If ‘minimizing involvement’ does not include money from foreign sources, then what is the source for your claim that the US is ‘minimizing involvement’ in the next election other than providing less military involvement because the Afghan Security Forces and Police will be in the lead much more than they were in 2009.
Money will be the only thing not minimized, because it’s a meaningless sum to us, and it’s easy and bloodless. We send money everywhere, we are super-rich. We sent over a billion dollars to Kenya in 2011, are we “involved” in Kenya? Is Kenya a modern, prosperous country because we send them money?
But what can you cite to say that the US has decided to minimize it’s involvement in doing what it can to support open and valid elections later this year?
It’s 2014, not this year.
There were 60,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan for the last presidential election, which was a fraud. There will be far fewer in 2014. Who, then, is going to do as Dr. Abdullah wishes and make this next election a legitimate one? It’s up the Afghans.
The Afghanistan National Election is in April 2014, however preparation needs to be started this year. So where is it written that the US will be minimizing non-military assistance in the upcoming election.
As far as troop levels go, more on that below, but first I must remind you that what is being discussed is what Dr. Abdullah Abdullah wrote, which looked so far beyond the military and security requirements that he barely mentioned it as a concern.
He was talking about this:
Then you wrote that the US was minimizing it’s assistance. I asked you what you meant.
Now you mention troop strength which is the military component which does not apply to this duscussion of Dr AA’s views.
But your troop strength argument is quite flawed.
You do not take into account all that has transpired since August 2009.
*All the troops from Obama’s first surge were not in theatre at all or for very long when you cite the 60,000 number.
*The Taliban/insurgency had four + years of momentum going into the August 2009 elections in terms of territory controlled and in terms of ability to intimidate and terrorize civilians.
*General McCrystal did not have the culture of the ISAF coalition turned around to the new strategy for the second surge which focused on population centric COIN. The troops there were engaged in major offensive combat operations, the first goal was to reverse insurgent momentum in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces.
And a big difference which alleviates between a twenty to thirty thousand reduction in US troops for the April 2014 election, is that there are over 200,000 more Afghan men and some women in uniform providing front line security in all population centers, where the Taliban have been effectively driven.
It’s just you and me again. I wonder if that says something about me, or something about you. Or both.
How about this: what do you think Abdullah means by “a push from the international community, and in particular, the United States, to help Afghanistan conduct free and fair elections.” What will this push consist of?
In what ways did the U.S. assist in the last election? We can go from there.
Here’s the thing: the Taliban was only part of what made the 2009 election a sham. They kept some voters away, but the bulk of the problem came from corruption and fraud by the government, voter fraud, interference from warlords and elders, suppression by ethnicity, and the runoff being cancelled. Having the next election more in the hands of the central government vs. the U.S. makes all of this more likely, not less.
You’re assuming those 200,000 more local troops are committed to keeping the election fair; prepare to be disappointed.
The runoff was canceled because Abdullah withdrew.
The one million fraudulent votes were removed from Karzai putting him below 50% and forcing the runoff in the first place.
And as for assuming that the additional Afghan security forces want a fair election, I’d like to know why someone not among a fledgling security force that are attacked and killed by the dozens every month by a ruthless murderous enemy of the state they represents assume that they do not care.
I gave several factors in better conditions coming for the next election.
You need to dismiss them in the context if the whole. They are all working together.
While this is literally true, it rather misses the point, which is the reason that Abdullah withdrew:
Again: total sham.
And the runoff was set to be handled by the same corrupt election commission that rigged the initial result.
Who says they don’t care? I’m sure they care tremendously about their futures, which is why they will most likely help rig the upcoming election. Why leave such things up to chance, after all?
Not really; the fact that the Taliban is weaker is a fairly small part of the equation.
