Was World War I avoidable?

Great Debates
81

Yeah, I’d say the obsession general staffs had with mobilization does resemble the strange logic of the Cold War, and for a similar reason. Just as the existence of ICBMs threatened nation-states with immediate extinction, the ability to mobilize vast armies and deliver them, fully equipped, to the front, threatened to render any state that was slow to mobilize with defeat.

The Keegan book I mentioned summarizes the reasons pretty lucidly. I can’t do it full justice here, but basically:
[ul]
[li]Improvements in farming increased food production[/li][li]Improvements in public health increased not only the size of the young population but also meant more of them were militarily healthy than in past generations[/li][li]Improvements in census-taking gave nations a much more accurate accounting of strength and a much better tool for mass conscription into reserves[/li][li]Improvements in communications helped governments shape public opinion (propaganda) and helped calling up the reserves in a crisis[/li][li]Improvements in industrial production enabled huge amounts of war material to be stockpiled in advance[/li][li]Improvements in transportation – especially railroads – permitted the rapid delivery of vast numbers of young men to depots to arm and then directly to railheads at the frontier[/ul][/li]
It was believed that vast, well-supplied armies equipped with breechloading rifles would be unstoppable offensive juggernauts, and defense itself fell out of favor. Military planners realized that meant the nations that perfected mass mobilization would have an enormous initial advantage in any coming war. Speed was the key to mobilization, and, in those pre-computer days, elaborate pre-planned organization was the only way to get that speed. They were intensively planning for it around the beginning of the century.

Necessary connections were built between previously independent rail lines and gauges were standardized. Railroads were nationalized (or cooperated closely with governments) and detailed plans written to remove potential confusion on the inevitable Mobilization day. Sleepy rural towns in Germany that hardly ever saw passenger traffic were built with brand-new disembarkation platforms a mile long, so that huge trainloads of soldiers could be offloaded all at once.

All Europe was trending this way – not because anyone especially wanted war, but because the population trends and the technologies of the time threatened national extinction to those who did not prepare in this way. And when the balloon finally went up, everyone felt enormous pressure to launch the machinery of mobilization or be caught half-mobilized, and destroyed. Million-man armies sprang up, fully armed, in only days.

To show just how rigid the mobilization plans were, look at this chilling passage from Wikipedia, in which Kaiser Wilhelm was flat-out unable to get his military to stop launching war against France and England:

[QUOTE=Wikipedia]
On August 1st 1914, a British offer to guarantee French neutrality was sent out and promptly accepted by Wilhelm.[178] At 4:23 PM a telegram from the German Ambassador to Britain arrived with a planned British proposal to guarantee the neutrality of France and thus limit the war to one fought in the east. Wilhelm then ordered German forces to strike against Russia alone, leading to fierce protests from Moltke that it was not technically possible for Germany to do so as the bulk of the German forces were already advancing into Luxembourg and Belgium.[178] Wilhelm immediately accepted the proposal by telegrams at the ambassadorial and royal levels."[192] In keeping with this decision, Wilhelm II demanded his generals shift the mobilization to the east. Helmuth von Moltke (the younger), the German Chief of General Staff, told him that this was impossible, to which the Kaiser replied “Your uncle would have given me a different answer!”[193] Instead, it was decided to mobilize as planned and cancel the planned invasion of Luxembourg. Once mobilization was complete, the army would redeploy to the east.

In response to Wilhelm’s order, a dejected Moltke complained that “Now, it only remains for Russia to back out, too.”[178] Moltke then proceeded to persuade the Emperor to continue the advance for “technical reasons.”[194]

In Berlin, Bethmann Hollweg announced that Germany had mobilized and delivered an ultimatum to France telling that country to renounce its alliance with Russia or face a German attack.[195] In response to reports of German troops invading Luxembourg and Belgium plus the German ultimatum, French mobilization was authorized on August 1st.[196] On the afternoon of August 1st, Wilhelm signed the mobilization orders.[190] Bethmann Hollweg was angry with Moltke for having Wilhelm sign the orders without informing him first.[190] By 7:00 pm of August 1st, German troops invaded Luxembourg.[197]
[/QUOTE]

82

It’s amazing how much misunderstanding of each other and misunderstanding of their own situations leads to bad political decisions.

