# What can a police officer make me do? **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [May 2, 2008, 3:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757 "2008-05-02T15:14:54Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![Chessic\_Sense](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/7c8e57/32.png) [@Chessic\_Sense](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Chessic_Sense)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 3:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/1 "2008-05-02T15:14:54Z")
I understand that a police officer can make me do a lot of things in the line of duty, such as clear out of an area or go wait ‘over there’ or stop beating my wife. I understand that he can’t make me get him a cup of coffee. What are the limits on what I have to obey? ---
**Author:** ![DSYoungEsq](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/c6cbf5/32.png) [@DSYoungEsq](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DSYoungEsq)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 6:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/2 "2008-05-02T18:55:28Z")
[QUOTE=IntelSoldier] I understand that a police officer can make me do a lot of things in the line of duty, such as clear out of an area or go wait ‘over there’ or stop beating my wife. I understand that he can’t make me get him a cup of coffee. What are the limits on what I have to obey? [/QUOTE] That question is so vague and undefined as to make a coherent response almost impossible, without the answer being so vague and undefined as to be of no real value. 😉 ---
**Author:** ![Lobsang](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/lobsang/32/4067_2.png) [@Lobsang](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Lobsang)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 7:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/3 "2008-05-02T19:01:27Z")
[QUOTE=DSYoungEsq] That question is so vague and undefined as to make a coherent response almost impossible, without the answer being so vague and undefined as to be of no real value. 😉 [/QUOTE] I don’t see a problem. - What can a Policeman legally coerce a civilian to do? _Can_ he ask you to get him a cuppa? I’ve seen on TV where the police have contacted HGV drivers by radio to ask them to assist in police chases (to act as road blocks) So that’s one example of something a policeman _can_ get a civilian to do. ---
**Author:** ![Euphonious\_Polemic](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/euphonious_polemic/32/3002_2.png) [@Euphonious\_Polemic](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Euphonious_Polemic)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 7:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/4 "2008-05-02T19:20:37Z")
[QUOTE=Lobsang] I’ve seen on TV where the police have contacted HGV drivers by radio to ask them to assist in police chases (to act as road blocks) So that’s one example of something a policeman _can_ get a civilian to do. [/QUOTE] But is that more along the lines of a polite request? Can the HGV driver say “no thanks, I’m busy”, and suffer no consequences? ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 7:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/5 "2008-05-02T19:21:52Z")
Here is a start: [http://www.straightdope.com/mailbag/mcommandeer.html](http://www.straightdope.com/mailbag/mcommandeer.html) ---
**Author:** ![Shagnasty](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/9dc877/32.png) [@Shagnasty](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Shagnasty)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 7:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/6 "2008-05-02T19:24:05Z")
One cop busted me for an out of service tail light. He made me cut his grass, wash his car, and press his pants for two weeks. It turns out the tail light worked after all. ---
**Author:** ![Spoons](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/spoons/32/3141_2.png) [@Spoons](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Spoons)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 7:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/7 "2008-05-02T19:24:40Z")
[QUOTE=Lobsang] I don’t see a problem. - What can a Policeman legally coerce a civilian to do? [/QUOTE] It’s an easy question, but there is no easy answer. As so often happens with legal questions, you have to specify a jurisdiction. Then, you have to look to any statutes that govern police powers and behaviour. Of course, there are the citizens’ constitutional rights that must be considered. And naturally in common law jurisdictions such as the UK, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, there will be a boatload of caselaw laying down principles and limitations on what police can and cannot do. Can the cop ask you to get him a cup of tea? Sure. Must you get him one if he asks? For the answer to that, you’ll have to consult a lawyer licensed to practice in your jurisdiction. ---
**Author:** ![Dogberry](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/7bcc69/32.png) [@Dogberry](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dogberry)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 8:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/8 "2008-05-02T20:05:31Z")
Let’s see. A cop (in the U.S.) typically has a gun, manacles, mace, a truncheon, and jackboots. I typically have a pocket comb and a touch of arthritis. So I’d say a cop can make me do almost anything I’m physically capable of doing. As for what he can make somebody else do, I guess that would be up to the somebody else. In other words, YMMV. ---
