“Be happy in your work.”
Of course - but then again there is a gap between “they wouldn’t agree to the conditions we insisted on” and “a negotiated surrender was strictly not possible”, isn’t there ? It wasn’t reached because both sides had mutually exclusive demands & expectations, and neither was *willing *to budge. This includes the Allies, obviously.
Not that I’m really arguing the Allies should have compromised - that bit of Devil’s advocacy was a response to the notion that saving lives is the paramount moral consideration. *If *it is, then biting the bullet and letting the hardliners remain in power in Japan proper would have been “the right thing”.
He said they had been eminently convenient pretexts for the growing peace movement. But that doesn’t mean they were the only possible thing that could or would have been used as such pretext - for example, the Soviets smashing into what was left of Manchukuo could conceivably have done the trick too, couldn’t it ? In fact, apparently some historians argue that the involvement of the Soviets did a lot more to bring about unilateral surrender than the atomic bombings.
I don’t - I do have a spark of critical thought sloshing around somewhere, you know. I think it’s in my other jacket, I can check if you really insist.
But you can’t lurk around grognardy forums without picking some stuff up, even if it’s just painstakingly, ponderously cited kvetching about how “they got this bit all wrong !”. Hardcore milsims like Silent Hunter are not quite the same kettle of fish as, say, boom-takatakata-zim-bang Call of Duty - nor are their respective fandoms.
To put it in perspective for you, the former are the kind of forums where debates still passionately rage on regarding what the proper failure rate for Mark 14 torpedoes hitting their target at angle so-and-so oughta be set to for the January-March 1942 period ; or how to interpret the painstakingly collected and collated official historical data (as put in critical perspective by the recorded accounts of sub skippers) in order to achieve a precisely historical dud rate. These people emphatically do not fuck around with their WW2 trivia :).
ETA: I will however cop to the fact that picking up lots of trivia does not a comprehensive picture paint.
I realize that - but blockades take time to set in, and while the Japanese supply fleet did suffer heavy losses more or less throughout the war, its crippling and comprehensive destruction was more of a late war, snowballing development. I think.
I will concede that the notion was more candidly naive than anything though, particularly in light of the food sitch.
Yes, but then again the delusions of the leadership, or even the level of indoctrination of individuals don’t necessarily mean much - Hitler was also convinced that his Volksturm would fight to the death (even when his generals were sceptical, with good reasons), that the Wervolf SS squads would keep the proud Aryan resistance going even after the war was over, that Germany would burn to cinders before its people would tolerate surrender, and so on.
In actual fact, the last remnants of the German military and its citizenry didn’t quite live up to these expectations past a certain point, a desperation/hopelessness/futility event horizon if you will.
Now, the situation was not 1:1 equivalent in the Pacific of course, and the events that transpired on Okinawa do speak of much greater levels of sheer existential terror on the part of the people involved - not even for their country or culture, but for *their own *continued existence if ever taken by the Allies.
How much of that was due to ingrained culture and propaganda, and how much was caused by the actions and behaviours of Allied troops on the ground would be a heated debate in and of itself - the facile, conventional answer that “oh, they were all fanatics with bushido warrior credos” doesn’t really satisfy me (if anything, because every army and country in the history of ever has used “never surrender ! death before dishonour !”-style propaganda. “We shall fight on the beaches…”), and poring through Wiki pages following this thread does paint a slightly different picture, notably from historians who interviewed Japanese veterans and civilian survivors.
I think everyone in Japan was well aware that things had gone hopelessly pear shaped for them long before the bombs dropped.
I’m still not completely convinced the nuclear bombs had that much more of a decisive effect on that sentiment, even if they were seized upon and politically exploited by the moderates. In terms of Allied price in lives per Japanese dead, or ease of obliteration they weren’t really that much of an improvement over regular carpet bombings, firebombings, constant naval shelling etc. even though they were probably more… dramatic maybe ?
Click on DrDeth’s link.
