staples.com and officedepot.com are classic examples of brick-and-mortar tie-ins, which Cervaise was specifically not looking for. 
So how’d you make out in the end, Urban Ranger? None worse for the wear, I’ll bet.
There was this guy (early to mid 20’s) on tv who was whining because he “lost millions”. Actually, he wound up with about 1.5 million. Poor guy. I think most of these guys laughed it off and got a job. Not so bad, imo.
Peace,
mangeorge
I’m curious also, Urban Ranger. What became of the dot com millionaires wealth? I even started a thread to keep from hijacking this one, but it’s not getting much response.
[QUOTE]
*Originally posted by handy *
**priceline.com, pricewatch.com, yahoo.com, plus, those of the big stores are doing alright, staples.com, officedepot.com etc. **
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/QUOTE]
That word “plus” in Handy’s quote means " ‘in addition to’ what Cervaise was looking for." Sometimes you get more than you ask for and it’s not necessarily bad form.
One company that is doing ‘relatively’ well is AOL Time Warner.
AOL’s move in January 2000 to purchase a more traditional media business was extraordinarily timely. By swapping their hugely inflated (and ultimately unsustainable) stock for a company with genuine assets and established markets they were able to weather the storm and still owned something of substance when valuations returned to reality.
At the time the merger deal raised a lot of eyebrows, not just because of it’s size ($350bn at prevailing capitalisation) but also because of the fantastic deal Time Warner appeared to be getting. Although AOL’s market cap was around twice that of TWs ($163bn vs $83bn), TW stockholders received 1.5 shares in AOL Time Warner (around 45% of the combined company). Time Warner shareholders effectively got a premier internet stock cheap, just when the market was at it’s most rampant.
On the other hand, AOL stockholders got a company that had a real balance sheet and (possibly more importantly in the aftermath) credibility. Although for a few weeks in early 2000 it may have looked like they had sold themselves short, in the end the decision-makers AOL, and/or their advisers displayed shrewd foresight in securing their company, and presumably their own financial security.
The projects I’ve worked on that have had a measurable benefit (as opposed to “establishing a web presence” sort of things) have involved using the Internet to simplify processes. For example, I once spent a few weeks working on an online form submission thing for … ummm … a huge name you would recognize if I was allowed to repeat it (commercial confidentiality, gotta learn to love it). Basically, it replaced a paper-based administration system with a web-based one - the practical upshot of which was that a process which hitherto took them six months could be done in an afternoon, with a concomitant saving in administration costs all around. (What about users who weren’t online? Well, the cost saving was sufficiently great, and the actual user base sufficiently small, that it made commercial sense for Huge Name Organization to give its users PCs and Internet connections, rather than continue to use the old system.)
It’s this sort of facilitation that the web is good for … the outstanding customer-facing example is eBay; it works by bringing sellers and purchasers together who, essentially, couldn’t meet any other way. But there is very little the web actually generates which has real value - as others have noted, web advertising mostly matters only to other web advertisers.
The fact that many Internet companies were producing nothing of real value was, believe me, clearly apparent, at least from where I was sitting. I once asked one of our sales and marketing bods where the money actually came from for these inflated ventures. “Day traders,” he replied. “Day traders are stupid, they’ll put money into anything, and there’s always more of them.” In hindsight, he got two out of three right.
One aspect of the OP not mentioned much yet, is why did the bubble burst when it did. Of course, the bubble would bust eventually.
The dotcom mania could go on indefinately as long as there was the likely prospect of selling the company publicly or privately at a sufficiently high price.
I don’t recall the name or can give a cite, but there was a stock analyst of some note that crunched the numbers on Amazon and came up with the conclusion that for the company to ever make a profit, they basically had to increase their book sales to the entire world sales level–Amazon had to BE the market.
His statement got some traction and over time enough investors took note and the funding dried up. Companies and individuals were no longer interested in bailing the dotcoms out.
mangeorge, bnorton:
For me, the wealth was largely illusionary. The dotcom Iworked for went under before it could launch an IPO. Mainly due to the way the top management team (rats, I have just implicated myself :D) was spending money. Expensive offices, big salaries, nice Christmas party (notice the singular usage), the whole works.
It was an interesting experience for an inside look at the fast track.
This extraordinarily good book is online now. The chapter on tulipomania is here: http://www.litrix.com/madraven/madne004.htm