What are some of the best critiques of new atheism?

Cafe Society
21

There is no such thing as “new atheism,” other than as a whiny way to refer to the fact that some authors have had best selling books talking about it.

There are also no good rebuttals to the basic observation that there isn’t the slightest evidence for sky gods. The books that attempt to address authors like Dawkins essentially just try to defend religion as an instutution rather than the EoG argument, though they do invariable trot out some of the old, tired apologetic arguments they’ve always used – the Moral argument, the Cosmological, etc.

I don’t think you’re going to find anything good, since nothing you’re going to find can prove the existence of God.

22

I don’t think anyone needs to prove the existence of God to make it a good read. I just want to gain some understanding, maybe some empathy, for those for whom God is meaningful. Right now I don’t understand them any better than I understand what it feels like to be a woman.

And similarly, I suspect I never will. But in both cases, I can’t seem to stop trying.

23

Surely, Dio, you will agree that atheism has matured over time since the ancient Greeks. Skeptics became materialists who became physicalists. I think modern atheism begins, as I said, with Nietzsche. His ideas were quite unlike any that came before. In big terms, I mean. I acknowledge that he picked this or that from Kant, but even some of those items were recontextualized (and even redefined) by him.

24

I think that Rationalism has matured, but I see atheism per se, as a null position, incapable of expansion. The absence of theistic belief constitutes the sum total of atheism, so it’s not something that can grow or mature. It’s may be a result of Rationalism (or perhaps you might think of it more as a symptom ;)), but I do see it as something which can be modified – at least not weak atheism.

25

I thought the very notion of atheism being a belief system had been exploded as a tactic of believers used in arguments like these. Doesn’t even the discussion of atheism being “new” or maturing" or any of the other words used here imply the framing of it as a belief system?

If so, how do the critiques of atheism handle the issue? Do they start with the assumption that it is a belief system, or do they start from a different viewpoint?

If not, does Nietzsche posit it as one? And if he does, how can he be linked to atheism and atheists who deny that such a thing even exists?

These are questions, BTW, not arguments.

26

I would disagree here. Atheism is a positive statement, not that there is no God but why there is no God. But to go much beyond that point would require taking this into GD.

I found Scott Atran’s response to be something worth looking at. To access it, go here and scroll down to “A Response”.

27

I disagree. Atheism – at least weak atheism – doesn’t state anything at all. It’s just an absence of a statement that there is a God.

Thanks. I’ll read it and let you know what I think.

28

OK, I read it. As with most of these other kinds of rebuttals I’ve read, it focuses on Dawkins’ and Harris’ polemics against religion as an institution, rather than against atheism, per se. It also contains a couple of strawmen (like the assertion that guys like Dawkins want to “replace religion with science”). I’m not saying Atran didn’t make any valid points, but they weren’t about EOG so much as about sweeping (and sometimes misinformed) broadsides against religion a a whole as well as against the perception of Dawkins et al as pursuing an activist, semi-politicized kind of anti-theism instead of just making the rationalist argument that we do not yet have a compelling reason to step off the weak atheist default.

29

But atheism, even weak atheism, is not just the absence of a statement that God exists. It is also the assertion that the arguments offered in favor of God’s existence are inadequate. Whenever a new argument in favor of God appears (as they continue to do, at least on the scale of millennia), atheism changes by expanding to include a denial of that new argument.

After Anselm introduced his ontological argument, an intellectually respectable atheism had to include an explanation of why that argument wasn’t convincing. That wasn’t necessary before the OA, so the OA resulted in an extension of atheism.

30

If you don’t mind, to simplify things for purposes of this dicussion, let’s leave out the word “system”. I’m not even sure what a belief system is. I mean, I’m sure it can be defined as a compound term, but the question at its root really is a question simply of belief. If there is a system underpinning it all, I think it can be examined separately.

And so, belief and its object — there can be no belief without a predicate: it is necessary to believe or not believe something or not something — is what we should examine. If the object were this board, for example, we might have the following statements:

  1. I believe this board exists.
  2. I do not believe this board exists.
  3. I believe this board does not exist.
  4. I do not believe this board does not exist.

Note that (1) is a positive affirmation of both belief and existence. (2) is a negation of belief. (3) is a negation of existence, but a positive affirmation of belief. And (4) is a negation of both belief and existence. So we can characterize the four statements this way:

  1. Having a belief that affirms the predicate.
  2. Having no belief that affirms the predicate.
  3. Having a belief that denies the predicate.
  4. Having no belief that denies the predicate.

Because these are modal statements, they are statements about belief, just as “I have no bananas” is a statement not about bananas, but about possession. The “no bananas” merely constitute what you “do have”. And so if we make the predicate about God rather than the board, we have:

  1. I believe that God exists.
  2. I do not believe that God exists.
  3. I believe that God does not exist.
  4. I do not believe that God does not exist.

There are four statements about belief concerning two different predicates.

