You’re kidding, right? What, exactly, do you think Roe v. Wade overturned, if not the long-settled law of the land? What do you suggest Roe tromped on, if not precedent and the public will? How do you suppose those pesky abortion restrictions, the ones Roe magically evaporated, manifested themselves if not as the “will of the people”?
I don’t think so. Public opinion was at the very least roughly in sync with each of these appointments; that’s why the Dems didn’t push. Dems could have pushed harder, but only to their political detriment. You can argue that this fight would still have been on the side of the angels, but that won’t change this political reality.
Nothing. It clarified an aspect othe existence of a right that had long been underrecognized, to say the least. It was over 30 years ago, too - how long does it take for *you * to consider a law settled?
What did it “tromp on”? Ignorance in general, acceptance of sexual discrimination, and ,most particularly unnecessary limitations on personal freedoms.
Any recent poll you can cite shows a broad, general acceptance of privacy rights as manifested in particular as a woman’s right to choose. The lack of organized opposition has a lot more to do with the refusal of any of those appointees to state a position that we all know each has, combined with a public understanding that there’s a lot more than one issue out there and that this one might never even come up in a SCOTUS case. Again, it’s been over 3 decades, and there’s been no concerted effort on anyone’s part to overturn Roe.
In a free, deomcratic society, a law is never “settled”. There is no law or provision of the US constitution that cannot be changed, and there is no SCOTUS opinion that cannot be reversed.
And, if you want some particular law to exist that 5 SCOTUS justices can’t take away, you’ll need to pass a constitutional amendment.
Justices, wisely, consider the concept of stare decisis when determining whether an opinion should be overturned, but surely you aren’t going to suggest that after some passage of time they shouldn’t ever overturn an opinion.
Indeed, if the anti-abortion faction is serious about overturning Roe, they certainly should get an Amendment going. But they haven’t, and can’t, and I think you know why - because, as I said, it’s settled law, and it’s generally accepted by society. The burden of changing the law or the Constitution, and changing public attitudes about it falls on *your * side. Your complaint about the law’s being *defended * against those looking to subvert it, against popular will at that, is utterly foolish, and it’s no wonder you’ve abandoned it.
beagledave, you neglect context. Society changed between Plessy and Brown, in the direction that both were reflections of popular will as well as a basis in legal precedent and constitutional principle, at the times they were issued. Roe, however, is as accepted as ever, nor is it possible to argue against on the basis of legal precedent or constitutional principle except by assuming a priori that a fetus is a human with fully equal rights. That, however, is solely a profession of faith.
Why? All they have to do is actually overturn Roe in the SCOTUS. What SCOTUS giveth, SCOTUS can taketh away. That’s the easier route, and just happens to be the same route chosen by the pro-abortion folks 30-odd years ago. One might just as well argue that if the pro-abortion folks wants to ensure that abortion remains legal throughout the US, then they should get and amendment going.
I disagree and I’ll point to the Interstate Commerce Clause. This part of the Constitution has been interpreted far beyond it’s original meaning. Even if a product is being used for intrastate use, the Federal government can regulate because its use may effect a similar product in another state. I believe that many drug laws (like medicinal marijuana) use this interpretation for regulation. This has clearly gone down the slippery slope basically nullifying the 10th Amendment under many judicial interpretations.
I’m not quite sure what you think this proves. All this example shows is that as a matter of fact, judges can say whatever they want in their decisions. This debate isn’t about the de facto limits of judicial power, though, it’s about what constraints an appropriate interpretive approach will impose on judges. That judges who adopt inappopriate interpretive approaches might feel completely unconstrained and foist all manner of bullshit on the public is neither here nor there.
Bricker’s slippery slope argument goes like this: if judges go beyond the text at all in interpreting the law, then there is no principled way to keep them from making up any old shit they feel like. (Well, actually, it doesn’t explicitly go like that - it usually consists of Bricker holding up some clearly unsupportable decision as an example and saying “A ha! See? What’s to prevent something like this!?”) What I was pointing out is that even he thinks that judges must go beyond the text (see, for example, the Equal Protection clause, which on a strictly literal reading would make virtually every law on the books unconstitutional, or the up-thread examples of exceptions to free expression). So, if this slippery slope argument is valid, it applies just as much to Bricker’s views on interpretation as it does to Hamlet’s.
But in fact, Bricker’s views on interpretation extend beyond just ‘read the text’ to include a plethora of other stuff, which is supposed to guide you when the text is ambiguous or vague or what have you. For his view to be at all reasonable, it has to include those supporting principles. And it’s those principles which will prevent judges sharing his views from straying so far from the text that they’d make ridiculous decisions like some of the Interstate Commerce decisions.
The problem with the argument is that Hamlet’s views on interpretation also include a plethora of other principles that will prevent judges from making those ridiculous decisions, even though they will lead to decisions which Bricker feels stray further from the text (but which I’ve little doubt that Hamlet feels stick closer to the spirit of the text). The mere fact that those principles can be characterized as adhering less strictly to the text does not mean that they are straying unduly from it, or that they are so permissive as to be meaningless.
To recap. There is a slope, and we must stand on it somewhere. If it truly is slippery, then all this debate is for naught. Bricker likes to ignore the fact that his position is one step out onto the slope, and to argue that the slope is slippery and if we step out onto it we will inevitably slide to the bottom. But as a simple matter of fact, we have to step out onto it, and in other contexts even Bricker will admit this (like when one points out that equal protection before the law requires allowing same-sex marriage). If his slippery slope argument is to really demonstrate what he wants to demonstrate, it must show that if you take one step out onto the slope, it’s not slippery, but if you take two steps, then you’ll inevitably end up at the bottom. And that’s the argument I’m referring to when I say I have no idea what it could even look like.