Done and done.
The hardliners were not willing to give up until their emperor ordered them to in August of 1945, after we had burned up their island, invaded and conquered one of their home countries, began to starve them out, sunk all their ships, had the USSR declare war on them, unleashed a new weapon of unbelievable magnitude, etc. They still wanted to hold on to their conquered territories, not disarm to the Allies and retain their current system of government.
What would have induced them to quit in 1944 as you suggest?
It’s OK to play the Devil’s advocate, but at some point you need to have something to back up your claim.
It is also unacceptable to simply wave your hand dismissively and say it was both sides’ fault. The Allies were not the ones invading and slaughtering civilians in other countries.
Vary familiar with this. Please note my repeated admonitions to others for not including the Soviet entry into the war as a gross oversight when discussing the surrender.
Are you familiar with any of the actual arguments the historians are making? I have my opinions on the matter and believe took a combination of the two. If you have any specific claims it would be interesting to discuss.
Please see this postfrom a recent thread, which I discount the bushido thing. That post also discusses the nature of the Japanese government and why the military had so much more power in Japan than in Germany. So much so, that your arguments concerning what happened in Germany are irrelevant.
This is incorrect as can be seen by actions and words of the members of the military leaders, including the key members of the Supreme Counsel. While they knew they were getting destroyed, they had deeply held belief, however completely irrational, that when the Americans invaded Japan, the Japanese soldiers would fight so hard, and inflict so much damage on the invading forces, that the Americans would settle for something less than a total surrender of Japan.
The everyone in Japan was irrelevant. The decision to surrender came down to a ruling oligarchy.
How so?
They were. The regular carpet bombing and shelling were destructive to a certain, but the atomic bombs destroyed everything in it’s radius. They US was firebombing, which was very effective on wooden houses, but not so much on factories.
The winds over Japan were fast enough that the bombers’ guidance couldn’t work quickly enough to allow precise bombing. If they went against the wind, then they had too slow of a ground speed and were more vulnerable to AA, so they started flying at higher altitudes, but using general purpose bombs were ineffective. This is the reason the USAAF went to napalm, in which they could fly lower at night to reduce the losses to AA and precision was not a requirement.
Again, there were all of the Allied POWs set to be executed, all of the civilians dying, people dying in the occupied countries. How exactly could the US stop the war quickly?
Let me ask some questions. What responsibility did the US have to its service members held as POWs? And what responsibility did the Allies have to the civilians in the occupied countries, if not but to end the war as quickly as possible to save as many people.
Your suggestions would simply have caused a far greater amount of deaths, many of starvation and disease, certainly not a painless process. This is something which I find abhorrent.
Sorry, I didn’t think you were taking him seriously, but just wanted to be sure. I had one of those ‘oh god no, not again’ moments; his whackadoo claims were brought up seriously in a recent thread.
As TokyoBayer said, that would have required the hardliners to be willing to negotiate in 1944. They weren’t even willing to negotiate after both bombs had been dropped and the USSR entered the war. It’s also worth noting that a coup of ‘double patriotism’ (acting against the emperor’s expressed wishes in favor of his ‘true’ wishes) was attempted on Aug 14/15 with the intent to place Hirohito under house arrest, prevent his recorded acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration from being broadcast and to continue on with the war. I didn’t say Hirohito’s surrender speech for a reason; the word surrender does not appear anywhere in the speech (full text here), and it was not immediately clear what it meant to the masses.