(a) One “push” is an ‘extra’ push, on fighting corruption. I say “extra” because there were recently 22 convictions related to the Kabul Bank Scandal and other moves by the international community to force the Afghan Government to deal with corruption. -NF
{cite} “The tolerance of the Afghan government and foreigners alike toward high-brow corruption has today become a significant threat to a stable Afghanistan, along with the Taliban.” -Dr A. Abdullah; Foreign Policy, 8 January 2013; “Saving Afghanistan” {cite}
(b) The second “push” cited by Dr A. Abdullah would be the push that Democracy can work in Afghanistan and to not give up just because the first expererience with Afghan Democracy came with erratic and corruption driven governing by the Karzai regime. Karzai is NOT the Afghan people’s fault or lack of ability to embrace ‘one person one vote’. -NF
{cite}“It would be a tragic mistake for the international community to conclude that democracy doesn’t work in Afghanistan, while the only thing that doesn’t work is democracy as Karzai’s government understands it.” -Dr A. Abdullah; Foreign Policy, 8 January 2013; “Saving Afghanistan”{cite}
© More non-military “push” seen as needed. -NF
{cite} “The Afghan government has done little to ensure that the institutions of democracy, from our parliament to our courts and civil society, are supported and nurtured.” -Dr A. Abdullah; Foreign Policy, 8 January 2013; “Saving Afghanistan”{cite}
(d) There is the need for a “push” against what has ‘confused’ the Afghan people - namely passivity, inconsistency and ambivalency regarding corruption and reconcilitiation with the armed insurgency. -NF
{cite} "Instead, it has confused the Afghan people by being passive toward corruption and pursuing an inconsistent and ambivalent policy regarding reconciliation with the armed insurgency.
As the current Afghan government has repeatedly made clear, a red line of reconciliation with the Taliban must be their acceptance of the Constitution – and Karzai needs to illustrate his own commitment to this same standard. No wonder Afghans feel no connection to this government and understand democracy to be code language for anarchy." -Dr A. Abdullah; Foreign Policy, 8 January 2013; “Saving Afghanistan”{cite}
(e) Dr A. Abdullah sums the ‘push’ up here. The U.S. and other supportive outsiders, must “focus more sharply on a political transition to send a clear message to today’s Afghan leadership demanding a democratic transition of power based on the principles of free and fair elections.” The outsiders must push hard this coming year to ‘clean up the keptocracy that they have been uneasily, but out of necessity in fighing the insurgency as the number one issue, been forced to support.’ -NF
{cite} "Because of these countless psychological and structural missteps, influential, democratically minded Afghans – and those who support them – must focus more sharply on a political transition, without which any “military transition” will ultimately be meaningless. And for a successful political transition, Afghanistan needs every country involved in its rebuilding effort to send a clear message to today’s Afghan leadership demanding a democratic transition of power based on the principles of free and fair elections. Instead of abandoning democracy because it hasn’t worked under a kleptocracy, Afghanistan and the international community must clean it up.
Can this be done in just over a year? Yes. The time until the 2014 elections must be used to implement procedures that support democracy. Our international partners, in particular the United States, should ensure the positioning of foreign observers to keep a clean tally of the votes. Karzai and the Afghan parliament should approve new voter registration procedures to ensure that every voter’s voice – new and old – is heard. Our parliament needs to mandate the vetting of all election officials who will oversee election centers, rather than accepting them as a result of presidential decree, as they are now. There needs to be an independent body to resolve all electoral disputes – an independent Electoral Complaints Commission whose members are selected transparently and with meaningful consultations among Afghan political opposition groups, parliament, civil society, and others.
Karzai must clearly illustrate his willingness both to step down when his constitutionally limited time is up and to promise not to interfere in the election process, addressing the top two concerns of the Kabul political elite. Taking into account our recent presidential and parliamentary elections in 2009 and 2010, state resources should not be used to influence the outcome of the elections.
The political transition, based entirely on credible and transparent elections, is of paramount importance because it will restore the Afghan people’s faith and sense of ownership in their government. Despite all the fraud and mismanagement in previous elections, it is, remarkably, not yet lost. And if the government obtains this mandate from the people, it can act with confidence on issues from dealing with the Taliban to stabilizing the economy and receiving long-term assistance from the West and the international community that will ensure Afghanistan’s security, stability, and prosperity. By playing a constructive role in facilitating necessary electoral reforms and overseeing a credible and legitimate transfer of power in 2014, Karzai can still take advantage of this unique opportunity and moment in Afghan history to be remembered as a reformist.
