However, the impression given by contemporary accounts is that he also cares about the perception that his leaders are “on his side”, that they share (to a reasonable extent) his risks and discomforts. This is part of the psychology of leadership: that the lead not begin to believe that their leaders fundamentally do not care about them, or are even aware of them as people.
Why else would the notion of “chateau generals” be such a big deal in WW1? On this question, I recommend Keegan’s “The Mask of Command”, which goes into detail about the psychology of military leadership.
I don’t know… machine guns and quick-firing artillery (the famous French 75, for example) were quite the game-changer for infantry/cavalry combat. At any rate, they’re 100% of why the war on the Western Front seized up into trench warfare, when no prior war had done so quite to that extent. Most of that credit goes to the machine gun as well.
And… from what I’ve read, the 8th AF suffered some 26,000 KIA, out of like 290,000 casualties- 9% instead of 10%.
But yes, until the USAAF higher-ups figured out the way to fight the war properly, there were grievous losses among aircrews, and even then, it was still a fairly high casualty form of combat.
This is why Gen Patton required his underlings to make regular trips to the front and considered a dead general as likely causing a moral boost. (in the sense that their death might inspire the men to try for revenge for their fallen gen)
Grant and Lee may not have fought on the front lines, but their corps and division commanders certainly did. More than a few were killed or wounded in battle.
Killed or mortally wounded: One Army Commander on each side, three Corps Commanders on each side and, as for Division Commanders, fourteen for the Federals and seven for Confederates. Cite.
The same was true of Generals in WWI. The book “Bloody Red Tabs”, by Frank Davies and Graham Maddocks, which just looks at the British army in WWI, lists 78 British generals killed and 146 wounded or captured.
Yes, and it is certainly fair to ask whether the stereotype of the “chateau general”, dining on silverware in a nice mansion miles from the front lines while his men rot in the trenches, is a realistic or fair one.
However, once that stereotype was established, it is easy to see how it could be bad for morale; and why generals would do a lot to avoid allowing that stereotype to be established (as drewder mentioned concerning Patton).
Nor was that stereotype limited to WW1. In WW2, there was the “Dugout Doug” reputation of MacArthur.
I suspect WWI was different in that the front was static for years at a time, making it much easier for higher officers to settle in, so to speak. I’d suspect anyone commanding anything higher than a regiment or brigade was probably not “at the front” in terms of being exposed to direct fire, and could get relatively comfortable. This doesn’t mean that they were far away, or not at the front fairly often- I suspect that considering the extreme close quarters of Western Front fighting, the generals were likely up toward the front often looking around with telescopes and binoculars themselves.
In WWII, anyone corps level or below was probably on the move pretty much constantly, and wouldn’t be quite so comfortable as their fathers would have been, even if they weren’t quite as uncomfortable as the infantry, nor as reviled as a result.