In the case of Japan in WW2 it wasn’t delusions of leadership; the Japanese had consistently fought almost literally to the last man during the entire course of the war whenever defeated, even when the tactical position they had been forced into made further resistance entirely futile. This never came close to happening for the Germans, even on the Eastern Front with all of its brutality. Hitler ordered 6th Army to fight to the death at Stalingrad and denied Paulus’ requests starting on Jan 22 to surrender as the situation had become hopeless. Nonetheless Paulus surrendered his remaining 91,000 men on Feb 2, 1943. Signs of Japanese morale cracking have to be seen in context; on Okinawa where 123,000 Americans and Japanese had killed each other, the battle ended with Japanese prisoners being taken in the thousands for the first time ever. ~7,400 prisoners were taken; but 95,000+ had been killed, and the prisoners were largely local Okinawans impressed into service during the battle and Korean laborers. Five months beforehand at Peleliu Japanese losses were 10,695 killed and 202 captured. Worse for the Americans the Japanese had abandoned the strategy of resisting at the shoreline and launching suicidal counterattacks to try to drive the invasion forces off of the island which had never succeeded in favor of digging in deeply throughout the island, not launching fruitless counterattacks and simply making the Americans pay in blood as much as possible. Hidden in the caves, 35 Japanese soldiers held out until April 22, 1947 when they were finally convinced by a Japanese admiral that the war was in fact long over. Throughout the Pacific Campaign things went more the way they had from the first Japanese defeat and American victory on land, the Battle of Tenaru River on Guadalcanal in 1942 where Ichiki’s troops fought suicidally to the death; only 15 prisoners were taken and 777 killed. To the horror of the Marines, wounded Japanese tried to kill their would be saviors after the battle:
As a final note on the issue of starvation, Japanese logistics were always tenuous at best. More Japanese died of starvation on Guadalcanal than from combat in 1942/43, and more died of starvation during the Imphal/Kohima battles in 1944 than as a result of combat. The soldiers on islands bypassed and cut off by the Allied advances across the Pacific were dying of starvation every day in 1945.
Do note, I wasn’t the one who put forward the possibility of 1944 peace negotiations.
In my own WhatIf mind, peace negotiations in earnest would only have been possible on even remotely acceptable terms when Japan itself, the only thing that might have mattered even a little bit to the ruling council (if only because that’s what they derived their personal power from), was in clear, present and unpreventable existential danger ; and when public order became that much harder to maintain. So, March/April 45 at the earliest.
Well, evidently they were, since they did surrender unconditionally and resigned themselves to occupation, full disarmament etc… That’s a negotiation, of sorts :).
One figures the Divine Emperor and his little friends, tremendous wilfully delusional shitheels though they may have been, could conceivably have settled earlier for less. One example would be Kido’s June proposal, which apparently was cautiously agreeable to the war cabinet, of ending all forms of hostilities ; withdrawing from occupied territories (barring Manchukuo, I think - that’d actually be the sorest point for me, the one straight and clear “no deal”) ; disarming for realz ; but no occupation or war crimes prosecutions. “Do over, let’s not do that again”, essentially.
Obviously, such a peace was never on the books as far as the Allies were concerned, and it’s eminently understandable why, but that’s the crux issue, isn’t it ? Diplomacy is nothing if not a sustained diet of bitter pills and barely palatable compromises.
Ultimately, the salient question is what goal is more moral or important to pursue: punishing the Japanese military clique for their crimes and removing them from power ; or avoiding the death of thousands upon thousands of people, the wounding of millions more - innocent and criminal alike (pre-supposing of course that even in the latter case, the crimes stop immediately). If you can’t have both, which to pick ?
To me, that is not such an easy, black/white assessment to make. Which, I guess, is reason #1 why I shouldn’t ever get into politics or the military 
It becomes much easier if you posit that had that kind of peace been agreed upon, then Japan would have remained immutably terrible, would only have re-armed and re-conquered in the exact same fashion 5, 10, 20 years down the line, but that’s hardly a given. Especially with nukes and a hefty dose of world opprobrium & scrutiny in the equation.
Yeah, but come on. Even Anami tossed those jokers out, and of the Japanese movers-and-shakers he seems to have been the most gung-ho loony and in deepest denial. I don’t think the actions of a handful of officers should be taken as indicative of the mindset of the Japanese military as a whole at that time, or even large swathes of it.