**Author:** ![DSYoungEsq](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/c6cbf5/32.png) [@DSYoungEsq](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DSYoungEsq)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 8:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/9 "2008-05-02T20:15:47Z")
[QUOTE=Lobsang] I don’t see a problem. - What can a Policeman legally coerce a civilian to do? [/QUOTE] But you miss the point. I can set up a generalization of what a policeman can force you to do, probably putting it into one, neat sentence. But this would be such a generalization that any attempt to accurately apply it to a real situation would be damn near impossible. In the example you gave, for instance, did they FORCE the cooperation? Or did they simply request it and get it voluntarily? See the difference? In situations like this, you are always better off ponying up some specifics and asking about them. ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 8:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/10 "2008-05-02T20:22:34Z")
> [@](#): > > Second, is it legal for the police to order me around and take my stuff? The experts agree: Probably. Many jurisdictions require civilians not only to surrender their property to a police officer in an emergency but to help officers subdue suspects on command. The Connecticut Supreme Court noted in State v. Floyd that “the basic concept that every citizen can be compelled to assist in the pursuit or apprehension of suspected criminals has ancient Saxon origins, predating the Norman Conquest, and . . . derives from a time in which the public peace depended upon the ability of the populace to summon their neighbors, through the raising of the ‘hue and cry,’ to come to their assistance when a crime had occurred.” In an essay published in the 1992 Yale Law Journal, Jon C. Blue, the trial judge in Floyd, elaborated on this custom: > > ``` > The antecedents . . . are centuries old. Their origins lie not in the urban landscape of present-day America but in the forests and walled cities of medieval England. Long before the creation of organized police forces, the common-law process of apprehending suspected felons was the hue and cry. The person discovering a felony would raise a cry of "Out! Out!" prompting the neighbors to turn out with their bows, arrows, and knives. The "hue" would be passed by horn-blowing from town to town until the ad hoc posse caught the malefactor or gave up the chase. Any malefactor overtaken would receive summary justice. > > ``` > > At first the hue and cry was a custom, but as time passed, participation dropped off, so Parliament made the custom a command: > > ``` > The First Statute of Westminster [1275] provided: "That all generally be ready and apparelled, at the Commandment and Summons of Sheriffs, and at the Cry of the Country, to sue and arrest felons, when any need is . . . and they that will not do so . . . shall make a grievous fine to the King." Ten years later, the Statute of Winchester not only affirmed the obligation of the populace to join in the hue and cry, but also commanded every man between fifteen and sixty years of age to have in his house a quantity of arms "to keep the Peace." Wealthy subjects were required to keep "an Hauberke, a Breast-plate of Iron, a Sword, a Knife, and an Horse." The less wealthy were obliged to keep swords, knives, bows, and arrows. > > ``` > > Today most jurisdictions have rules empowering sheriffs, and the police generally, to command assistance from the public. These laws are sometimes called posse comitatus (“the power of the county”) statutes. Ironically, England repealed its statute permitting sheriffs to command assistance in 1967. However, Blue says, “English constables are still thought to have the power to call upon bystanders to assist them in cases of reasonable necessity.” > > The Supreme Court has upheld the federal government’s power to commandeer private property but imposed strict limits. In United States v. Russell, the court noted: > > ``` > Extraordinary and unforeseen occasions arise, however, beyond all doubt, in cases of extreme necessity in time of war or of immediate and impending public danger, in which private property may be impressed into the public service, or may be seized and appropriated to the public use, or may even be destroyed without the consent of the owner . . . but the public danger must be immediate, imminent, and impending, and the emergency in the public service must be extreme and imperative, and such as will not admit of delay or a resort to any other source of supply, and the circumstances must be such as imperatively require the exercise of that extreme power in respect to the particular property so impressed, appropriated, or destroyed. > > ``` > > Some states have imposed similar requirements. For instance, in 1999, Ken Salazar, the Colorado attorney general, opined that absent a declared emergency, police could not > > ``` > commandeer the use of an electricity generator and employ it to provide electricity to other citizens. To do so . . . the sheriff would have to demonstrate that he could not have "fully performed" his peace keeping functions in that situation without the use of that action, and therefore, his power to act was implied. The sheriff would have to justify his actions based on the facts of each situation, and after the actions have occurred. Therefore, the sheriff is taking a legal risk when relying on a later justification of implied powers. By contrast, the use of traditional arrest powers is more appropriate and well defined. > > ``` > > Salazar was careful to note that a state statute authorized “the sheriff to ‘command aid’ from others; this language derives from the traditional notion of ‘rounding up the posse.’” But he saw the power as limited to property commandeered in order to make an arrest: “The codification of the ‘commanding aid’ statute clearly contemplates aid in the making of an arrest and not otherwise.” > > So there you have it. In most jurisdictions, police can take your property or insist that you help them, at least under some circumstances. > > Some jurisdictions permit firefighters to demand your property too. The Martinsville, Virginia fire department’s website notes, “In pursuance of using horses for transportation, an ordinance was passed authorizing firemen to stop and commandeer any horse-drawn vehicle on the street to pull apparatus to the fire scene.” Similarly, one court suggested that the state might destroy buildings to prevent the spread of a fire. > > Third, what if you refuse to help or surrender your belongings? In jurisdictions having a posse comitatus law, you could be fined and possibly even jailed. In Connecticut, for example, failure to assist a firefighter or peace officer on command is a Class A misdemeanor, which carries a maximum penalty of a year in jail and a $2,000 fine. > > **Fourth, are there any limitations on this power?