Be a shame if a major natural disaster that hit one or more states in early November (disrupting the voting process) would lead to those states losing representation later on.
Very interesting.
This gets into another interesting issue. According to the Missouri Secretary of State, in the 2010 elections, there were 1,943,899 total votes cast in the election for the state’s contested U.S. Senate seat. The nine Congressional elections had a combined total of 1,920,675 votes.
So 23,000 lawful ballots were cast that didn’t have any vote for any candidate for any Congressional seat.
Not only that, but in the most tightly contested Congressional race (which ended up 49%-47%) fewer total votes were cast than in five other districts. And in four of those other districts, the winners’ majorities ranged from 63% to 77% of the total vote. The winner of the tightest race actually got fewer votes than the loser (of the same party) in another district.
In other words, the tighter race actually had a lower voter turnout than the blowout races. Not only that, but the tightest race had five candidates on the ballot, which means third party candidates also were represented.
So how would you apportion those Congressional districts?
There is no requirement for congressional districts at all. They are simply a custom. But if a stated wanted to have them, let them (and the courts) figure it out.
Okay, let’s say that state X has 10 congressional seats; no districts, all seats at-large. Currently party A controls 6 seats and party B has 4.
Come election time party A ruthlessly suppresses the voters of party B. As a result, the state actually loses one Congressional seat due to lack of turnout. Now party A still has 6 seats (and maybe they even suppressed Party B so well that they picked up another seat) but the state only has 9 total seats.
Or consider a 50-50 split. Both parties try to suppress each other’s voter turnout. The state’s representation drops by one seat. Instead of the current 50-50 split, one party has a 5-4 advantage. Perhaps they’re so effective that the state loses two seats. They still have equal power in their state, but they’ve lost overall influence.
In the first example, it’s in the majority party’s advantage to suppress the minority vote, to obtain a stronger overall advantage. In the second case, it’s actually in BOTH party’s advantage to try and suppress each other’s votes.
And whether the Congressional delegation is at-large or by districts, there’s no advantage to either party in trying to increase the overall number of voters, only the number of voters who will reasonably be expected to support that party.
So if I’m the majority party, there’s no advantage in possibly getting more seats in Congress, if it may cause me to lose my majority. And if I’m the party out of power, I’m already trying to get my suppressed voters to vote.
But with such a rule, the party in power would pay a price (in your example one seat in Congress) for gaining nine sure things. Presently, the Ins can suppress the vote, win more seat than they otherwise would and pay no price at all.
What about uncontested elections? Voter turnout is naturally going to be lower because it literally won’t matter how many people vote for the candidate beyond the 1 is takes to win.
Until this amendment, you’re punishing the person so good at his or her job that no one wants to run against the incumbant. What would the candidate do then? Actively go out and seek competition just to have increased voter turnout? How is that logical?
Well then, ideally we would have a prod to encourage people to run for office.
Again, why not just suppress voting next door?
I live in a Democratic congressional district. The next one over is Republican. Why not do everything I can to suppress voter turnout in the adjacent district, so next cycle the voters that do live there have their votes lessened?
This is really a terrible idea, IMO, however good it looks at first.
It reminds me of the old riddle about the two guys who made a bet about whose horse was the slowest.
How about we restrict representation to only those who make income over x dollars, it will encourage states to raise their median income, right? Yeah, that’s it, it’s for the good of the poor.
The day we limit representation to anything less than the total population is the day we start on the road to the next revolution.
Apportionment as it’s now done includes however many undocumented immigrants responded to the census. Switching to the OP’s proposal would mean that states with large such populations would lose out.
Under current law, at-large congressional districts might be struck down as racially discriminatory, becuase they dilute minority voting power. You’d want your amendment to specify that they are permissible.
That would be my worry.
That Left Hand of Dorkness goes to Alabama? Why? What are you hiding there?
Having semi-independent states is itself a strength of the national system as a whole, and devices to preserve the powers of states as states are therefore desirable simply for that purpose. Not that the apportionment of the Senate is the most essential element of this.
As for the amendment proposed in the OP–representatives should represent all the residents of their districts, voters or not. Children can never cast a legal ballot, for example, but certainly we want reps to consider the interests of their districts’ children. Districts are apportioned on the basis of total population, not on voting-eligible population, are they not?
Except that the party who does it wouldn’t be the ones paying that price: It’d be the party who was suppressed that would pay.
Here’s how it will work in the real world. According to the U.S. Elections Project, voter turnout in the 2010 elections was about 41%.
Let’s say states with 45% turnout or more gain seats, states with 37% or less lose seats. We’ll reserve the middle for “just average.”
Here are the winners:
Alaska
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Iowa
Maine
Minnesota
New Hampshire
North Dakota
Oregon
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming
And here are the losers:
District of Columbia
Mississippi
New Jersey
New York
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
In the winner’s column you have Iowa, Minnesota, North and South Dakota and Wisconsin – all solid, rural heartland states; New Hampshire, arguably the most conservative state in the nation; urban Rhode Island; and Wyoming, which is both conservative and rural.
In the loser’s column, you have the District of Columbia (certainly the nation’s most liberal voting district) and New Jersey, both heavily urban; New York and Texas, two of the largest states; Mississippi, rural and probably the poorest state; and Utah – which is growing rapidly and competes with New Hampshire for the title of most conservative state.
Based on the actual voting patterns, what problem does changing Congressional apportionment solve?
Actually, I think it is covered in the 14th Amendment just never enforced even when blatent
I can think of two possible ways: A poor or otherwise undesirable territory applies for statehood, and it is offered statehood on the condition that it receives only one Senator; a rich or powerful territory applies for statehood on the condition that it should receive three Senators. Both pretty unlikely as things stand today, but I can envision it happening in the early U.S. more easily.
This isn’t right, because voter turnout is expressed as voters divided by voting-eligible adults. The relevant ratio for assessing the impact of the OP is voters divided by population.
The largest group of non-voting-eligible population is children. It seems perverse to take away their representation in Congress. Children can’t vote, of course, but they’ve always been recognized (as were women in earlier generations) as part of the polity in whose interest Congress is acting. I see no reason to change this.
I note prisoners are also counted for congressional representation, although the prisoners are not allowed to vote.