“They really wouldn’t risk war over this. It’s not important to them, but it is for us.”

“They really wouldn’t risk war with US! They must realise that we would win such a war.”

“They’ll surrender pretty quick, once we deliver a few sharp blows.”

“They can’t last. They’ll run out of troops/food/money/morale soon.”

83

And, of course, the always popular “We’ve come this far. We can’t stop now.”

84

Or, “we would dishonor the sacrifices of the fallen”!
Wars have a logic all their own-in which common sense goes out the window.
What would Germany achieve by victory over France? A sullen, resenful occupied population? Some more worthless African colonies?

85

You’re right–Germany had little to gain by defeating France. But they had to attack France, because France was allied to Russia. And, (they thought), they had a lot to gain by defeating Russia.

Russia had been modernizing and industrializing, with French financing, since the revolution of 1905. In a few years Russia might be stronger than Germany. But if Germany could win a war in 1914, Russia could be stripped of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland–all of which would fall more or less naturally into a German cultural and economic orbit. Russia could also be stripped of Poland and possibly the Ukraine, which would of necessity ally with Germany for protection.

The areas to be lost were among the most advanced and prosperous of the Russian Empire. Their loss would set Russia back by a generation at least. Germany would remain the most powerful country on the continent. And, the prestige of victory would lessen the pressure for annoying reforms like having the chancellor answer to the Reichstag instead of the Kaiser.

As it turned out, Germany did defeat Russia, and set it back by a generation. But it took so long to do so that the British naval blockade (ignored in German planning for a short war) destroyed Germany.

86

Thanks! So I guess Hitler’s designs on Russia really go back to Kaiser Wilhelm!
The whole “darng nach osten” seems to have been a feature of German nationalism.

87

It goes back at least as far as the Teutonic Knights. They were “crusading” in Eastern Europe in the 13th century.

88

As far as Germany being “allowed to have a Navy”, the modern equivalent would be worrying about which country has nukes.

89

Absolutely.
Although a navy leans a bit more towards projecting power, having nukes is more of a defensive measure.

Saying “you can’t have a navy.” means “We don’t want you fishing in our pond.” WE are the ones that carve up the world.

(The world already being carved up and the older payers not wishing to share, was of course also a factor in why Germany * had* to look East, if it wanted to expand. The dehuminisation of the Slavs needs to be seen in that light. The Slavs were to be Germany’s equivalent of “the natives”.)

Saying “you can’t have nukes.” means "We don’t want you to be able to defend yourselves. " WE want to be able to carve you up.

90

It is interesting to recall just how much Germany having a “blue water” navy bothered England.
Both Bismarck and Bethmann-Hollweg were against building up the High Seas Fleet-Bismarck because:
-Germany could never match the British Grand Fleet
-Spending money on the navy would divert money from the army
-Germany had no naval bases outside the Baltic Sea (and one on the North Sea-except for a few small ones in China, Africa, South Pacific). All of these could be easily blockaded by the mighty Royal Navy, in a war.
Bethmann-Hollweg opposed naval expansion because he saw no reason to (unncessarily) anger the British-challenging the Royal Navy was a sure way to drive England into alliance with France.
-the German Navy could never be decisive in a war with the UK
So, both of these highly intelligent, highly skilled leaders were overruled by the idiotic Kaiser Wilhelm.
So really, Wilhelm was largely responsible for the tragedy that was WWI.

91

Or Alfred Thayer Mahan. He wrote The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 in 1890. He argued that a country has to have a navy in order to be a great power. He was an American but his book was hugely influential in Germany and Japan and was used as the justification for naval expansion in those countries. This put Germany and Japan on a collision course with Britain and the United States.

92

And Mahan was right, of course.
Before this period, Britain had no navy to speak of.
When they decided to start building up their navy they were naturally on a collision course with the big navy of that day, the Dutch Navy.

I still think that those uppity Brits shouldn’t be allowed a navy. Why (unnecessarily) anger the Dutch?

93

“I do not say, my Lords, that the French will not come. I say only they will not come by sea.”

