# USSC Election Thread

**URL:** https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ussc-election-thread/43978
**Category:** Great Debates
**Created:** [December 4, 2000, 6:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ussc-election-thread/43978 "2000-12-04T18:27:25Z")
**Posts on this page:** 2
**Page:** 1

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### Author: ![Freedom](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/bc8723/32.png) [@Freedom](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Freedom)
#### Post date: [December 4, 2000, 6:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ussc-election-thread/43978/1 "2000-12-04T18:27:25Z")

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I’m not all that surprised that the one time Stoidela has not run right out and started another election thread is when the result is not beneficial to Gore.

To summarize, the USSC basically ruled that the SCOFLAw decision pushing the certification back was to vague for them to rule on. They sent the case back down to them to clarify how they made their decision. While the SCOFLA writes it’s clarification, they will have in mind the fact that if they stray from laws written before the election, the USSC will just overturn them.

My read on this is that the USSC did a little back room negotiating among themselves. I think they felt a 9-0 decision was important to the country, and sending it back down to give the SCOFLA another chance to get it right was the only way a 9-0 decision was going to come out of this case.

I think the USSC agrred in advance to two future outcomes if they see this case again. If the SCOFLA can write a clarification that obeys the laws written by the FL legislature and the US Constitution, then the USSC will rule 9-0 in favor of Gore if it reaches them again. Of course, since this isn’t possible, they will either have to reverse themselves or they will get slapped down 9-0 by the USSC.

This is of course, only my partisan take on the matter.

Any other thoughts?

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### Author: ![Freedom](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/bc8723/32.png) [@Freedom](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Freedom)
#### Post date: [December 4, 2000, 6:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ussc-election-thread/43978/2 "2000-12-04T18:49:00Z")

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(Slip Opinion) Cite as: 531 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2000) 1  
Per Curiam

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

* * *

No. 00­836

* * *

GEORGE W. BUSH, PETITIONER v. PALM BEACH  
COUNTY CANVASSING BOARD ET AL.  
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT  
[December 4, 2000]  
PER CURIAM.  
The Supreme Court of the State of Florida interpreted  
its elections statutes in proceedings brought to require  
manual recounts of ballots, and the certification of the  
recount results, for votes cast in the quadrennial Presi-dential  
election held on November 7, 2000. Governor  
George W. Bush, Republican candidate for the Presidency,  
filed a petition for certiorari to review the Florida Su-preme  
Court decision. We granted certiorari on two of the  
questions presented by petitioner: whether the decision of  
the Florida Supreme Court, by effectively changing the  
State’ s elector appointment procedures after election day,  
violated the Due Process Clause or 3 U. S. C. §5, and  
whether the decision of that court changed the manner in  
which the State’ s electors are to be selected, in violation of  
the legislature’ s power to designate the manner for selec-tion  
under Art. II, §1, cl. 2 of the United States Constitu-tion.

531 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2000).  
On November 8, 2000, the day following the Presidential  
election, the Florida Division of Elections reported that  
Governor Bush had received 2,909,135 votes, and respon-dent  
Democrat Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., had re-•2 BUSH v. PALM BEACH COUNTY CANVASSING BD.  
Per Curiam  
ceived 2,907,351, a margin of 1,784 in Governor Bush’ s  
favor. Under Fla. Stat. §102.141(4) (2000), because the  
margin of victory was equal to or less than one-half of one  
percent of the votes cast, an automatic machine recount  
occurred. The recount resulted in a much smaller margin  
of victory for Governor Bush. Vice President Gore then  
exercised his statutory right to submit written requests for  
manual recounts to the canvassing board of any county.  
See §102.166.

He requested recounts in four counties:  
Volusia, Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade.  
The parties urged conflicting interpretations of the  
Florida Election Code respecting the authority of the  
canvassing boards, the Secretary of State (hereinafter  
Secretary), and the Elections Canvassing Commission. On  
November 14, in an action brought by Volusia County, and  
joined by the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, Vice  
President Gore, and the Florida Democratic Party, the  
Florida Circuit Court ruled that the statutory 7-day dead-line  
was mandatory, but that the Volusia board could  
amend its returns at a later date.