** The earliest American case discussing the crime of “refusing to assist an officer in making an arrest” is Dougherty v. State, an Alabama case.\*\* The court held that the defendant should be acquitted if an attempt to give aid would be both futile and dangerous. \*\*Other courts have noted that the request must be legal, and a few have held that just because a law requires a citizen to obey doesn’t mean the police are authorized to command–a separate statute is required for that. Still other courts have seized on the word command–they require the prosecution to prove that the defendant disobeyed a command, not just a request. > > There are also constitutional limits. Is it constitutional to require people to risk their personal safety and property when a law enforcement officer asks? The Connecticut Supreme Court addressed this question in the Floyd case mentioned above. In Floyd, a statute making it a “misdemeanor for any person to refuse to assist a peace officer or fireman authorized to command assistance in the execution of his duties” had been challenged as an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and denial of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. \*\*The court found the statute constitutional, but imposed conditions similar to the Dougherty case: A peace officer could command the assistance of a civilian only when such assistance is “both demonstrably necessary and reasonable under all the circumstances.” \*\* [http://www.straightdope.com/mailbag/mcommandeer.html](http://www.straightdope.com/mailbag/mcommandeer.html) ---
**Author:** ![Flander](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/8c91f0/32.png) [@Flander](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Flander)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 8:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/11 "2008-05-02T20:38:31Z")
No fair quoting yourself! 😛 Seriously, as a citizen, you basically have the DUTY to assist in matters to the benefit of your community, provided it’s not life threatening. **Shagnasty** , how’d that come about? ---
**Author:** ![Jodi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/7feea3/32.png) [@Jodi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Jodi)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 8:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/12 "2008-05-02T20:56:06Z")
[QUOTE=Flander] **Shagnasty** , how’d that come about? [/QUOTE] Would you like to borrow a cup of humor? You seem to be a tad low. 😉 ---
**Author:** ![Lemur866](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/lemur866/32/434_2.png) [@Lemur866](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Lemur866)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 9:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/13 "2008-05-02T21:39:52Z")
[QUOTE=Shagnasty] One cop busted me for an out of service tail light. He made me cut his grass, wash his car, and press his pants for two weeks. It turns out the tail light worked after all. [/QUOTE] Press his pants? Is that what the kids are calling it these days? ---
**Author:** ![Kozmik](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/k/8dc957/32.png) [@Kozmik](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Kozmik)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 10:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/14 "2008-05-02T22:04:32Z")
You know how important the uniform is to a police officer. I’m suprised he didn’t have you shine his shoes. ---
**Author:** ![UltraVires](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/ecccb3/32.png) [@UltraVires](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/UltraVires)\ **Post date:** [May 2, 2008, 11:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/15 "2008-05-02T23:33:39Z")
I won’t speak for the OP, but here is an example: There was a shooting at 1:15a.m. at Florida Atlantic University down here. The whole campus was on lock down meaning that no one could enter or leave. Now prohibiting entry I can understand; they control the property. But prohibiting leaving? What if I was visiting someone and at 2:30a.m, I wished to leave campus and return home? The immediate emergency was over by then, and they were simply looking for the suspect. By what authority can they prevent me from leaving campus? The lockdown wasn’t lifted until 3pm the following afternoon. ---
**Author:** ![pkbites](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/pkbites/32/204_2.png) [@pkbites](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/pkbites)\ **Post date:** [May 3, 2008, 2:19am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/16 "2008-05-03T02:19:00Z")
[QUOTE=IntelSoldier] I understand that he can’t make me get him a cup of coffee. [/QUOTE] Do you work at the Honey Dipped donut shop over on Greenfield Avenue in West Allis? If so, then yes, you are going to get me a cup of coffee, and be damn honored to have my business! 😃 😃😃😃 ---
