Drachinifel (natch) has a 36 minute video, ‘Armoured’ and ‘Unarmored’ Carriers - Survivability vs Strike Power.
Many of them members of the Wisconsin National Guard, carrying on the tradition of the US Civil War’s Iron Brigade. Thirty years later, my dad drank with them at our town’s VFW. All these chubby old retired farmers, each with a bag of gold fillings stashed in their attics.
The USSR’s role in the Asian campaign is often overlooked. While many westerners are aware that the USSR swooped in to occupy Japanese territories in the final days of the war, there was an earlier conflict between Japan and the USSR and Mongolia - the battle of Khalkhin ghol. This started as a skirmish but escalated to a fairly major engagement. Basically, Japan got their keisters handed to them by the Soviets (led by Gen. Zhukov). As a result, Japanese leadership decided to seek resources in SE Asia, as opposed to tangling with the Soviets again in Siberia.
OK, conceded. Except maybe in the case of Guadalcanal. Or would you say the Marines weren’t needed there too?
One of my HS history teachers was a vet from the very tail-end of the war who had been dreading the impending invasion of Japan. He as patriotic as apple pie and as anti-commie as any good red-blooded American from those days. But he noted how grateful he and the soldiers he served with had been for the Soviet entry into the Pacific War. They had kinda expected them to renege or drag their feet and the USSR upholding the terms of their treaty to the letter and crushing the remnants of Kwantung army was a something of a morale booster (including the impact it may have had on the Japanese surrender).
If the deck were hit, not the island or sides.
The American advantage was that they could build so many of the darned things, as well as smaller escort carriers.
That’s pretty much what Drach says in his piece above, the American attitude was, “Eh, you damaged one of our CVs? We’ll just bring out this other one we had waiting.” Coupled with the excellent USN damage control practices (e.g. USS Franklin) it felt that was the way to go.
It’s interesting how much MacArthur downplayed the Australian contributions to the war, including issuing press releases identifying Australian troops as “Allied” rather than “Australian.” Americans think of WWII and American’s massive armed forces in 1944 and 1945, but most people don’t realize just how badly unprepared they were.
America had planned to build up its armed forces in the event of war, but also didn’t realize how badly they would be beaten up by a well prepared Japan.
In the second half of 1942, after Japanese transports were turned back at the Battle of Coral Sea and they were unable to invade Port Moresby. They attempted to cross over the Owen Stanley Range along the Kokoda Trail in what many people say were the worst conditions ever for fighting in WWII. The Australian army was able to push the Japanese back in months of fighting over terrible jungle conditions.
The majority of Army casualties in the Pacific were illness. I’m not sure if that was the same as for Marines as well.
We’ve had this discussion before, but it’s impossible to say which was more valuable in defeating the Japanese.
The firebombing campaign was a significant contribution to Japan’s decision to surrender without an invasion.
Operation Starvation is another often overlooked contribution
Another overlooked aspect was that many in the Go North faction never gave up that idea, so the IJA kept many troops in Manchuria and China to counter the perceived threat from the Soviets as well an option to invade if possible. That was one reason that Japan wasn’t able to fortify themselves in the Pacific and why they didn’t have enough troops to invade Australia. (They didn’t have enough shipping, anyway.)
- Where did I say the Marines weren’t needed?
- You know the US Army was at Guadalcanal too, right? Two Army divisions, the Americal and 25th were there alongside two Marine divisions, the 1st and 2nd.
Sure, not for the first two months, though. (Same citation! 
)
I’d say the Army’s ability to join the fighting there was entirely due to the Navy and Marines. I believe we can agree on this. Hopefully.
You’re conflating the Navy with the Marines. Without a navy to provide transportation over the seas, neither the Marines nor the Army could have fought at Guadalcanal. If the Marines didn’t exist, the Army could still have gotten there. The Army didn’t lack for troops trained in amphibious operations, and in any event the landing at Guadalcanal was virtually unopposed.
Here’s a fun fact: half the Marines landed on Saipan arrived in Army amtracks.
I’m not sure if you mean in the 1940s or in the present day. In the 40s Americans were fed on a diet very rich in jingoistic propaganda, so it is not unsurprising they didn’t have a good knowledge of the lack of preparedness of the military. But in modern times I feel like just about every treatment of WWII that focuses on the American side mentions the serious deficit the U.S. military was starting from initially.
I vaguely recall a story about an RAAF bombing mission from mainland Australia to Japan and back.
Did that really happen?
No RAF bomber could fly that far.
That’s over 3,500 miles one way. I don’t think even the B-29 had the range.
Nor any American one for that matter. With a 1,600 mile range, from Australia even a B-29 could reach only the southern half of the Phillipines.
The Catalina had a range of over 2,500 miles. Still not enough to get to Japan and back of course.
My father was the radar officer in a Cat squadron based in north Australia, he only mentioned bombing raids and recon runs as far as Rabaul, or west towards Ceylon.
And the only reason the Japanese tried to come over the Kokoda Trail was the Australians had defeated their first landing at Milne Bay.
The only mission profile I can think of that would fit the description (given known Allied capabilities) would be to land a Catalina at sea in Japanese-held waters to refuel from a submarine. Kinda like an Aussie version of Operation K - Wikipedia.
Would have verged on a suicide mission, IMHO, particularly after the Doolittle raid.
The reason that the army wasn’t involved in the initial Guadalcanal landing was that General MacArthur and Admiral King disagreed on strategy and hated each other.
Fortunately for the Allies, their personal rivalry was exceeded by the enmity between the Japanese Army and Navy (‘would rather loose the war than shake hands’)
Okay, it wasn’t Japan, it was Borneo. It is a fascinating story and I heard it on the radio. It is also a film.
‘Shady Lady’ is the epic story of the B-24 bomber aircraft called ‘Shady Lady,’ that set off from Darwin on Friday, 13 August 1943, on what was at that time the world’s longest ever attempted bombing mission of WWII, to the oil refineries at Balikpapan, Borneo.
‘Shady Lady,’ with a crew of 10 and one RAAF photographer, was one of eleven bombers that chased the setting sun westward past Timor, into heavily defended enemy territory.
The crew of ‘Shady Lady’ under the command of First Lieutenant, Doug Craig, had a hazardous journey to the target. Flying through numerous tropical thunderstorms that caused severe turbulence and greatly hampered navigator, John Nash’s ability to carry out celestial navigation. Despite all the odds, all 11 aircraft arrived individually at their target. ‘Shady Lady’ was the last to arrive and was tasked with not only attacking the target, but to also photograph it.