-John Jervis, 1st Earl of St Vincent

94

Latro, it’s not a case of a country being allowed to do something. It’s the simple reality of a country doing what’s in its best interests.

Germany with a big navy was a threat to Britain. France with a big navy was a threat to Britain. Germany decided to build a navy, even though it had no real need for one. France, on the other hand, went to Britain and agreed to limit its navy so it wasn’t a a threat to Britain. The result of this was Britain, which had traditionally been friendly with Germany and hostile towards France, reversed its position. Britain ended up fighting alongside France against Germany. Germany lost the war.

So what was Germany’s best interests? It wasn’t that it didn’t have a right to build a navy if it wanted to. But it was a bad idea and Germany would been better off if it had chosen not to build a big navy. A British alliance would have been worth more than a navy.

95

Absolutely right. Countries don’t have friends they have interests. Britain saw it as being against its interest for Germany to become a naval power able to achieve superiority in the North Sea so took steps to prevent it. In the early 20th century France was never in a position to challenge British naval dominance but Germany was. Germany’s industrial strength and large population allowed it to build a first class fleet while still having the most powerful army - something France could not do.

The danger to British national interests was perceived as so great that centuries of mistrust were overcome sufficiently for most of the British Mediterranean fleet to be brought back to home waters (something Tirpitz had failed to allow for) and the French accepted RN protection of their Atlantic coastline.

As for Germany being allowed to build a navy, Britain had not been “allowed” to build a navy to challenge the Dutch. Dutch national interest fiercely opposed it and led to four wars in the 17th and 18th centuries - including major defeats for Britain before the economic and political circumstances changed and the Dutch could no longer match their rivals.

As to Mahan in many ways he was a saviour for Britain in the two world wars. His ideas of the command of the sea and the fleet in being obsessed German naval thinkers leading to much expenditure of resources on beautiful but useless capital ships while, at least before the wars, failing to build submarines able to wage a guerre de course - the strategy that actually very nearly brough Britain to its knees.

96

For those following at home without a program, “guerre de course” means “commerce raiding,” that unglamorous but strategically vital attack on the enemy’s shipping and transport.

97

Ooops! Sorry - must not use jargon…

98

He knows that. He’s trying to shed some light on the assumptions we have, some of which are not honest. We could say that Britain felt it had an interest in stopping Germany’s fleet, and that contributed to the war. But to say that Germany caused the war in challenging England is not right. Both sides chose war over the alternative.

There’s long been a wish to place blame on Germany and pretending that Britain and France were innocent of any wrongdoing. Yes, Germany had its faults. But the war was coming, and ultimately occurred because millions of people in every European nation decided there should be a war. Britain wanted to put down the upstart German power, and since Germany unification had been unable to come to terms with the new situation on the Continent. France wanted revenge, land, prestige, and more revenge. Austria wanted glory, Russia wanted Serbia, and Germany wanted out.

I think they did misjudge their real situation. But only as a matter of degree and not of kind.

99

And I specifically addressed that point. German naval expansion was not a cause of the war. The cause of the war was Germany telling Austria to invade Serbia. Britain and France had no responsibility for that. Austria obviously had a share of that responsibility but Austria was unable to act without German support. So it was Germany that decided whether or not a war started.

Saying otherwise is historical revision, like trying to claim that both Japan and the United States were responsible for war in 1941. Yes, there were existing tensions between the two countries and both sides contributed to that. But it was Japan alone which decided to go from tensions to war.

100

No, you didn’t. You completely failed to analyze the many factors involved.

I don’t know of any reputable historian who would agree with that.

This makes no sense unless you have extremely picky rationales, and I highly doubt you’d apply such selective criteria elsewhere. Germany didn’t want to go to war against France or Britain, and didn’t want to go to war against Russia. They were prepared to do the latter as the price of the Austrian alliance, which they desperately needed. Even by yiour own logic, there would have been no world war (just a minor argument in the Balkans) except that Russia decided to mobilize and call in France.

No, saying otherwise is acknowledging that nobody had clean hands in that mess. Except the United States and other non-European countries who just wanted it over.