I used to be fairly sanguine on the subject. After all, I spent years studying how to safely operate a nuclear power plant in the Navy and we learned all about the safety features and this and that and so on. My positive attitude was in spite of the fact that one week before I started Nuclear Power School the Chernobyl disaster took place. That was sure a solemn backdrop for our studies throughout 1986.
Nowadays I’m on the fence. Surely, properly run power plants with well kept waste are a good thing, but when things do go wrong they go wrong badly.
I remember that in our technical library we had write-ups of TMI and other accidents and we read them. It seemed that as long as you follow the checklists everything will always work correctly.
Right now I’m reading a book that doesn’t help my confidence in the industry: Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety
This book is not about nuclear power; it is about nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the dangers are similar, and the absolute necessity of never making mistakes is similar.
Checklists and regulations dominated Strategic Air Command, to the point that one would imagine nobody would ever make mistakes, but they did. Hundreds of them. In closing, the author discusses whether it is possible to have a complex closely coupled system that doesn’t fail terribly because of simple problems.
His argument is that the close coupling of all of the systems cause accidents to involve multiple factors, often masking each other. And this very nature of things (example: an event that causes a fire and simultaneously damages fire detection circuitry) makes it very difficult to predict the scenarios.
The author of the book used a 1980 accident at a Titan II missile silo in Arkansas as the backdrop for his story, underscoring how so many things went wrong that those in control did not really know what was happening within the missile silo at all, until the missile’s fuel finally exploded. During a serious nuclear power accident I’m certain that the same can be said about the power plant: the only folks who know what was going on find out by forensic analysis.
That’s the kind of thing I don’t think can be swept under the rug. No matter how many safety systems there are and how much training there is, major accidents will happen.
My vote: I don’t like fossil fuels much, but why can’t we reduce our overall consumption? Why do we all have huge American cars, when our European and South American counterparts do quite nicely with smaller vehicles?