The structure of Afghanistan’s political process, which was discussed in that meeting in 2000, further implemented in the 2001 Bonn agreement, and painfully built over the past decade, is still the right one. But work remains on that central point – ensuring that every person gets the opportunity to choose his or her government. With a push from the international community, and in particular, the United States, to help Afghanistan conduct free and fair elections, Afghanistan can be saved – and move into the next decade from a position of strength. Together with our international partners, the Afghan nation has come a long way in our transition toward democracy and stability. We must march on forward." -Dr A. Abdullah; Foreign Policy, 8 January 2013; “Saving Afghanistan”{cite}
Post 169 was accidently posted.
I think that was quite straightforward from Dr. A. Abdullah in his commentary on January 8, 2013 when he didn’t mention the ‘military’ support of elections or the need for more military action against the insurgents. It appears from what the Doctor wrote that the military component and the insurgency itself is not an issue at this time. But he does not appear to favor reconciliation with the insurgents, so the value of the US military mission to weaken and undermine the insurgency should go without saying. It was invaluable in getting to this point. See my responses, (a) through (e) below to what you have asked.
(a) One “push” is an ‘extra’ push, on fighting corruption. I say “extra” because there were recently 22 convictions related to the Kabul Bank Scandal and other moves by the international community to force the Afghan Government to deal with corruption. -NF
{cite} “The tolerance of the Afghan government and foreigners alike toward high-brow corruption has today become a significant threat to a stable Afghanistan, along with the Taliban.” -Dr A. Abdullah; Foreign Policy, 8 January 2013; “Saving Afghanistan” {cite}
(b) The second “push” cited by Dr A. Abdullah would be the push that Democracy can work in Afghanistan and to not give up just because the first expererience with Afghan Democracy came with erratic and corruption driven governing by the Karzai regime. Karzai is NOT the Afghan people’s fault or lack of ability to embrace ‘one person one vote’. -NF
{cite}“It would be a tragic mistake for the international community to conclude that democracy doesn’t work in Afghanistan, while the only thing that doesn’t work is democracy as Karzai’s government understands it.” -Dr A. Abdullah; Foreign Policy, 8 January 2013; “Saving Afghanistan”{cite}
(c) More non-military “push” seen as needed. -NF
{cite} “The Afghan government has done little to ensure that the institutions of democracy, from our parliament to our courts and civil society, are supported and nurtured.” -Dr A. Abdullah; Foreign Policy, 8 January 2013; “Saving Afghanistan”{cite}
(d) There is the need for a “push” against what has ‘confused’ the Afghan people - namely passivity, inconsistency and ambivalency regarding corruption and reconcilitiation with the armed insurgency. -NF
{cite} "Instead, it has confused the Afghan people by being passive toward corruption and pursuing an inconsistent and ambivalent policy regarding reconciliation with the armed insurgency.
As the current Afghan government has repeatedly made clear, a red line of reconciliation with the Taliban must be their acceptance of the Constitution – and Karzai needs to illustrate his own commitment to this same standard. No wonder Afghans feel no connection to this government and understand democracy to be code language for anarchy." -Dr A. Abdullah; Foreign Policy, 8 January 2013; “Saving Afghanistan”{cite}
(e) Dr A. Abdullah sums the ‘push’ up here. The U.S. and other supportive outsiders, must “focus more sharply on a political transition to send a clear message to today’s Afghan leadership demanding a democratic transition of power based on the principles of free and fair elections.” The outsiders must push hard this coming year to ‘clean up the keptocracy that they have been uneasily, but out of necessity in fighing the insurgency as the number one issue, been forced to support.’ -NF
{cite} "Because of these countless psychological and structural missteps, influential, democratically minded Afghans – and those who support them – must focus more sharply on a political transition, without which any “military transition” will ultimately be meaningless. And for a successful political transition, Afghanistan needs every country involved in its rebuilding effort to send a clear message to today’s Afghan leadership demanding a democratic transition of power based on the principles of free and fair elections. Instead of abandoning democracy because it hasn’t worked under a kleptocracy, Afghanistan and the international community must clean it up.