**Author:** ![Apocalypso](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/f19dbf/32.png) [@Apocalypso](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Apocalypso)\ **Post date:** [May 3, 2008, 4:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/17 "2008-05-03T16:15:48Z")
If a police officer “made” you get him a drink and upon your refusal, threw you in jail, what would you be charged with? “Refused to provide officer with beverages” doesn’t sound like it would stand up in court. 😃 ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [May 3, 2008, 5:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/18 "2008-05-03T17:34:06Z")
[QUOTE=jtgain] I won’t speak for the OP, but here is an example: There was a shooting at 1:15a.m. at Florida Atlantic University down here. The whole campus was on lock down meaning that no one could enter or leave. Now prohibiting entry I can understand; they control the property. But prohibiting leaving? What if I was visiting someone and at 2:30a.m, I wished to leave campus and return home? The immediate emergency was over by then, and they were simply looking for the suspect. By what authority can they prevent me from leaving campus? The lockdown wasn’t lifted until 3pm the following afternoon. [/QUOTE] Here’s a case with a different fact pattern, but it shows the way courts respond to claims like this: First the facts, from the District Court opinion: > [@](#): > > Through a business corporation, Galloway was one of the owners of a building located in a high crime neighborhood in the City. A small, recently opened variety store, owned and operated by Galloway, was located in the front of the building, and first and second floor apartments were located in the rear and were leased to individuals. There was no physical access from the apartments to the store. Based upon police surveillance of the neighborhood surrounding the building, a prior drug-related arrest of an occupant of the upstairs apartment, and statements from a “confidential informant,” defendant Coyne applied for and obtained separate search warrants for the building’s apartments, the A to Z Variety Store, and other buildings located in the neighborhood which had been identified through surveillance as appearing to be associated with illegal drug activity. There was no police observation or verification of illegal drug activity in the variety store, although persons believed to be engaged in illegal drug activity on a public street corner near the store had been seen entering and leaving the store. The “confidential informer,” according to the search warrant affidavit, told Coyne that the building was the core of drug activity, both in and outside the store and the apartments within the building, and that the drug operation was being run by Jamaican males, one of whom, nicknamed “Bongo,” always had two bodyguards in his company that carried firearms. At trial, Coyne testified that the “confidential informer” was also the principal seller of narcotics on the street corner as observed through police surveillance and that the police believed that he was the possessor of all the premises to be searched. Coyne also testified that he knew the “confidential informer” through numerous prior drug related arrests and that he was considered unreliable, except as to the information about the building in question. The “confidential informer’s” identity and full history were not made known to the judge who issued the search warrants. Through pretrial discovery, immediately before trial, the identity of the “confidential informer” became known to plaintiffs’ counsel. He testified at trial, pursuant to subpoena, that he had not given the statements to Coyne about the store and its operator that Coyne attributed to him. > > As the investigating detective, Coyne was in charge of executing the warrants obtained, although it was not established that he was in charge of the uniformed police officers assigned to provide protection for the executors of the warrants. Coyne was part of the team of officers that met to coordinate their “assault” upon the premises to be searched on January 28, 1997. > > The uniformed police officers were members of the SWAT team and were under the command of superiors who directed their operations. Each was dressed in black clothing with faces covered. Except for one of the group of police that entered the store, each carried a drawn gun, shotgun or police revolver. One carried a ramming device. The police entered for the purpose of securing the building and disabling all occupants so that there could be no interference with the searches. The time selected for the warrants’ simultaneous execution was just after the end of the winter daylight hours, but well within the store’s regular business hours. The SWAT team entered the store without warning, prepared to physically subdue all its occupants. There was no need to knock the store door down, since the store was open for business. However, the merchant/salesperson was located within a locked space for his own protection. The police banged on this enclosure, demanding immediate entry. > > Galloway and Jones, who were the store’s merchants, were surprised. Because of crime in the area, they were behind a transparent bulletproof locked enclosure. While there was dispute at trial whether the police identified themselves as police, it was clear that the entry was intended to be loud, disturbing, and distressing so as to discourage any resistance to the police presence. The SWAT team did not have a search warrant with them and could not produce one to Galloway. Galloway testified that he first thought the store was being robbed by armed thugs and was hesitant to open the door to the bulletproof haven to the demanding men dressed in black. Jones, who was Galloway’s fiance, and had been helping out in the store, had been asleep on a small settee or sofa behind the cash register when the police demanded entry into the secure area. Leocal, a store customer, had been playing a video game when he was surprised by the police SWAT team entry. Galloway, Jones and Leocal were ordered down onto the floor and immediately they were bound by the police with