The U.S. at this point was comitted to making the Phillipines independant (which itself comes down to the very weird history U.S. Imperialism*. But it would certainly have remained within the U.S. sphere of influence and we likely would have defended it even afterward. And for that very reason, the Phillipines were hostile to the Japanese; they knew we’d keep our word, so it wasn’t just a change of arbitrary foreign masters.
*Never has a built an empire nor abandoned most of it with more eagerness. The United States decided to expand around the world, only to realize twenty years later that it didn’t have a reason to.
Again, I must respectfully disagree. You are not considering the actual situation of late 1941. An attack in the Far East would not have meant "warring against Southeast Asian and (some) South Pacific nations ". In 1941 it would have meant war against the British Empire and also the remnants of the French and Dutch. It would have meant war against the United States. The Phillipines was a United States possession, a bit like Guam is today. A war against anyone of these, but especially the UK and the US would mean ultimate defeat for Japan. Not attacking the US possessions would have made any conquests untenable much faster than historically. The Japanese were committed to attacking several US possessions (and did so in fact) any one if which would have led to war.
Secondly, I think you ignore the fact that political, military and naval leaders were already prepared and decided on hostilities by late 1941. The US was supporting the UK with arms. American ships were actively operating against the German Navy, with an order to shoot on sight. Diplomatic relations had been broken off. In the Far East, the Naval commanders expected war. Remember in the day and weeks before the attack they were sent multiple war warnings. Not statements saying “Japan is going to attack the Far East, sit back an eat popcorn”. Orders which said, war is coming, prepare to intercept and destroy the enemy" Remember on the morning of the attack, the Enterprise and Lexington had been on out delivering fighters to Wake and Midway, the Enterprise returned during the attack actually. Both task forces were under orders to sink any Japanese vessel they saw. The previous week, the fleet had actually been sortied in response to war warnings.
Finally, I do not think that comparisons to 1940 are valid. When the Germans overran Europe, the US did nothing, because their was little they could do, the military forces of the US were very small and weak (Naval forces being much better). In the 20 or so months since, their had been a massive rearmament programme and an army of nearky 100 divisions was in the process of being raised, in addition to Naval and air force increases. They US had become a lot moe assertive and anti German in the previous few months.
In short. War was inevitable. Everyone in a position of power on all sides knew it, The Japanese did the right thing in getting their licks in first. They erred on going to war at all.
I disagree with 5 and 6 here. I don’t think anyone in a position of authority in Japan thought the US *couldn’t recover from the losses at Pearl Harbor. Rather, the philosophy was to make things so rough that the traditionally isolationist US wouldn’t pursue armed conflict in the region and sue for peace. Not to sound jingoistic, but the rather monumental blunder was Japan’s misunderstanding of the American character. Japan thought a devastating attack would cow the US diplomatically, not wipe out most significant opposition to war with the Axis.
*Yes, there were still American peace movements after Pearl Harbor. I’d argue that they had no traction politically.
One of the quirks of the Pearl Harbor attack is that Admiral Yamamoto had insisted that Japan advise the United States of the coming attack (IIRC this was in the form of a declaration of war) before the bombs started dropping. Accordingly the Japanese sent a a long message to their embassy in DC to this effect, and included a list of 8 reasons for the attack. However, the Japanese Embassy in DC didn’t have a trained typist on hand, so one of their minor officials had to do the typing required.
As this guy was strictly the hunt and peck type, it took him so long to type the message that the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred before the transmittal of the war declaration to the State Department.
This, of course, enraged the country even more than it would have if the warning had been received before the attack. You folks who don’t remember what things were like then really have no idea of the absolute hatred for the Japanese that this generated, along with a savage thirst for revenge. I well remember seeing an editorial cartoon in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch the next morning showing a grief stricken Uncle Sam cradling a dead sailor in his arms, with a large knife sticking out of the sailors back.
Yamamoto characterized this as “…I fear that we have aroused a sleeping giant.”