The court further ruled  
that the Secretary, after “considering all attendant facts  
and circumstances,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a, could exer-cise  
her discretion in deciding whether to include the late  
amended returns in the statewide certification.  
The Secretary responded by issuing a set of criteria by  
which she would decide whether to allow a late filing. The  
Secretary ordered that, by 2 p.m. the following day, No-vember  
15, any county desiring to forward late returns  
submit a written statement of the facts and circumstances  
justifying a later filing. Four counties submitted state-ments  
and, after reviewing the submissions, the Secretary  
determined that none justified an extension of the filing  
deadline. On November 16, the Florida Democratic Party  
and Vice President Gore filed an emergency motion in the  
state court, arguing that the Secretary had acted arbitrar-ily  
and in contempt of the court’ s earlier ruling.

The•Cite as: 531 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2000) 3  
Per Curiam  
following day, the court denied the motion, ruling that the  
Secretary had not acted arbitrarily and had exercised her  
discretion in a reasonable manner consistent with the  
court’ s earlier ruling. The Democratic Party and Vice  
President Gore appealed to the First District Court of  
Appeal, which certified the matter to the Florida Supreme  
Court. That court accepted jurisdiction and sua sponte  
entered an order enjoining the Secretary and the Elections  
Canvassing Commission from finally certifying the results  
of the election and declaring a winner until further order  
of that court.

The Supreme Court, with the expedition requisite for  
the controversy, issued its decision on November 21. Palm  
Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, Nos. SC00­2346,  
SC00­2348, and SC00­2349 (Nov. 21, 2000), App. to Pet.  
for Cert. 1a. As the court saw the matter, there were two  
principal questions: whether a discrepancy between an  
original machine return and a sample manual recount  
resulting from the way a ballot has been marked or  
punched is an “error in vote tabulation” justifying a full  
manual recount; and how to reconcile what it spoke of as  
two conflicts in Florida’ s election laws: (a) between the  
time frame for conducting a manual recount under Fla.  
Stat. §102.166 (2000) and the time frame for submitting  
county returns under §§102.111 and 102.112, and (b)  
between §102.111, which provides that the Secretary  
“shall . . . ignor[e]” late election returns, and §102.112,  
which provides that she “may . . . ignor[e]” such returns.  
With regard to the first issue, the court held that, under  
the plain text of the statute, a discrepancy between a  
sample manual recount and machine returns due to the  
way in which a ballot was punched or marked did consti-tute  
an “error in vote tabulation” sufficient to trigger the  
statutory provisions for a full manual recount.  
With regard to the second issue, the court held that the  
“shall . . . ignor[e]” provision of §102.111 conflicts with the•4 BUSH v. PALM BEACH COUNTY CANVASSING BD.  
Per Curiam  
“may . . . ignor[e]” provision of §102.112, and that the  
“may . . . ignor[e]” provision controlled. The court turned  
to the questions whether and when the Secretary may  
ignore late manual recounts. The court relied in part upon  
the right to vote set forth in the Declaration of Rights of  
the Florida Constitution in concluding that late manual  
recounts could be rejected only under limited circum-stances.