handcuffs. They were kept on the floor face down or in squatting positions until all the premises to be searched had been secured and searched, including premises within the area that were not part of the building in which the store was located. The searches commenced upon the securing of the premises. > > Galloway, Jones and Leocal testified that they were held with guns pointed at their heads, were afraid to move for fear of being killed, and remained in “custody” for several hours. The police denied that the “custody” was for that length of time or that guns were pointed at the heads of plaintiffs. The police admitted rapid entry, the immediate take down of the store occupants, handcuffing them and keeping them close to the floor until the searches were completed. In the process of responding to the directions of the officer guarding her, Jones suffered a deep scratch to her back caused by a sharp object. The scratch left a very discernable scar. Coyne entered the store premises after the buildings were secured but after the search of the store had started or was substantially completed. Shortly after his arrival, Leocal was released. > > Galloway and the other plaintiffs testified that the store was ransacked, with store goods strewn about by the searchers. Coyne and the police officers testified that the store was left in the same condition as when they found it. Galloway also testified that the apartments of the building had been greatly damaged. The police justified all their actions as being necessary for their own and the officers’ safety. > > Following the search, Galloway, with Jones’ assistance, filed a grievance with the police department complaining that the store and apartments were damaged and reimbursement was sought. The grievance was denied on the basis that the search was pursuant to a court issued warrant. This lawsuit ensued. > > Plaintiffs averred that Coyne and other City police officers, pursuant to a City policy, practice, or custom, in executing a search and seizure warrant for the A to Z Variety store premises, subjected the individual plaintiffs to unconstitutional periods and conditions of detention, and the store to unconstitutional, unreimbursed physical damage. Plaintiffs further alleged that the search was conducted pursuant to an invalid warrant, since the confidential informant upon which the affiant, Officer Coyne, caused the magistrate to rely, was known by Coyne to be unreliable and was, in fact, a target of the warrant. These facts were not disclosed to the issuing judicial officer in the search warrant affidavit. There was no arrest warrant. > > At trial, the parties stipulated that plaintiffs themselves were not targets of the search warrant. No drugs were found in the store or its basement. What was described as a wrapper that could have been used to wrap a small amount of illegal drug substance was found in the basement, but it did not suffice for any charges against any plaintiff. During the search, Jones testified, she repeatedly begged to be taken to the restroom so that she could urinate. She was repeatedly denied access. When finally she was escorted to the toilet by a female officer, she wet herself and had to complete her urination in the toilet in plain view of male police officers. > > Plaintiffs elicited from police witnesses testimony that City policy required that police order to the ground and place handcuffs on anyone found in a building during a search, regardless of whether they were known suspects or law-abiding citizens, and that those individuals are searched and detained, for safety reasons, during the entirety of the execution of a warrant. 1 > > 1 Leocal, a customer in the store at the time of the warrants’ execution, testified that he alone was allowed to leave approximately 45 minutes to one hour after the police SWAT team had entered. He also testified that he spent that time on the floor handcuffed, and with an officer holding a large gun close to his head. ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [May 3, 2008, 5:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/19 "2008-05-03T17:34:34Z")
And the Third Circuit’s opinion: JUDGES: Before: SCIRICA, BARRY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges. OPINION BY: Maryanne Trump Barry OPINION BARRY, Circuit Judge Because we write primarily for the parties and the District Court who are thoroughly familiar with the facts of this case, we see no need to reprise those facts here. Suffice it to say that this case arose out of a search of a building owned by corporate plaintiff United Solutions, Inc. The search was conducted by police officers employed by the defendant City of Philadelphia. The three individual plaintiffs – Ronita Jones, Rashford Galloway and Rubens Leocal – were inside the building at the time of the search and were detained while it was conducted. The individual plaintiffs alleged that their detention violated the Fourth Amendment and that they sustained personal injuries which constituted a taking for purposes of the Fifth Amendment; the corporate plaintiff alleged that damage done to the building during the search constituted a taking. The jury found in favor of plaintiffs on their Fourth Amendment claims, finding that they proved that it was a policy, practice or custom of the City of Philadelphia to subject occupants of premises being searched to unreasonable periods and conditions of detention. The jury also found that, as a result of the City’s policy, plaintiffs Galloway and Jones suffered 10,000 worth of damage and plaintiff Leocal suffered 5,000 worth of damage. The jury also found in favor of plaintiffs on their Fifth Amendment claims, finding, first, that the store was damaged as a result of the search and that the damages amounted to 500, which it awarded to plaintiff United Solutions. Second, the jury found in favor of the three individuals on their takings claims and awarded 10,000 to plaintiff Jones for physical damage to her body, 15,000 to plaintiff Galloway, and 10,000 to plaintiff Leocal. The City has appealed, arguing that the District Court erred in not granting judgment as a matter of law in its favor on the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will reverse. We will reverse with regard to the Fourth Amendment claims because no evidence was presented at trial from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the City had a policy or custom of detaining innocent bystanders for unconstitutionally long periods of time or under unconstitutional conditions during otherwise legal searches. 