Can this be done in just over a year? Yes. The time until the 2014 elections must be used to implement procedures that support democracy. Our international partners, in particular the United States, should ensure the positioning of foreign observers to keep a clean tally of the votes. Karzai and the Afghan parliament should approve new voter registration procedures to ensure that every voter’s voice – new and old – is heard. Our parliament needs to mandate the vetting of all election officials who will oversee election centers, rather than accepting them as a result of presidential decree, as they are now. There needs to be an independent body to resolve all electoral disputes – an independent Electoral Complaints Commission whose members are selected transparently and with meaningful consultations among Afghan political opposition groups, parliament, civil society, and others.
Karzai must clearly illustrate his willingness both to step down when his constitutionally limited time is up and to promise not to interfere in the election process, addressing the top two concerns of the Kabul political elite. Taking into account our recent presidential and parliamentary elections in 2009 and 2010, state resources should not be used to influence the outcome of the elections.
The political transition, based entirely on credible and transparent elections, is of paramount importance because it will restore the Afghan people’s faith and sense of ownership in their government. Despite all the fraud and mismanagement in previous elections, it is, remarkably, not yet lost. And if the government obtains this mandate from the people, it can act with confidence on issues from dealing with the Taliban to stabilizing the economy and receiving long-term assistance from the West and the international community that will ensure Afghanistan’s security, stability, and prosperity. By playing a constructive role in facilitating necessary electoral reforms and overseeing a credible and legitimate transfer of power in 2014, Karzai can still take advantage of this unique opportunity and moment in Afghan history to be remembered as a reformist.
The structure of Afghanistan’s political process, which was discussed in that meeting in 2000, further implemented in the 2001 Bonn agreement, and painfully built over the past decade, is still the right one. But work remains on that central point – ensuring that every person gets the opportunity to choose his or her government. With a push from the international community, and in particular, the United States, to help Afghanistan conduct free and fair elections, Afghanistan can be saved – and move into the next decade from a position of strength. Together with our international partners, the Afghan nation has come a long way in our transition toward democracy and stability. We must march on forward." -Dr A. Abdullah; Foreign Policy, 8 January 2013; “Saving Afghanistan”{cite}
So, to your way of thinking, is this just a matter of the U.S. threatening to cut off the money supply if the Afghan government doesn’t meet these demands? Is that what the “push” really is?
No. It is working with Karzai on his way out the door as best as anyone can work with Karzai to do what Dr A. Abdullah wrote.
I see what Abdullah is saying in full context that we a pushing a bus load of crippled and injured people up a steep hill to get them to treatment by muscle power of 1000 alone. For years few Afghans were pushing the bus. But now more than half of those puching are Afghans. But there is a ways to go and the outsiders have grown weary.
What Abdullah is saying is we are 75% of the hill… Don’t quit now.. If we need some fresh pushers from outside we will get there.
“the Afghan nation has come a long way in our transition toward democracy and stability” It would be a shame to quite pushing now.
What do you think US Policy should be starting tomorrow?
In the form of what, polite suggestions? Threats that we’ll bring back the army and toss his regime out if he doesn’t play ball?
Further, it would be naïve to believe that Karzai and his government could eliminate corruption (which is a longstanding part of Afghan culture) or instill faith in democracy (which is not a longstanding part of Afghan culture), no matter how sincerely they tried to do so. If all it took to solve social problems and overcome cultural biases was a good-faith effort, our own nation would be in better shape.
That’s fine as far as metaphors go, except for all the people who don’t want the bus to go up the hill, and the people who can use the bus-pushing project to line their own pockets and look out for their own tribe.
No more Americans will die for Afghanistan; we’ve done what we could, but their problems can’t be solved by foreign interference. We can toss them a few billion here and there so long as their government isn’t too horrible, but we need to get out, for good, as soon as possible.
