And here again is the shell game that makes it so maddening to have this debate. AGW catastrophists throw out extreme scenarios or demand specific policy interventions, and if anyone questions it, the response is that there’s a wide consensus among scientists that AGW is real, and therefore if you refuse to accept whatever the current flavor of argument is, you’re a ‘denier’.
Let’s go over the chain of knowledge surrounding climate change, and where the consensus really is:
- Is Earth Warming? (overwhelming consensus - yes)
- Are human CO2 emissions part of that warming? (overwhelming consensus - yes)
- Is that warming a potential risk of future harm? (consensus - yes)
- How big is the risk (no consensus at all)
- What should be done about it? (No consensus at all)
Items 4 and 5 are where the debate should be focused. Most of us, including many famous ‘deniers’ like Lindzen, Christy, Pielkie, McIntyre, and others, would agree with the first three statements, as would I. But let’s be clear: When it comes to ‘what should we do?’, the catastrophic AGW side is trying to trade on the consensus on the first three items to shout down debate on policy. Or, they try to sneak in outlier studies that show great harm and claim they are part of the consensus, or use low-probability scenarios as if they are the median.
So what do we need to know to solve items 4 and 5 and come to an agreement as to what should be done? Well, if you want to be scientific about it, you’d need to do the following:
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Establish a reasonable model of likely climate outcomes, and quantify them into an overall risk assessment, including a risk assessment on the process used to come up with those likely outcomes.
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To do that, you need to have a reasonable model of CO2 emissions over the next 100 years, which requires an economic model that can predict our fossil fuel consumption over that time period.
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Develop a reasonable model quantifying the sources of economic and environmental damage, and assign risks to them (extreme weather, sea level rise, droughts, etc). We need to know where the damages might be so we can decide if mitigation is a better path than prevention.
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Understand what the costs will be for mitigation vs harm.
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Using the risk profiles, costs of each risk, costs of mitigation, establish a reasonable number for the net present value of those future costs.
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Develop strategies for preventing the outcomes or adapting to them, assign costs to those strategies, and all the various risks in implementing them. The burden of proof is on those proposing the strategies to show exactly how they will reduce global CO2, what the cost will be, and based on that CO2 reduction how much future damage was prevented.
NONE of these questions have satisfactory answers today. Our climate models have shown zero ability to predict climate more than a decade or so into the future. Our economic models can’t even predict GDP six months in advance with any accuracy. Our sociological models are pretty much useless for prediction.
There have been numerous studies that have tested expert ability to predict the future of complex systems. In almost every case, the experts do no better than amateurs - or chance. The current GCM climate models actually do worse than simple models that extend the trendline into the future and incorporate known cycles like el nino and la nina. All financial models utterly failed to predict the 2008 financial crisis, and subsequent macroeconomic models were less accurate than simple ‘regress to the mean’ models at predicting GDP even a year into the future.
Determining future costs depends on what technologies we will have in the future, which is unknowable. It depends on the wealth and development of Africa and other poor equatorial nations, which are political problems that have nothing to do with science. It depends on human migration patterns over the next 100 years, which are unknowable.
Knowing the cost of restricting CO2 today depends on the cost of developing alternatives that will scale - which is still unknowable. It’s unknowable in part because it depends on unpredictable breakthroughs, and in part because it depends on regulatory and political issues outside the scope of science. For example, we could assign a cost to solving the problem by transitioning to nuclear power - except no one knows if governments will actually allow that to happen, or if they do how much the cost of the regulatory burden will be.
The future is damned near a random walk when it comes to complex adaptive systems. That’s why experts have failed at predicting them. Consider just two big changes that have happened in a very short period of time which drastically affected predictions of CO2 output since the 2007 IPCC summary: The financial crisis, and the discovery of new natural gas reserves through fracking. Both of those resulted in a major reduction in CO2 output relative to predictions - and both happened within a couple of years after the last ‘100 year’ forecast.
We don’t know what big changes are going to happen in the future, but we know there will be big changes, and that they will dominate in determining our future direction. Since the models can’t predict them, they can’t predict the future with much accuracy.
And of course, the big elephant in the room is the fact that no regime of carbon reduction can possibly work so long as China, India, and Russia refuse to go along. And so far, every indication we have is that they’re not going to.
The key takeaway is that there is still a LOT of work to be done before we can get to the point where we should start interfering in people’s lives and forcing them to reduce their standard of living in order to ‘solve’ the problem. It’s this hard work that the catastrophic global warming folks want to short-circuit by shouting down the opposition.
Of course, if we take this out of the realm of science and into philosophy and political worldview, it all changes. And that’s why the two camps are so separated.
If you believe that:
A) sustainable living is a good all by itself,
B) giving more power to governments and NGO’s is a good thing,
C) Taxing CO2 emitters is a public good because the money can be used to redistribute wealth,
D) we should be engaged in large wealth transfers between the rich countries and the poor, and that such transfers should be directed by governments and NGO’s
E) The primacy of the environment over man, and that any risk of ecological damage is too great (the precautionary principle)
Then the whole calculus of climate change ‘action’ is different. To people with this worldview, it’s a no-brainer. The things they want to do would be valuable even if it turns out that AGW doesn’t happen at all. If what some of us see as risks and costs are perceived as benefits and improvements, of course it makes sense to take action now. But don’t confuse your political preferences for science. They are value judgments.
From my perspective, I’m very focused on risks like carbon taxes becoming riddled with so many loopholes and exceptions that they will fail at reducing carbon, but instead will become just another way for big government to control the economy and extract wealth from the citizenry. I’m worried that any UN-based global regime will be quickly co-opted by bad actors and kleptocrats. I’m worried that government-imposed alt-energy schemes will be inefficient and inferior to what we might achieve if we let the market sort it out. I see a whole bunch of additional risks from the ‘action’ side of the debate that I’m sure people like GigoBuster either discount or perhaps even see as features.
In any event, this debate is never going to be resolved until the CAGW side is willing to engage in the higher level debate and acknowledge the concerns that the other side has. And the ‘other side’ is not going to get anywhere with the higher-level debate until they stop arguing over the basic science.