It was a deeply flawed plan. Even if they were successful in nailing the carriers, which they weren’t, the US had another and bigger fleet in the Atlantic that they could have moved to the Pacific within two weeks through the Panama Canal. If Hitler hadn’t declared war on the US, which the Japanese didn’t even ask him to do, that is probably what would have happened, despite Roosevelt thinking the war in Europe and the Battle of the Atlantic was more important.
I’ve often thought it ironic that the war in Europe (and in particular Hitler) are what generally springs to the average American’s mind these days when the topic of WW ll is discussed, with the war in the Pacific seen as almost an afterthought. During the actual war, it was very much the other way around (at least according to my relatives who were around then to see it).
As far as public opinion/attention was concerned, the Pacific campaign seems to have predominated (cite: a trunkful of WWII era newspapers I spent many a rainy afternoon perusing when I was growing up). The reason for this may have been that the Pacific was “our” war, while Europe was shared with the UK and USSR.
Militarily, that wasn’t the case. Shortly after the US entered the war, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that Germany was the #1 target, and it was treated as such. While the bulk of naval construction (at least in terms of capital ships) wound up going to the Pacific, most everything else went primarily to Europe.
What the Japanese militarists did not realize was that this sentiment would not be confined to aggressive American military leaders, but would extend to much of the population.
Which is why their dream of cowing the U.S. into submission was so devastatingly poorly conceived. Pearl Harbor = short-term tactical success, strategic disaster.
On the other side, thinking that we could compel the Japanese to pull back from their Chinese conquest through sanctions, while not making better preparations for war was a sizable strategic blunder as well.
The other thing was Japan (and Germany) never imagined what American industrial power could do. There was nothing Japan could have done in 1941 that would have stopped America: Japan could have literally sank every American carrier, battleship, and cruiser that existed in 1941 and it would have only delayed the American victory for a year or so. The USN had eight carriers at the start of the war. The USN launched 163 new carriers during the war.
The Japanese did not touch the shipyards or the submarine fleet, either. It took about a year to repair the surface fleet to the point that it was at before the December 7 attack; those submarines were practically all the Navy we had in the Pacific until then. If the Japanese intended to do anything other than scare the U. S. to keep us out of the way, they sure had a weird way of going about it!
Yamamoto’s comment was right; essentially, he said, “Now we’ve done it.”
And the blunders in transmitting decoded messages across the country didn’t help matters.
Nobody brought this up but I’m asking anyway: How well was the Panama Canal guarded?
I’ve always been surprised that Japan didn’t take Hawaii when they had the chance. I think it would have been easier taking Hawaii than the Philippines.
Imagine the US trying to fight a Pacific war from California. The extreme distances would have made it nearly impossible.
The Canal on the Pacific side had a set of gates that were underwater on the bottom, but they could be raised to intercept any torpedoes. This was highly secret. The Japanese had a plan to attack the lock gates, but never implemented it.
The problem is that Japan would have been fighting a Pacific war from Japan. Their supply line to Hawaii would have been over a thousand miles longer than America’s and their logistic resources were much smaller. Trying to maintain an occupation force in Hawaii would have just given the American navy easy targets to attack.
And the Philippines were a much more important target. Once the war started, Japan needed to secure the Philippines - they were right across the routes between Japan and the SE Asian oilfields. Historically it took Japan five months to secure the Philippines. The last thing they could have afforded to do was divert resources to another front.
Wow! Thank you ladies(?) and gentlemen. Television could *never *have scripted a better mini-documentary. During the course of this discourse, questions were raised that, if using a script, would never have seen the light of day. Television writing never expounds on anything; I much prefer reading educated points of view. This place is a figurative gold mine.
I’ll shut up now. Feel free to carry on.
And, of course, they didn’t have the troops or transports which were tied up elsewhere.
Regarding the post (quite a few back) that the Japanese sank the battleships in shallow water and they could be raised and they should have sunk them in deep water, I would disagree. Repairing the battleships was for national pride- not because of their value. They were too slow to keep up with the carriers and tied up a lot of resources repairing them.