There has been a significant drop in US combat deaths this year because Afghans are in the lead in security operations. By summer that is projected to be in all Provinces.
If US Policy must be that US Military personel will be guranteed to never die die as we transition to Afghans in charge of their own security, that will not happen either.
Likewise, We are never going to get out of Afghanistan for good, and neither will the international community. The international community including NATO have learned one lesson mostly because that is what the Reagan and George HW Bush Administration did after the last round of Cold War ‘foreign interference’ in Afghan’s lives.
So your ‘as soon as possible’ is hardly going anywhere either.
It is quite noble to want those things, I’d like to see them too. Sacrificing American lives should never be taken without continuing to review the certainty that the sacrifice is bringing the results desired.
President Obama has met that review to me, and the plan he put forth in December 2009 at West Point is coming pretty much to fruition as far as the transition process goes.
What is done is done, and there are signs that the sacrificeby our troops is achieving the results that were set in 2009 by President Obama after five years of endless drift and no review of the war effort there.
To just pull out ‘as soon as possible’ is by the end of 2014 and with a low casualty rate for our troops as the trend is showing, is the most realistic and responsible policy going forward.
Furthermore, our goal in Afghanistan should be to leave behind a U.S.-friendly regime that will keep a lid on terrorist activity. Fooling around with democracy is a mistake, we’d get better results with a traditional strongman.
Our goal is being achieved then, however the strongman is the fledgling Afghan democracy that has developed into at least some early stage of infancy and does appear to be a U.S. friendly regime that will be able to keep a lid on terrorist and insurgent activity by the end of 2014.
The only exception to your strongman goal that requires no US Troops is that it appears that the US and our allies will keep about 10,000 troops stationed in Afghanistan beyond the 2014 withdrawal. Those will be Special Forces Units and trainers that will react to any increases in terrorist and insurgent activities that the Afghans may not be able to handle and/or which would pose a serious threat to the central government or any of the provincial governments and their agencies.
Six to eight-thousand Special Operators and Trainers from the US in Afghanistan for as long as it takes to keep the terrorists and insurgents from retaking control of Afghanistan is a good plan going forward, as I see it.
What we shoulda coulda done when Bush first sent Special Forces into Afghanistan is behind us.
The future looks decent enough not to pull the plug now because we don’t like the way it was done and had to be done and the record of the first real administration that governed Afghanistan through all of it.
“U.S. friendly” is highly debatable; it was two weeks ago that Karzai claimed that the U.S. was colluding with the Taliban to keep Afghanistan weak, and that the U.S. doesn’t want to leave.
Right, they’ll be there to prop up a weak, corrupt, regime with very little popular support. Yay.
The future is a weak, undemocratic government that depends heavily on the U.S. to avoid being overthrown. While that’s not the worst possible outcome, it’s nothing to be proud of or happy about.
The true question is whether it is better than it was in 2001. Afghans and the coalition should be proud of that in that all have made it possible that a weak and imperfect democracy steadily gets better.
3,000,000 girls are in school when in 2001 there were a handful at best.
Girls being educated to the ways of the modern world is not the reason our military was sent in, but it is one positve result the comes out of it.
In my view it will have a major corrective impact on Afganistan’s future.
No, the true question is whether the improvement was worth what it cost to acheive it.
It is far from clear that the democratic process in Afghanistan will be getting better.
And this why the word “victory” is too strong to describe what has happened; you’re making qualified claims about the hypothetical impact of more girls being in school.
To do that you’d need to have a completion date for whatever model of full improvement you think is required.
It is quite more incorrect to say that the democratic process is currently worse than it was in 2001. To me the trend in place carries more weight than sheer pessimism and lack of faith in the people of Afghanistan.
I guess if one thinks that educating young minds makes little difference in the world. and specifically in a highly illiterate nation of 30 million where 10% of families have sent their girls to school with the boys, and at many times, at great risk of violence to their daughters and to themselves.
I don’t see where the impact of that must be refuted or discounted if it’s value.
Every Afghan child that gets a better education than their parents in that part of the world is a victory to me.
I don’t see that as an overstatement at all.