on now.

-Someone Else

Sorry for the simul-post, erofeev.

Doesn’t the fact that someone thought that a conviction could not be secured suggest to you that there was a risk that a judge might have thought that the safeguards on liberties might absolve the accused?

Do you perceive a difference between somehow “knowing” that a person is guilty, and a judgment of guilt?

That is one of the things bothering me about all of this. The presumption here seems to be this: we know they’re guilty, and we don’t need those pesky civilian courts interfering. Determination of guilt is not the role of the executive. That is the role of the judiciary. Avoiding the judiciary and its inherent safeguards by establishing an alternative is not right.

Someone who posts here is from the ACLU, and if I recall correctly has said that this order will be challenged. I suppose we could all be patient and wait for the outcome.

Dr Deth

The balance of your post has been answered. In respect of this, though, I’m still not sure what you’re saying. Is it that terrorists are more ruthless than criminals? Perhaps you’re not that familiar with organised crime and its ruthlessness and capabilities, nor with the British experience with the IRA.

I also think that the risk of this is small: if anyone was to hijack a plane they’d be flying it into the White House, next, not a hotel full of jurors simply for the purpose of intimidating a civilian court.

I think it is illustrative of the risks and hurdles faced by trying war criminals in our civil courts. I am still somewhat amazed that there are those who feel that foreign war criminals are automatically entiltled to the protections of the constitution.

I think the difficulty you are experiencing is because you persist in viewing this as a civil/criminal matter when it is not. We don’t mirandize them before they get bombed, either. I wonder at the perceived hypocricy that lobbing ordinence on them, irrespective of guilt, is just fine but when they are caught they have to be awarded the same rights as a US citizen. I disagree.

Problems with the three emboldened words in the above quotation:

  1. Absence of the word “accused.”
  2. “Foreign”–what’s your point? When the U.S. extradites someone, he/she is tried under U.S. law, with U.S. rights. When a foreigner is arrested in the U.S., same deal.
  3. “War criminals”–So bring them before the International War Crimes tribunal, for instance.

As for this whole straw man about “how can we justify lobbing ordnance on people when we call for fair and impartial trials for those we catch,” whoever said they were in favour of dropping bombs on people in Afghanistan? Certainly not me. Moreover, catching someone gives us an incredible opportunity to actually mete out fair and impartial justice. We should take it.

I agree, and I think the Tribunals will be a fine mechanism to do so without the attendent risks to additional innocents.

And yet.

And yet you would deny those accused the right to an appeal–under ANY circumstances, not fair, as it compounds any injustice within the trial itself. You STILL haven’t responded to this criticism.

And yet you still think that a court in which one-third of the jury believes that there is a reasonable doubt of the accused’s innocence, and an execution can still occur, is a fair court in keeping with accepted principles of justice. Again, no response as yet.

And yet you still refuse to address the idea that the released information in a civilian trial can indeed be limited for national security interests, as I pointed out a long time ago.

Come on, Gardner. You say you’re all in favour of mitigating “attendant risks to innocents,” but for crying out loud, at least acknowledge that military tribunals carry an inherent risk to innocents–the difference being that we’re considering innocents that have been accused by the state of having committed war crimes. An accusation is NOT, nor has EVER BEEN, in American jurisprudence, even in times of crisis, a conviction. You are holding a double standard, claiming that American innocents are more important than innocents accused of war crimes and brought before a military tribunal. The rights of those innocents are apparently unimportant to you. The fact that those innocents may be executed is also apparently unimportant to you. Therefore, the attendant risk to innocents of instituting these tribunals is also unimportant to you–and congratulations, you’ve got yourself in a neat little contradiction.

Have fun.

Someone Else