Another interesting one, from the Universal Declaration site above:
Freedom of movement you would think would be pretty fundamental, especially within the borders of the country where you’re born, but I’ve heard tell that, even today, in Russia, one needs special permission to live in Moscow, and maybe some of the other big cities there. Is this true? Can anyone here confirm this one?
Kind of puts you in the same status as a slave, it seems to me, if you can’t even claim freedom of movement.
Well there is that little thing about going to Cuba.
Peace,
mangeorge
I work with three people from the former USSR, and while they don’t know how it is now, free movement before was something that was, in practice, difficult to do. On top of that, I am told, everywhere was depressingly similar, and so there was no real need to go anywhere else.
Yuck. Score one for capitalism.
Oh, one is from Lithuania and the other two from Ukraine.
I’ve been sitting on this one for a bit. Not sure what to make of it, heads or tails.
I don’t know that what the infant has is a positive economic right, but rather what the parent has is a responsibility to account for his or her actions which resulted in a dependent life.
I think, as well, that the infant should have all the rights that a “regular” person would have, though perhaps not all of their freedoms.
If the parents die I do not see it as an automatic responsibility of some larger, socially conscious institution to take over and care for the child, though it would not suprise me if one popped up in response to such occurances (which, indeed, some have).
I guess, again, I see a “right to life” in the same boat as “right to education” and “right to health care,” that is, they are something that another person must actively provide. Life is not automatic; I see no reason why we should pretend that it is guaranteed, either.
Since all rights require resources for their enforcement, I think ARL’s stance rules out any sort of moral rights. I’m not sure whether this applies to legal rights though.
Legal rights can be defended on utilitarian grounds. Essentially one can argue that life is substantially less nasty, brutish and short in a state with civil rights. Choosing what set of resources are delivered under the framework of rights and what set are merely, “discretionary spending”, becomes a matter of values, empirics and of course politics.
As for moral rights, I think ARL is asking for a derivation. Eighteenth century thinkers liked to use a natural law approach to assert a small number of fundamental rights, and build up from there. It might be possible to appeal to human equity, the idea that no particular class of individuals possesses intrinsically superior worth over another (as opposed to extrinsic worth embodied in certain virtues). From there, certain moral rights might be deduced. Maybe.
John Rawls provided a framework for morality in the societal context, that is a theory of justice. I trust there are other possible approaches, I sketch this one since I have a small amount of familiarity with it, though I really haven’t mastered it.
Rawls extended Locke’s idea of the social contract. To Rawls, the principles of a just and fair society are ones that could achieve unanimous consent under a thought experiment that he calls, “the original position”. In this hypothetical original position, agents try to arrive at the principles of a social contract that they would be willing to enter into. The catch is that these agents are negotiating without knowing their eventual position in that society. They don’t even know how smart or skilled they will be. Thus, the principles of social justice arrived at will be purged of, “the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance”.
What might this hypothetical group come up with behind their “veil of ignorance” (about their eventual social status, etc.)? Rawls proposes a number of principles. A simple version of what we might call the liberty principle reads as follows:
“Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”
Again, Rawls argues that this would achieve unanimous consent, at least when combined with his other (frankly more controversial) proposals. My only aim here was to show how moral rights might be derived within a social contract framework along Rawlsian lines.
Well, flowbark, I don’t know that I would consider defending a right creating anything, but yes, I find that there are very little rights in general.
Everyone argues from this context or that context (utilitarian, society, etc etc). I was thinking that perhaps we could agree upon some rights under the context of man himself since he is actually the one who has these rights. It seems I was wrong again.
It seems the rule so far is: no rights of man, except by societal decree.