The court then stated: “Because of our reluc-tance  
to rewrite the Florida Election Code, we conclude  
that we must invoke the equitable powers of this Court to  
fashion a remedy . . . .” App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a. The  
court thus imposed a deadline of November 26, at 5 p.m.,  
for a return of ballot counts. The 7-day deadline of  
§102.111, assuming it would have applied, was effectively  
extended by 12 days. The court further directed the Secre-tary  
to accept manual counts submitted prior to that  
deadline.  
As a general rule, this Court defers to a state court’ s  
interpretation of a state statute. But in the case of a law  
enacted by a state legislature applicable not only to elec-tions  
to state offices, but also to the selection of Presiden-tial  
electors, the legislature is not acting solely under the  
authority given it by the people of the State, but by virtue  
of a direct grant of authority made under Art. II, §1, cl. 2,  
of the United States Constitution. That provision reads:  
“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the  
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors,  
equal to the whole Number of Senators and Represen-tatives  
to which the State may be entitled in the Con-gress  
. . . .”  
Although we did not address the same question petitioner  
raises here, in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 25  
(1892), we said:  
“[Art. II, §1, cl. 2] does not read that the people or the  
citizens shall appoint, but that ‘ each State shall’ ; and•Cite as: 531 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2000) 5  
Per Curiam  
if the words ‘ in such manner as the legislature thereof  
may direct,’ had been omitted, it would seem that the  
legislative power of appointment could not have been  
successfully questioned in the absence of any provi-sion  
in the state constitution in that regard. Hence  
the insertion of those words, while operating as a limi-tation  
upon the State in respect of any attempt to cir-cumscribe  
the legislative power, cannot be held to op-erate  
as a limitation on that power itself.”  
There are expressions in the opinion of the Supreme Court  
of Florida that may be read to indicate that it construed  
the Florida Election Code without regard to the extent to  
which the Florida Constitution could, consistent with  
Art. II, §1, cl. 2, “circumscribe the legislative power.”  
The opinion states, for example, that “[t]o the extent that the Legislature may enact laws regulating the electoral proc-ess, those laws are valid only if they impose no ‘ unreason-able or unnecessary’ restraints on the right of suffrage” guaranteed by the state constitution. App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a. The opinion also states that “because election laws are intended to facilitate the right of suffrage, such laws must be liberally construed in favor of the citizens’ right to vote . . . .” Ibid.  
In addition, 3 U. S. C. §5 provides in pertinent part:  
“If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted  
prior to the day fixed for the appointment of the elec-tors,  
for its final determination of any controversy or  
contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the  
electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or  
procedures, and such determination shall have been  
made at least six days before the time fixed for the  
meeting of the electors, such determination made pur-suant  
to such law so existing on said day, and made at  
least six days prior to said time of meeting of the elec-tors,  
shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the•6 BUSH v. PALM BEACH COUNTY CANVASSING BD.  
Per Curiam  
counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Con-stitution,  
and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the  
ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State  
is concerned.”  
The parties before us agree that whatever else may be the  
effect of this section, it creates a “safe harbor” for a State  
insofar as congressional consideration of its electoral votes  
is concerned. If the state legislature has provided for final  
determination of contests or controversies by a law made  
prior to election day, that determination shall be conclu-sive  
if made at least six days prior to said time of meeting  
of the electors. The Florida Supreme Court cited 3  
U. S. C. §§1­10 in a footnote of its opinion, App. to Pet. for  
Cert. 32a, n. 55, but did not discuss §5. Since §5 contains  
a principle of federal law that would assure finality of the  
State’ s determination if made pursuant to a state law in  
effect before the election, a legislative wish to take advan-tage  
of the “safe harbor” would counsel against any con-struction  
of the Election Code that Congress might deem  
to be a change in the law.  
After reviewing the opinion of the Florida Supreme  
Court, we find “that there is considerable uncertainty as to  
the precise grounds for the decision.” Minnesota v. Na-tional  
Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551, 555 (1940).  
This is sufficient  
reason for us to decline at this time to review the federal  
questions asserted to be present. See ibid.  
“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and  
unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitu-tions.  
But it is equally important that ambiguous or  
obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as  
barriers to a determination by this Court of the valid-ity  
under the federal constitution of state action. In-telligent  
exercise of our appellate powers compels us  
to ask for the elimination of the obscurities and ambi-guities  
from the opinions in such cases.” Id., at 557.•Cite as: 531 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2000) 7  
Per Curiam

Specifically, we are unclear as to the extent to which the  
Florida Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as  
circumscribing the legislature’ s authority under Art. II,  
§1, cl. 2. We are also unclear as to the consideration the  
Florida Supreme Court accorded to 3 U. S. C. §5. The  
judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is therefore  
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings  
not inconsistent with this opinion.  
It is so ordered.  
Please forgive the formatting, I threw some spaces in there somewhat randomly to make it easier to read. If my spaces somehow change the legal meaning of the opinion, please accept my apoligies:)
