Sure, when it’s clear to everyone concerned that you’re just proposing a hypothetical. But in this case it appears that the would-be website designer invented a same-sex couple that supposedly asked for her services. Without any real client, it’s not clear that she would have had standing to sue.
That was my first question when i heard the case. Who the hell would hire a web designer at odds with their chosen lifestyle? It’s not like a baker, who might be the best in the area, or even the only one in the area. You can literally hire a web designer from across the world.
So I was both angry and not all that surprised to learn she’d made up the customer. And I’m really pissed that she abused the court system, when she hasn’t suffered any injury, in order to proclaim her bigotry to the world. And I’m even more pissed that the court decided to hear her case. They obviously have members anxious for an excuse to promote bigotry.
But isn’t there usually a real case underneath it all to base it on? In this instance it looks like there wasn’t.
They may have abused the court system, but they didn’t abuse this particular court, since much of the court seemed to be co-conspirators.
Is a cake not food? But we seem to agree that it becomes potential speech when it is a wedding cake. What about a gay couple who want to reserve the private dining room of a restaurant for a party? Can they be kicked out when the waitress realizes it’s a wedding anniversary? Can the chef refuse to “create” for them at that point?
What concerns me far more though is the chink in the wall. I predict this decision will become a cite for pharmacists who don’t want to sell plan B or oral contraceptives. And i especially worry what it will mean for gay and trans children with ultra-religious teachers in public schools. I don’t think the agenda has begun to be written, and i don’t trust this court to slow it down in the least.
It is useful if those hypotheticals are actually relevant, which in the case of this thread, they are not.
And it is also useful for there to be a real case for the courts to decide on, rather than one that exists only in the mind of the one bringing the suit.
Should I be able to sue on the basis of “What if they come into my house and drag me out and make me march in their Nazi parade?” I mean, it could happen.
That’s already covered. And as Bricker informed us it applies to any woman that the pharmacist suspects has had an abortion as the basis to refuse to fill any prescription sell her even a Tylenol.
No, that’s absolutely not what she does.
She just might, at some undetermined point in the future, do that.
As I quoted in post 25:
"
For its part, the Tenth Circuit held that Ms. Smith had standing to sue. In that court’s
judgment, she had established a credible threat that, if she follows through on her plans to offer wedding website services, Colorado will invoke CADA to force her to create
speech she does not believe or endorse. The court pointed to the fact that “Colorado has a history of past enforcement against nearly identical conduct—i.e., Masterpiece Cakeshop”; that anyone in the State may file a complaint against Ms. Smith and initiate “a potentially burdensome administrative hearing” process; and that “Colorado [has] decline[d] to disavow future enforcement” proceedings against her. Id., at 1174. Before us, no party challenges these conclusions."
The fact that Lorie Smith and her attorneys are likely liars in addition to bigots doesn’t really surprise me, nor would it have stopped the Court from finding she had standing.
I’m not really all that concerned about this Court’s flexible use of standing, other than it once again emphasizes the hypocrisy of the right wing’s (represented on this board by Bricker), crying about judicial restraint and manufactured court cases, but only when its a case that doesnt go their way.
Hey, now. Our wedding cake was a sheet cake with
Happiness is
Someone to love
Something to do
Something to look forward to
on it. The wedding was closest friends and family, about a dozen people and the cake was thrown in gratis by the same baker who did the cake for the reception party two days later. That was your more typical three-tier wedding cake with a different flavor on each layer, but the toppers were corn-husk dolls made by my mother.
I don’t know where this post (of mine) properly lives, so I hope I can simply cross-post it here:
How do you square that assertion with cited Rehnquist-era precedents? My oversimplified summaries do not do these cases justice, but I struggle to distinguish them from the present case.
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
(A private group of veterans organizing a parade may exclude a group of gay/lesbian/bisexuals from marching due to the latter group’s purpose of celebrating gay/lesbian/bisexual Irish-Americans, despite applicable state antidiscrimination/public accommodation laws, because they do not want to convey the idea that the parade is celebrating gay, lesbian, or bisexual Irish-Americans.)
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
(BSA may exclude membership to an openly gay individual on the basis of his activism, despite applicable state antidiscrimination/public accommodation laws, because they do not want to convey the idea that homosexuality is morally acceptable)
In my mind, I can distinguish the above line of precedents from the Warren-era cases Heart of Atlanta Motel, Katzenbach v. McClung, etc. as the latter do not involve expressive speech.
While I don’t agree with today’s Court that Colorado’s laws operate to eradicate the idea that marriage is or should be strictly heterosexual, it does appear that it would (in the hypothetical case) compel a wedding website designer to express support for same-sex marriages. I agree with the Court (and the 10th Circuit, and both parties) that custom tailored website design services here contemplated are expressive in nature. I see that as similar to writing a song or poem to celebrate a particular wedding.
The logical conclusion is that businesses can refuse to provide made-to-order expressive services for child marriages, polygamous marriages, interfaith marriages, nonreligious marriages, interracial marriages, etc.
~Max
I saw the story about this break the day before the ruling was released.
It’s interesting to consider what would’ve happened had this been discovered last year.
That’s different in my eyes, because it’s the 14th Amendment prohibiting the state from discriminating. Do States even have 1st Amendment rights? They sure didn’t assert them in the '60s. Here we’re dealing with a private person (actually, a private corporate person) doing the discrimination. I don’t think the equal protection clause applies.