1 We will reverse with regard to the Fifth Amendment takings claims because there can be no takings claim for damage to one’s body, as the United States may not legally “take” its citizens’ bodies, even if it compensates them therefore, and there can be no takings claim for the damage done to the plaintiff corporation’s property under the circumstances present here. 1 Because no evidence of such a policy or custom was presented at trial, we will not reach the City’s additional arguments (1) that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the restraint of the plaintiffs was reasonable or (2) that it is entitled to a new trial because the District Court’s instruction on no-knock warrants was misleading and prejudicial. The City argues that the District Court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Judgment as a matter of law should only be granted “if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability.” Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). With regard to plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims,innocent persons can be detained for reasonable periods and under reasonable conditions during searches to protect their safety and the safety of the officers. Torres v. United States, 200 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1999). In order to prevail against the City, plaintiffs had to show that the City had a formal or informal policy or custom of detaining such persons for unreasonable periods or under unreasonable conditions, such that the City could be said to be the moving force behind the harm done to them. Bd. of the County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997). The following evidence of a policy or custom regarding the length and conditions of detention was presented at trial. Officer John Coyne testified that under certain circumstances individuals are restrained and handcuffed when the police enter a property, but that excessive force is not to be used. When asked to elaborate, he explained that “when you feel that you have information on past investigations of others that there is danger which weapons could be present, that is policy to secure the individuals’ hands.” When asked how long an individual’s hands could be secured, he explained that there is no time limit, but that individuals cannot be detained for an excessive or unreasonable amount of time. He acknowledged that if an individual were handcuffed “for a long period of time . . . that there would have to be a reason for that, or you would be violating policy[.]” Nothing in Officer Coyne’s testimony would support a finding by a reasonable juror that the City of Philadelphia has a policy or custom of detaining individuals for amounts of time or under conditions which would violate the Fourth Amendment. The only other evidence of any policy or custom with regard to detention was the testimony of Lieutenant Tom Wixted, who testified that it is not the policy of the Department to detain people for hours at a time. He explained that it would be a violation of policy to detain a person for several hours without arresting him or her. As with Officer Coyne’s testimony, there is nothing in Lieutenant Wixted’s testimony upon which a reasonable juror could base a finding that it was the City’s policy to detain individuals for excessive amounts of time. If anything, his testimony supports the opposite finding. Turning to the Fifth Amendment takings claims, the City was also entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the individual plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims for personal injury because “to assert that one’s body is private property that may be taken by the United States for any governmental purpose of any kind upon the payment of just compensation is to contend for something so far contrary to our theory of government, the relationship of the government and citizens as to be untenable.” Commers v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 943, 945 (D. Mont. 1946). See also Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588-589, 35 L. Ed. 2d 508, 93 S. Ct. 1157 (1973) (a material witness detained prior to trial does not have a takings claim). The City was also entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff corporation’s Fifth Amendment claim for damage done during the search. This case involves only a temporary physical invasion of private property by the government. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982)(noting “the distinction between a permanent physical occupation, a physical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of property.”). As the Loretto Court explained, every physical invasion is not a taking. