Are you suggesting there was an attempt to communicate by Japan* between* the two bombings that was mistranslated and led to the second bombing?
The ambiguous translation that I’m aware of came before the first bombing, not between them. While it’s conceivable that a different interpretation might have resulted in neither bomb being dropped (unlikely IMO), I can’t see how it would have affected only the second bombing.
Not a sin at all. In any way or in any sense of the word.
Like I said, I couldn’t remember where I read it. I thought it was in between, but I guess I misremembered.
Comment, in a slightly bitchy way but useful:
As usual, seems most posting here are completely ignoring the effect of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and focussing only on the US (and grudgingly it seems the Commonwealth) on the Emperor’s decision - i.e. pacific war from western POV. There’s a reason chiang kai shek was at Potsdam too you know, manchuko etc were most important to the Japaenese. And also don’t be too fooled by stuff about the Japanese Emperor acting in a completely unprecedented way (or at least being a godlike figure) - see Meji restoration etc. And at least he survived to look after some koi carp.
Regarding the OP - the Nagasaki bombing was designed so as to give the impression that the US had access to lots of bombs, that is why it was so close to Hiroshima. Perfectly justified tactically and strategically.
This was a fight for civilisation. Almost anything would have been justified. It’s just a shame what happened to the UN after the war.
I can’t remember where I read it, but it was decades ago and I can’t make any convincing counterarguments to the claim: Hiroshima was the last bomb of WWII, and Nagasaki was the first bomb of WWIII. That’s lost some of its punch since we backed down from the Cold War abyss but still has the potential to be true in the long-range sense.
Where I can read more online about the internal machinations of Japan after the two bombs? I find it difficult to believe that the power of those two bombs, plus all of the Allied wins, weren’t enough to convince some in the Japanese army to not surrender. I want to know more about what the emperor did, how it was done, etc. Anyone help?
Somewhat trite, but the Wikipedia article on the Surrender of Japan has some good stuff.
I do not know about online links especially but can recommend good books.
The atomic attack on Hiroshima was made on August 6. Truman made a public announcement on August 7 that if Japan did not immediately surrender there would be further attacks. Japan did not respond. The atomic attack on Nagasaki was made on August 9. The Imperial Council held a meeting on the evening of August 9-10 and decided to surrender.
So it seems to me Japan was given a reasonable opportunity to surrender after the Hiroshima bombing and chose not to use it.
All of my thoughts on the events of August 1945 are summed up in G.E.M. Anscombe’s essay “Mr. Truman’s Degree” – the barbarism of “unconditional surrender”, the decision to attack civilians as a means to an end, all of it.
http://www.pitt.edu/~mthompso/readings/truman.pdf
Anscombe was devoutly Catholic (and you’ll find that in references here and there in this essay). I don’t subscribe to religious beliefs anymore, but her argument against not only Truman’s actions but the conditions in which he made them (e.g. unconditional surrender) is one that I find compelling.
The atomic bombings certainly saved many lives. Not just the lives of American soldiers, but the lives of Japanese civilians who would have died during the on-going fire bombings, the lives of Allied prisoners of war (in August 1945 there were still some in Kanchanaburi repairing the infamous railroad!), the lives of people in territories still occupied by the Japanese, and the lives that would have been lost by atomic bombing during the Korean War since it was inevitable that these weapons would be used at least once before mankind intuitively grasp their full horror.
It’s possible that the Nagasaki bombing could have been delayed one week to give Japan time to appreciate the new weapon, BUT be aware that
Persistent ignorance on this matter does annoy. In the Best/Worst Presidents thread 3 years ago, Truman was condemned for the atomic bombings. When it was pointed out that the March 1945 bombings of Tokyo cost more lives, the reply was “That’s what I meant: bombing civilians.” Uhhh…
Possible nitpick: The very same day that Winston Churchill signed the Potsdam Declaration, Clement Attlee was summoned to Buckingham Palace and asked to form a new government. :smack:
Early in the essay, Anscombe repeats the claim that FDR knowingly abetted the attack on Pearl Harbor. I think this claim has been debunked at SDMB before. Anscombe bases his case on a distinction between innocent civilians and war participants. It is OK to kill those making bullets for their troops, but not those making bread for them. I don’t find this distinction compelling.
Anscombe objects to the goal of unconditional surrender (apparently agreeing that the bombings were OK given that goal). I can’t agree. Thou shalt not do this anymore seems like a better answer to Japanese atrocities than Game over. Play nice for a few years and we can all try it again! That Japan has replaced its samurai ethic with a pacifist one would seem to confirm the wisdom of Potsdam.
A peculiar irony there in a sense because Attlee, love him or hate him (or both, as I espouse) was probably the most significant PM of the 20th century, more important than Churchill frankly (others would have done a fairly similar job I think).
We had already killed as many people firebombing Tokyo as were killed in any atomic bomb. One bomber vs hundreds, similiar results.
I believe Oliver Stone lost his marbles a looong time ago.
FYI - The Kokura arsenal was the original, intended target of Bock’s Car and Fat Man. Weather problems cause a target change from Kokura to Nagasaki.
Japanese military authorities, or the Emperor, could have broadcast a radio message of unconditional surrender at any time, if that’s what they thought was the best option for Japan and it’s future.
The choice to use a 2nd bomb was “primarily” due to the fact that Japan had not surrendered. The Allied invasions of Japan were still being planned and assembled and would have been given the green light if use of the plutonium bomb had failed to convince Japan’s military/Emperor to surrender unconditionally.
I don’t know how long it would have taken the U.S. to produce a 2nd plutonium core for another Fat Man which makes it difficult to judge how long the invasions might have been delayed or if they would have delayed.
I hear this from time to time, and I’m never quite sure what people mean by that. There wasn’t a complete bomb assembled, but there was a third core being prepared. The mechanical pieces of the third bomb were already on Tinian. Kokura was selected to be the target. In fact Kokura was supposed to be the target on the 9th, but due to cloud cover they moved to the alternate target, Nagasaki. There is some question as to when it would be deliverable, but most of the eyewitness testimony was that the core was complete and sitting in Wendover, UT when Japan had surrendered. If Truman hadn’t suspended further atomic attacks without his explicit order, the core would have probably already been shipped. In any case it is pretty clear that a third bomb could be dropped by the 20th.
After that the US had sufficient production of plutonium that by November it was expected that an additional 12 bombs would be available. There are a series of memos between General Marshal, Groves, and Oppenheimer wherein this is spelled out. And then Marshal orders that whatever else happened at least nine of the 12 would be reserved for use in conjuction with Operation Olympic.
Not to be ignored, and figuring prominently in the calculations about the costs of invading Japan, was the fact that there were 900,000 IJA soldiers in Japan, preparing for defense of the home islands. Given that Japanese troops sustained 95% casualty rates on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, it’s not implausible to say that the vast majority of those Japanese soldiers were among the lives not lost by dropping the bombs.
People seem to feel using the atomic bomb was some immense moral issue that should have been agonized over for weeks and months. Keep in mind the world was eight years into a war that killed over sixty million people. People in 1945 probably didn’t see two hundred thousand people being killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki as that much of a moral issue.
Nagasaki wasn’t the obvious target; after Hiroshima, Kokura was the next target (with Nagasaki third). The weather conditions above Kokura saved it.
EDIT: Sorry, was beaten to it; had the post page up for ages before getting around to replying.
Niether was a sin. They were as the Strategic Bombing survey pointed out, not necessary.
Eight years ? I thought Pearl Harbour was a day that would live in infamy. Guess Franky D. was full of it 