And my point is on some points of law re: The Constitution the slippery slope does exist. The ICC is a case in point and some may argue that eminant domain (Kelo v. New London, Conn.) is on that same path. In both cases, the interpretations of those clauses has grown so general that a judge can rule however they desire. What is interesting is that other clauses seem to be going in reverse. The 2nd Amendment is interpreted as applying to militias (today the state’s National Guard as per SCOTUS) and not the people. Now gun control is MORE restrictive. Same with the First Amendment and censorship (for God’s sake, if Howard Stern offends you - TURN HIM OFF. If you have kids, do some goddamn parenting and don’t expect the government to do it for you.)
To recap, some interpretations of the Constitution have gone down that slippery slope, but certainly not all.
But you’re making a point that is at best tangential to my own. Sure, as a matter of fact, the jurisprudence of a few issues (and ICC is probably the best example) has left a trail of precedents that have left us with settled law pretty much completely disconnected with its purported textual basis. What does this have to do with whether or not a given approach to legal interpretation places constraints on how practitioners of that approach may interpret the law?
You’re missing the point. How long should the abortion restrictions Roe dispensed with have been on the books for you to consider them “settled law”? BTW, many were much older than 30 years.
You can categorize those laws thusly, and that still doesn’t change the fact that you seem to respect precedent and “settled law” only when it suits you.
To say the legal defination is that life begins at conception may be used as a legal means to stop abortions, but if there was no life in the man’s sperm then one could say that, however a woman then would just be reduced to the status of a brood mare and have no say over her own body. She would be forced to carry a rapist child and he would be rewarded while she was punished. Life began millions of years ago that is a fact; even believed by those who believe in the Genesis story. Life (even human) is a passed on thing.
The way to stop abortions is better education and better birth control methods.
To be tongue in cheek one could say, have all men who appose abortions to be castrated, now that would save a lot of human life that is in their sperm. Wrong? Of course, but it is no less unfair to say a woman must bear a child even though her life, mental state, would be effected by it. Pro life means pro the woman’s life too.
A woman’s right to control her own body has been settled in the law ever since the Supremes ruled it settled. It’s been settled in society ever since it became the preponderant viewpoint. You don’t have to like it, but, bluntly, that’s *your * problem.
*That * from somebody who wants to overturn the law because it suits him? Which of us, pray tell, has both the law and popular sentiment on his side?
See above. Having failed to overturn the law, or to pass or even begin an amendment, or even to sway popular opinion in your direction, you now wish to use judicial activism to simply make the world be the way *you * personally wish, all others be damned.
Why not? You don’t know? Because it’s dishonest both intellectually and morally, and because it’s opposed to precedent and reason in the law, and because it’s opposed to popular will. You don’t have to like it either, but don’t pretend you’re advocating something honorable and honest, either.
Both your advocacy of judicial activism and the concept that a person’s control over her own body should be subjected to government control are hardly what one would expect from a self-described libertarian. Where are the limits to that philosophy, and whence do they derive?
Who here has read Roe v. Wade? There’s some interesting commentary in it, around the topic of the ‘quickening’, about common law and tradition. It certainly shows no binary perspective at all.
Yep, the definition of the beginning of life has a lot of variations, not only between cultures but between different times in the same culture. The proponents of the notion that it’s simply and obviously the moment 2 cells combine rarely, if ever, acknowledge that, or the moral certitude upon which their entire argument rests crumbles and an individual’s right to make that decision herself becomes logically inevitable.
As I said earlier, claims of judicial activism are often the eyes of the beholder, but there are some good reasons to consider *Roe *to be an act of judicial activism. A right of privacy that included the right to an abortion would include the right to engage in many activities that the SCOTUS simply wouldn’t uphold. For instance, the right to engange in prostiuttion or, as we saw recently, the right to use medicinal marijuana. From that perspective, the right to “privacy” looks more like a convenient excuse than it does a justifiable reason. Additinonally, there are a considerable number of legal minds (on both sides of the political spectrum) who find the legal reasoning in *Roe *to be troubling. It’s hardly the anti-abortion folks alone who think *Roe *was not decided correctly.
As for claiming that a reversal of *Roe *would be “judicial activism”… well, that act in and of itself would create no law. It would be legally neutral. One might more properly call it judicial passivism, if one felt the need to classify it in some way.
A better analogy would be if the SCOTUS were to rule that abortion itself was unconstitutional. That could more properly be called judicial activism, since it would result in a specific legal outcome.
But the US does not have a libertarian legal system. If I were to insist on a libertarian legal outcome, then I’d be engaging in judicial activism. Rather, I’m looking at the legal system we do have and asking whether a certain judicial outcome can be justified based on the rules we have in place-- not the rules I wish we had in place. From that perspective, I can favor a judiciary that is neutral on the subject of abortion, but a legislature that allows abortion to be legal. I’d be quite happy if the Constitution did indeed contain a “right to privacy” as envisioned by Roe. That would imply a right to engage in prostitution, a right to contract any wage found agreeable between employer and employee, a right to recreational drug use in the privacy of one’s own home, etc. But I don’t for a minute think that the SCOTUS really sees the right to privacy that way, nor do the majority of the American people.
You, on the other hand, have never been able to name one judicial decision that is in agreement with your own political leanings but that you’d be willing to call judicial activism. For that reason, you are one of the single most unqualified posters on this board to weigh in on the issue of judicial activism.
Or, the court has become more conservetive, more cowardly, and/or more callous. Those should be legal. They aren’t, due to American callousness and amorality.