[QUOTE=TokyoBayer]
Are you familiar with any of the actual arguments the historians are making? I have my opinions on the matter and believe took a combination of the two. If you have any specific claims it would be interesting to discuss.
[/quote]
Not yet - I’m pretty much learning as I go here.
If they were irrelevant, what would have been the purpose of firebombing their houses, or even dropping leaflets ? Of course they were relevant - do you really believe the military establishment could have weathered a large popular uprising at any point in the war, much less at the eleventh hour ?
You quoted one of the guys yourself: “I think the term is inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, divine gifts. This way we don’t have to say that we have quit the war because of domestic circumstances”.
In other words, Yonai at least was concerned with saving face in a decision he was already in favour of for previously existing reasons. I assume that here, “domestic circumstances” is a charming, very Nipponese euphemism for “the whole country’s been getting blown to fine smithereens for a while now and people are starting to complain about the noise”. But the point is, he wasn’t saying “the bombs, the fire and the eating our boots we could take, no big, but nukes are just too much”.
The point was that it was the “hardliners” who were unwilling to surrender, or to negotiate a surrender, even after two nuclear bombs, Russian involvment plus all of the other issues facing Japan. I believe that’s an important distinction.
You have to remember that a lot of the political and military leadership on both sides of the war were veterans of the previous World War.
In my opinion, the Allied leaders were not going to be satisfied with some kind of return to the status quo. They were going to want to be sure that Germany and Japan couldn’t just rearm and try again in 20 years.
The U.S. experienced something of this attitude again, within my lifetime.
Vietnam was seen by some people as an overall failure due to shifting (or vague) political goals or limits that negatively impacted military operations and/or safety.
Whether that is actually true or not is the subject of another thread. I only report that the opinion existed because I think it shaped the actions of Bush the Elder, Powell, Schwarzkopf, and others, in their handling of Operations Desert Shield & Desert Storm.
After two of their large cities were reduced to rubble in seconds, it was still a deadlock in the Supreme Council over whether to surrender. The Emperor broke the deadlock. The blockade, the firebombing, two nukes and the invasion by the Soviets were barely enough of a hard time to get them to surrender. I’d say between the holdout soldiers, the popular uprisings against the surrender, and their unrealistic expectations about what they could negotiate for; it’s pretty obvious that before early August Japan wasn’t anywhere near a surrender any victor would accept, much less a bunch of angry Americans.
Indeed that’s what I meant, the military half of the cabinet was still in favor continuing the war after both bombs and the Soviet intervention, and they had the deciding power over the civilian half of the cabinet, both de facto and de jure. By law if the military withdrew one of its cabinet members and refused to nominate a successor, the PM had to resign and a new government formed. It took the personal intervention of the Emperor to make them abandon the position of continuing the war.
As you say, such a proposal was entirely unacceptable to the Allies. That this was being tossed around as a serious peace proposal by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in June, 1945 speaks more to the level of delusion existing at all levels in the Japanese government. I know you didn’t say it, but since it frequently comes up on the topic of an earlier Japanese surrender, from Downfall: The End of The Imperial Japanese Empire:
I didn’t say it was indicative of the military as a whole. It is however worth noting that it was the mindset of enough to put a coup in motion to prevent the surrender from happening even after Hirohito gave his backing to it. Anami didn’t 'toss those jokers out:
That’s not exactly tossing them out and certainly not having them all arrested for plotting treason, something one would expect the Minister of War to do as part of his job rather than letting the chips fall where they may by being fully aware of the planned treason but not becoming personally involved pending its outcome. He also comitted suicide after the failure of the coup.
Oh, clearly, yes. As I already said long ago in this thread, I think I understand why things happened the way they happened, and I don’t blame the people who took these decisions at that time, based on their own subjective experiences and in their own historical context.
Well, since you bring it up, I was originally going to use the Iraq situation as a perhaps more relate-able illustration of the difficulty of that moral assessment.