ETA: The rationale used in Loving is persuasive, but it doesn’t clearly carry over as well-established law. Loving didn’t balance antidiscrimination against freedom of speech and I think that’s determinative here. ETA2: It’s also worth noting that in Loving, the “service” the party refuses to provide is not readily accessible elsewhere. The state government has a monopoly on marriage licenses, but even an undue burden would be enough to distinguish the cases for me. In the present 303 case, parties stipulated that there are other wedding website designers readily available.
~Max
That’s a very interesting point.
I wonder, though, whether (and what redress there could conceivably be, anyway) the SCOTUS just effectively interfered with a state (in this case, CO) that was trying to deliver Equal Protection via its “public accommodation” and “anti-discrimination” laws.
The counter argument, of course, would be that the ‘faithful’ got their brand of equal protection by way of this decision.
I, of course, wouldn’t agree … for a nearly unlimited number of reasons.
Neither Hurley, nor Dale, involved a commercial business. But don’t just listen to me, Sotomayor says it better:
"The majority, however, analogizes this case to Hurley and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640 (2000). The law schools in FAIR likewise relied on Hurley and Dale to argue that the Solomon Amendment violated their free speech rights. FAIR confirmed, however, that a neutral regulation of conduct imposes an incidental burden on speech when the regulation grants a right of equal access that requires the regulated party to provide speech only if, and to the extent, it provides such speech for others.
Hurley and Dale, by contrast, involved “peculiar” applications of public accommodations laws, not to “the act of discriminating . . . in the provision of publicly available goods”
by “clearly commercial entities,” but rather to private, nonprofit expressive associations in ways that directly burdened speech. Hurley, 515 U. S., at 572 (private parade);
Dale, 530 U. S., at 657 (Boy Scouts). The Court in Hurley and Dale stressed that the speech burdens in those cases were not incidental to prohibitions on status-based discrimination because the associations did not assert that “mere acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair [the association’s] message.” Dale, 530 U. S., at 653; see also ibid. (reasoning that Dale was excluded for being a
gay rights activist, not for being gay); ibid. (explaining that in Hurley, “the parade organizers did not wish to exclude the GLIB [Irish-American gay, lesbian, and bisexual group] members because of their sexual orientations, but because they wanted to march behind a GLIB banner”); Hurley, 515 U. S., at 572–573.
Here, the opposite is true. 303 Creative LLC is a “clearly commercial entit[y].” Dale, 530 U. S., at 657. The company comes under the regulation of CADA only if it sells services
to the public, and only if it denies the equal enjoyment of such services because of sexual orientation. The State confirms that the company is free to include or not to include any message in whatever services it chooses to offer. Supra, at 26–28. And the company confirms that it plans to engage in status-based discrimination. Supra, at 22–23, 31–32. Therefore, any burden on the company’s expression is incidental to the State’s content-neutral regulation of commercial conduct.
Frustrated by this inescapable logic, the majority dials up the rhetoric …"
Definitely. The State argued that it was satisfying its compelling interest to remove discrimination in places of public access. The 10th Circuit held that this was a compelling interest and the Supreme Court upheld that determination. But in order to compel speech (or overcome any other fundamental right) the State needs to prove that its particular law is narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest, and on that ground, the Court … implied … they failed.
I wish Justice Gorsuch had explicitly written as much but unless I missed it, he appears to have omitted that key point. Nevertheless it follows from the opinion’s holding. This isn’t some new exception to the strict scrutiny doctrine.
~Max
I read that, but didn’t find it dispositive. FAIR didn’t involve expressive speech, as I recall the central holding was that association with military recruiters on campus was not expressive speech. The present case involves expressive speech.
The cites I saw in the dissent don’t speak to commercial/noncommercial, at least not for expressive speech. Even the dicta doesn’t speak to why the distinction is relevant. I don’t understand the argument for why commercial/noncommercial is relevant. As the majority points out, most protected speech is paid for. Political speechwriters draw salaries, poets can sell their poems, photographers can sell their pictures, website designers can sell their designs, etc.
~Max
Literally the first example that jumped into my mind.
The part I bolded here is silly. Nothing you described is an endorsement. An endorsement is a public declaration of support for something. Considering the wishes of the other person is just the job of design.
Now maybe you could argue that certain designs would be endorsement. The obvious example would be making a cake that says “Gay marriage is awesome” on it. I’m sure you could come up with more.
However, anything you came up with would be specific to the people being gay. You couldn’t say that roses were an endorsement of homosexuality, for example.
Yes, design is a form of expression. No problem there. But the expression is the final result, not the process. Just like speech is the words you say, not the thoughts you have.
It is entirely possible to design a romantic weekend that would be the same regardless of the gender of the participants. You could have Pat and Jessie, and design something you know they’d like, without ever even knowing if they are both men, both women, one of each, or anything else.
It makes sense to argue that you can’t be compelled to endorse something. It makes sense to argue you don’t have to design something that pushes a view that you abhor. But it doesn’t make sense when you could design a neutral something instead.
That’s where the Court errs. If you wouldn’t do the exact same thing for a gay customer that you would do for a straight customer, then that is de facto discrimination. The only actual difference is the sexuality of the person–not the service or design.
I hold this in all such situations. I said it on the cake, where I said they shouldn’t be required to say “Gay is good” or paint the cake with a rainbow flag, but they should do whatever they would be okay with doing if the couple were straight. They should be okay with, say, putting roses on the cake.
That is where the line should be. That balances the right to freedom of expression the right to nondiscrimination. The line the Court has come up with errs way too far on the right to freedom of expression, allowing more discrimination than is actually necessary.
Short version: There is a difference between designing something for a gay couple and endorsing gay couples. Just like there is a difference between designing something for a bigot and endorsing bigotry. The court decision blurs the line between the two.