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436. Temporary invasions are subject to a “complex balancing process to determine whether they are a taking . . . [because] they do not absolutely dispossess the owner of his rights to use, and exclude others from, his property.” Id. “Resolving whether public action works a taking is ordinarily an ad hoc inquiry in which several factors are particularly significant – the economic impact of the regulation, the extent to which it interferes with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.” Id. at 432 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978)). In this case, the economic impact of the government action was minimal – the jury found that the police caused just $ 500 worth of damage – and there was no evidence that the plaintiff corporation invested in the property at issue with the expectation that it would remain free of legal searches founded upon probable cause. Turning to the “character of the governmental action” prong, a "‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Notwithstanding this general rule, in this case “the government’s activity was so short lived as to be more like the tort of trespass than a taking of property.” Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The Hendler Court contrasted a situation in which a government vehicle parked one day on an individual’s land while the driver ate lunch, which would be more like a trespass, with a situation in which the government established a long term storage lot for vehicles and equipment, which would be more like a taking. Id. The two-hour-long occupation of the plaintiff corporation’s property which occurred in this case falls into the trespass category. In addition to – and partly because of – the short duration of the “invasion,” it did not interfere with many, even most, of the traditional rights of property owners. Moreover, a temporary seizure of property in order to search that property is a permissible exercise of the government’s police – as opposed to its eminent domain – power and neither this Court nor the parties have found a federal case in which a court has held that such a seizure constituted a taking under the federal constitution. 2 See Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1351 (10th Cir. 1997)(plaintiff who alleged that officers ransacked his home during a search failed to “allege any facts showing how his property was taken for public use in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”). As the Supreme Court has recently noted, “orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that violate health codes, fire-damaged buildings, or other areas that we cannot now foresee . . . have long been considered permissible exercises of the police power” which do not entitle the individuals affected to compensation. 3 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1485, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002). See also Hurtado, 410 U.S. at 588-589 (“public duties” such as the giving of testimony do not trigger just compensation requirements); United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 935 (3d Cir. 1976)(applying Hurtado to preclude a claim by an innocent bank forced to undertake a costly records search on behalf of a federal agency). The temporary occupation of plaintiff’s store is analogous to a temporary denial of access were it a crime scene. The corporation is not entitled to compensation because it was its “public duty” to submit to a search upon probable cause. 2 In the forfeiture context, the Eighth Circuit has explained that “. . . the forfeiture of contraband is an exercise of the government’s police power, not its eminent domain power. A forfeiture is not subject to the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause when it deprives an innocent owner of his property . . . .” United States v. $ 7,990.00 in U.S. Currency, 170 F.3d 843, 845-846 (8th Cir. 1999). See also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452-453, 134 L. Ed. 2d 68, 116 S. Ct. 994(1996)(“The government may not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain.”). 3 Plaintiffs argue that their claim is supported by National Bd. of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns v. U. S., 395 U.S. 85, 92, 23 L. Ed. 2d 117, 89 S. Ct. 1511 (1969)(“YMCA”), in which the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the Takings Clause for damage done to one of its buildings which had been occupied by United States troops during a riot, because the troops were acting primarily in defense of the building, as opposed to primarily for the public good. The Court held that where a “private party is the particular intended beneficiary of the governmental activity, ‘fairness and justice’ do not require that losses which may result from that activity ‘be borne by the public as a whole,’ even though the activity may also be intended incidentally to benefit the public . . . .” YMCA, 395 U.S. at 92. Arguably, this broad dictum would support a takings claim where an individual was injured during a search and was not the “intended beneficiary” of the search. The YMCA case is distinguishable from this case. First, the plaintiff corporation may not have been the intended beneficiary of the search, but presumably it would have benefitted had the police found and put an end to criminal activity occurring in its building. Even if the corporation was not the intended beneficiary, the argument that fairness and justice require the public to reimburse it for its losses is mitigated by the fact that the damages were sustained as a result of a presumably reasonable search that was reasonably executed based upon a judicial finding of probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed inside. The judgment of the District Court will be reversed and the case will be remanded for entry of judgment in favor of appellant. /s/ Maryanne Trump Barry Circuit Judge ---
**Author:** ![Lumpy](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/lumpy/32/446_2.png) [@Lumpy](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Lumpy)\ **Post date:** [May 3, 2008, 8:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-can-a-police-officer-make-me-do/447757/20 "2008-05-03T20:04:02Z")
As a related but slightly different question, what can you **refuse** to do when a police officer orders you to? Even if the order is flatly illegal, do you have the obligation to suck it up and only seek restitution after the fact?