Back in '91, like everybody else I wasn’t exactly overjoyed with the coalition’s decision not to pursue Saddam Hussein & co. over their various monstrosities, despite having comprehensively defeated his army. Was the decision to end the hostilities “half way through” over concerns re:human cost right or wrong then ?
Flash forward to 2003, do over, this time it’s decided that removing him was in retrospect a better idea, let justice be done, oooah. But doing that results in anywhere between two hundred thousand and half a million people dead (including ~5000 Americans and ~200 Brits), probably three times that many wounded, the country in ruins, psychological trauma galore etc… Right or wrong ? Worth it or not ?
Fuck if I can tell.
[QUOTE=Dissonance]
It took the personal intervention of the Emperor to make them abandon the position of continuing the war.
[/QUOTE]
Yes. What prevents us from imagining a similar tie-breaker Imperial intervention prior to that, given different circumstances and diplomatic overtures ? It’s not like he was left out of the loop.
Possibly the fact that earlier, nuclear weapons weren’t burning his cities down to match sticks and the Russian hadn’t declared war on them?
Five blokes consistently failing to convince anyone else isn’t much of a coup though, is it ? Nor is the mindset of the troops that followed them much indicated, since the conspirators apparently had to forge orders and lie to them as to the real purposes of their actions.
The Matsue incident, or for a similar postwar example Yukio Mishima’s spontaneous bout of retardation in the 70s, look like more of the same to me: a small group of dissenters expecting that the whole Army/country would rise to support them if they could only address them, and being very puzzled when they, in fact, didn’t. Very Business Plot.
Isn’t the fact that in each case the idealists were promptly stopped and/or treated like kooks not *more *indicative of the larger, more general mindset ?
OK, went back and picked up a number of posts to gain clarification.
I’d be interested in your thoughts after you read the essay linked by Dissonance above.
Factually incorrect, as is well established by numerous direct accounts. This argument is mind boggling and runs counter to everything I’ve ever read or studied on the war.
To quote myself on a reply to another poster:
What specifically would you have done? Allowed millions of civilians in China and other occupied counties die what we fought a “clean” war? Slaughter hundreds of thousands more boys out of high school? Allowed millions more Japanese civilians and soldier to starve to death?
Make no mistake. That was was hell and it is terrible that circumstance were such which lead to the horrible deaths of so many civilians as well as combatants.
The essay linked above points out the ease of condemning from afar, and I would be interested in hearing a rebuttal as to why yours is not the simplistic argument it seems.
In your opinion, what terms would have been acceptable to the Japanese military?
Fortunately we have more information to rely on, including the leadership of the Japanese armed forces who, unlike you, were worried about the officers not following the order to surrender.
This was in response to your statement.
. Again, rubbish and as far wrong as one can be. The ultra nationalists knew that things were extremely sever, but they still believed that they could inflict enough damage to the invading Allied that they could be allowed an armistice which would allow them to remain in power.
Are you working with any cites for these assertions?
The Japanese civilians would not have made a popular uprising. Period. What many of the leaders were concerned about what after the inevitable defeat, and that the public would reject the imperial system. There is good reason to believe that this was one of the key concerns which was instrumental in forcing the Emperor to finally take action.
No one here is discounting everything else. In fact, I referral to it in my posts. This was in response to your statement
However, the question is if the atomic bombing and the entry of the USSR were irrelevant then why didn’t the frantic meetings of the Cabinet and Supreme Council and among the various players including audiences with the emperor start on August 5th?
Again, we have the notes of the Cabinet meetings over the critical period which demonstrates your argument is without merit.
OK, we’ve been down this before so again I’ll ask: What specific overtures would have allowed this circumstance to change?
Wow. I don’t often see a factual error by Dissonance, even if it’s just a nitpick.
There were two bodies here. The cabinet and the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War (the “Big Six”). There were only two members of the military in the cabinet, the Minister of War (Army) and the Minister of Navy. Correct on their ability to withdraw a member and cause the government to fall. This was a major concern of the moderates in the final days.