The problem with saying that denial of belief is an “absence” of belief is that it is not — a negation is not an absence. -2 is not the absence of 2. Not A is not the absence of A; it is the contradiction of A, just as A is the contradiction of Not A. Every positive affirmation has a negation and vice-versa.

Having no belief is not the absence of a belief, but a negation of having a belief. “No belief” is the kind of belief you have, just as “no preference” is the kind of preference you have if asked what you’d like to eat. For an absence of preference, you have to negate the having, not the preference.

So, “I do not prefer bacon” is different from “I do not have a preference for bacon”. The former is a statement about what you prefer, while the latter is a statement about what you have. Likewise, you can make a statement about belief in God such that belief is absent by not modalizing the belief itself:

“I do not have a belief that God exists” expresses the absence of belief. Here, the predicate is about belief of a certain kind. And the statement is about a negation of inclusion. This may sound nitpicky to people with little knowledge of grammar or logic, but it is in fact very helpful in communicating exactly what it is you believe or don’t believe or have or don’t have.

I think that eliminating the equivocations helps us to communicate better.

31

When I was growing up, religion was practically a foreign concept to me. I’d heard of it, knew that some people had this idea of a god out there somewhere, but it didn’t really register with me. It was as if religion were some TV show I’d heard someone talking about - but I’d never seen it, didn’t know what it was about, and it was on a channel I didn’t get.

I made no assertion about it at all. I just didn’t believe in it.

32

No, it’s not an assertion that new arguments aren’t convincing, it’s just a failure to be convinced. Atheism is not a “side” to be defended. Stuff like the OA is inadequate with or without an atheist response.

33

Everything in your post is pretty much incorrect.

34

As far as I know (and I haven’t read them all), what the writers who are lumped together under the term “The New Atheism” have in common, aside from being atheists, is that they are hostile toward religion in general. They claim that religion (not just some religions or things people do in the name of religion, but religion as such) is a wholly bad thing that the human race would be better off without. Such claims certainly are open to debate/critique/discussion.

35

Unfortunately, this fails to explain to me your assertion that atheism has “matured.” If it’s a matter of using a different proposition, how is one more mature than any of the others? How can you leave out the word “system” if you insist that atheism is a “side?”

36

Shalmanese, I understand that a book called “The Devil’s Delusion” by David Berlinski is supposed to be a good one. Can’t vouch for it personally, as I haven’t read it, but I heard the author on the radio, and he sounded reasonably intelligent.

37

Can you tell me what you’re saying each of the following three sentences means?

  1. John believes there is no God.
  2. John does not believe there is a God.
  3. John has no belief that there is a God.

I think you’re saying there is an important difference in the meaning of 2 and 3. What is that difference? And I think you mean to say that both mean something different from 1. Is that right? What are the differences?

-FrL-

38

Well, the doxastic logic that we used in my explanation to you was unknown to Protagoras. Or to Nietzsche for that matter. In ancient Greece, atheism was expressed as skepticism, and did not resemble the materialism that later emerged. Man was the divine creature in his own right, and did not need validation from gods. As Protagoras put it, “Man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, of things that are not that they are not”. Over time, atheism became more materialistic, and with Kant, more rational. Eventually, categories of materialism emerged as full fledged philosophies, and include rationalism, humanism, and physicalism. The analysis has also become much more rigid, in the sense of having logical meaning, thanks to logics devised to examine such things as knowledge and belief.

It’s a “side” depending on how the terms are negated. As shown in detail above, one can negate the belief itself or the thing that is believed. It’s in the same sense that A is one side and Not A is another. But I’m not married to the term “side”. If you prefer some other term, I’m open to that.

39

Number (1) is describing John’s belief. He believes the predicate, which is “there is no God”. He believes the opposite of a person who believes there is a God.

Number (2) also describes John’s belief. It is negated; therefore, it is the opposite of belief, just as Not A is the opposite of A. He disbelieves rather than believes.

Number (3) needs to be rewritten to correspond to what I said. It should be “John does not have a belief that there is a God.” It needs to negate the “have” so that there is an absence of belief (as opposed to the negation of a belief).

The difference between (2) and (3) is that (2) negates the belief, while (3) negates a characterization of John himself (as in definition 5A of “have”). There is neither belief nor disbelief. Belief is simply absent.

40

I don’t agree with you about (2). I think the following sentence is true:

  1. My bookmark does not believe there is a God.

If (2) asserts that John “disbelieves rather than believes,” then (4) asserts my bookmark disbelieves rather than believes. Do you think my bookmark disbelieves in God’s existence? Or do you think my bookmark simply lacks the belief that God exists?

Or do you think (4) is not true?

Also, your last post didn’t make it clear to me whether you think (1) and (2) have different meanings. Do you think they say the same thing, or something different? And, a question most (but not all) think is the same thing as asking whether they mean the same thing–do you think it is possible for either of (1) or (2) to be true of someone while the other is false of her?

-FrL-