Despite having never done it myself, I’m sure it’s not easy to live with knowing you’ve killed someone, even if that’s your job. That’s probably why many combat veterans reluctance to talk about what they did in action.
I’m sure it’s less paperwork for the PD to fill out a successful hostage negotiation/surrender than for a police shooting, coupled with the potential loss of team members from stress/burnout.
The cost of a bullet is much less than the cost of trial & incarceration but we’re not civilized if we think that way.
I’m thinking quick & peaceful surrender might only get you, say, 20 years instead of 25.
I dunno. How important are the hostages? The US will make any deals if feels the need to, regardless of any public proclamations of “no negotiating with hostages.”
If you steal a bunch of money, hide it, and get caught, you can generally negotiate a lower sentence for returning the money. It might not be legally yours to give, but at some point the system acknowledges the reality that it’s worth some concessions for a better outcome for all.
Maybe. What if the deal was “if all the hostages are released unharmed, you get immunity for the crime of taking hostages”? Any other crimes, the hostage taker is still on the hook for. This means that there’s no incentive to take hostages to cover for previous crimes (which I think is how most hostage situations occur. A crime goes badly, the criminals get surrounded, and they grab someone to make sure the police don’t just come in guns blazing).
But now there is an incentive for the hostage taker to calm down, realize that he’s screwed, but he can at least unscrew the most recent decision, and everyone walks away.
But who counts as important to the United States as a whole? Sure, I care very much if my loved ones are hostages. But if the President is a hostage, so what? If he gets killed, we get a new President. There’s nobody that important.
The point is, making deals with hostage takers encourages hostage taking. A policy of never making deals means that hostage takers have the reasonable expectation of getting nothing for taking hostages, and therefore are less likely to try it. Sure, it’s tough on the hostages. But it prevents further hostage taking in the future. Paying only makes sense if you consider any one particular hostage incident in isolation. But you can’t take it in isolation. Setting the expectations of hostage takers to “YOU GET NOTHING! YOU LOSE! GOOD DAY SIR!” is extremely valuable to everyone. Complaining that this policy is hard on the current hostages ignores the fact that they probably wouldn’t be hostages today if we hadn’t caved in to the hostage takers in the past.
Have you noticed a reduction of hostage taking because no one negotiates with hostage takers?
You perhaps haven’t because we do and have negotiated with varying degrees of success with hostage takers in the past. And how successful the negotiations were is a matter of opinion.
In 1977 12 armed radicals took seized 3 separate sites and 34 hostages in Washington. Two people were killed and a number of others were seriously injured. Nevertheless, negotiators agreed to 3 of the 4 demands of the terrorist leaders, and the terrorists ultimately surrendered with no more violence. One of the demands agreed to was that the terrorist leader be released on his own recognizance while awaiting trial for this act.
Tha’ts about the best analysis I’ve seen of how to split the baby for a win-win outcome both short- and long-term. It solves the present (mostly inadvertent) crisis and doesn’t store up bad precedents for the future.