Four members of the cabinet, the above two as well as the PM and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were joined by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy as the Big Six of the Supreme Council. The Chiefs of Staff nominally reported directly to the Emperor himself and were not directly under the respective ministers.
At the end of the war, the PM was Admiral Suzuki so five of the six were military. The driving force of the moderate faction Minister of Foreign Affairs: Shigenori Tōgō was joined by PM Suzuki and the Minister of Navy Yonai in accepting the Potsam Declaration while it was opposed by the other military members. The Chief of the Army Staff Yoshijirō Umezu was also fanatical and was aware of the attempted coup but didn’t take action to either join or stop it.
One simply cannot compare Mishima to the ultranationalists of the 30s and 40s. That’s silly.
Someone who would have an informed opinion of the potential danger would be Privy Seal Kido who spend the night at the imperial palace because of concerns for assassination, which was a real threat. See the history of militarism in Japan in the 30s.
I still stand by it. I also stand by my lack of condemnation of Allied command’s decisions, as examined in their historical and subjective context. I’m well aware of presentism, thank you very much.
Which is also why I think musing from our own point of view is more interesting, or meaningful - we can’t think like them or put ourselves in their subjective shoes. So why pretend ? Or bother passing judgement ?
Do you seriously not get that distinction/dichotomy ?
Clarification: by pointless here I meant “couldn’t have reversed the course of the war”. That some were deluded enough to stand by their pre-war assessment that they could break the resolve of the Allies if only they killed enough, a little more, just a little more and they’ll cave for sure, is not in dispute.
From both your insistence that I read that essay (which I did), and comments like these, you seem to be taking me for a run of the mill “they should have assaulted instead, what bastards”.
I may be sketchily informed on the details, possibly naive also, but I’m not completely retarded. And I never, not once, made that argument. You’re talking to yourself here. It’s almost self-evident that a conventional assault on the islands would have taken much longer, and resulted in unmitigated slaughter and this even if the Japanese Army had only presented token resistance. Between encouraged mass suicides, starving refugees fleeing the frontlines, angry Marines in kill mode running into same, not to mention of course the months of bombings, shellings… When I wondered what the morale situation was really like among what was left of the army, and the people, that was strictly that. Wondering. About how the Japanese on the ground felt.
The atrocities I was referring to in that post were not the A-bomb droppings and were part of a different sidetrack altogether. I don’t consider the A-bomb droppings as atrocities, or as outstanding atrocities if you prefer - as I’ve said before, they were in line with how the war had been going and the tenets of total war. The concept of total war itself is some kind of bizarrely methodical madness, of course, but that’s what everybody was coming down with back then, so…
I already answered that question. Though I’d rather frame it as “could” than “would”.
What they were worried about is immaterial, when the fact remains that it didn’t happen to any meaningful extent.
…so popular opinion was irrelevant *and *instrumental. Ooookay then.
Not big on nuance, are you ? “Much more of an effect” != “irrelevant”. And I was only speaking to the effect of A-bombing vs. “mere” sustained conventional carpet bombings on the feelings of the peace proponents ; the entry of the USSR and its effect were outside the scope of that particular musing.
Again, I’ve already answered that question, as have you in a sense: an armistice that would have allowed them to remain in power, and Japan-as-of-1914 unoccupied. Everything else as per Potsdam - immediate and unilateral withdrawal of everything everywhere, restitution of all land, disarmament, reparations… and if they didn’t agree to terms as magnanimous as that, then yeah, fuck 'em where they live.
The question I’ve been asking (and am personally struggling with) is, imagining an alternative reality where the Allies would magically have been willing to approve of such terms because they’d be modern people, and in the event that Japanese leaders had agreed to them, what would have been the moral thing to do ? End the bloodshed then and there ; or keep on through to Potsdam without compromise, atom bomb and all ?
Wait, you would have offered to leave the Militaristic stage of the Showa government in place? Good God, I don’t see how that could have led to anything but war again. Leaving the Emperor in place was pretty much a concession of convenience. It meant that we didn’t have to tear Japan’s society out at the roots, and rebuild them psychologically as a country.
I don’t think a modern country that behaved like Japan did from 1930-1945 would be allowed to even maintain a figurehead leader if they were defeated. I don’t think you can really compare Saddam’s behavior, or the screwed up war that led to his eventual demise.
The main difference between then and now is: only one side had nukes, and was ignorant of the full cost of using them. That’s not the case today. If we were attacked by a non-nuclear power, we probably wouldn’t use nukes, because we’d be international paraiahs. I think we’d still demand the total surrender of any country that attacked us in the manner of Pearl Harbor. If they were a nuclear power, we would be in for some tense days.
Was there that much fundamental difference between Showa Japan and Stalinist Russia, on the “predictably necessary future war front” ?
Actually there is, and possibly a meaningful one - while even in tense peacetime Russia was always eager to export its ideology abroad and form ties that way, Showa Japan was always flying more or less solo, and the most basic principles of its racial-, national-centric ideology would have ensured that it remained isolated even *if *every neighbour of theirs hadn’t positively, irrevocably and profoundly hated their guts. Which they did. Oh, how they did. Still kinda do to this day, really.
Beyond that, can we absolutely dismiss, out of hand, the possibility or likelihood of its structure meaningfully evolving in defeat ? As has been mentioned, that was a fear for its leaders at the time ; and it would have been pretty difficult for them to argue with anyone that their leadership and ideas had brought most radiant prosperity to glorious Nippon. Not with so many dead in the ruined streets, not with their power & status in the region reduced to a smouldering nub compared to what was still fresh in living memory, their plans proven dead wrong etc…
Actually, and as I think about it, the question of POWs and their putative influence on such a potential prospect is intriguing - they feared that they would be rejected by the country and treated as “ghosts”, even if allowed to return home. The administration definitely wrote them off as soon as they were captured, and publicly denied even their existence (though that was kind of an open secret). And indeed, historically, quite a few looked down on them after their return (to the point of receiving hate mail and death threats).
But the prevailing attitude still was a neutral “Good job. You tried”. I wonder how much of that can be chalked as the exclusive, direct result of the fatalistic, “we don’t have a say, it can’t be helped” Japanese leitmotiv during the US occupation, and how much was simply human behaviour, lassitude with conflict and so forth. According to this book (which I’ve been devouring thanks to this thread - fascinating stuff) one of the greater impactors, besides time, on popular perception of POWs in Japan was the capitulation of the Emperor himself. I guess the reasoning was that, if even the divine yadda yadda had to bow his head, what more could the little people have done ? Not sure even a “partial” surrender of Japan could have been spun as anything *but *a surrender, even if couched in euphemisms, “saving face” omissions and the like.
And if we can posit that POWs would have in time been fully re-integrated into society, then their testimony of what had happened to them in Allied camps, of how the Allies were not as barbaric and inhuman as the War Ministry’s propaganda would have had them believe (at least off the frontlines), might have had a serious positive effect.
For nuking a universally hated country, topped by a leadership with a well documented history of aggression and utmost brutality ? *And *after they’d made the first move to boot ? I sincerely doubt it, particularly if you factor out the public stigma of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Isn’t that lingering doubt a large part of what keeps the DPRK in check, they of “China’s our only ally on paper and they can’t fucking stand us” ?
Fridge Moment ETA Wait, are you saying that, all other things being equal except for awareness of the full cost of nukes*, today we would move towards “storm the beaches” over “nuke 'em” ?!
- which would have been gained regardless of their use - according to this summary of a cite they *were *for the most part known of in '45 (and predicted in '40) by the scientists of the Manhattan project ; it’s just that information was compartmentalized in such a way that the key people who took the decision (nevermind the soldiers who dropped it) hadn’t been informed when they did.
This thread is better than a sitcom!