During peacetime, you spend your money on the big complex ships that take three years to build.
During wartime, you focus on stuff that’s quick to build.
The Navy planners knew this even during the twenties, when military spending was not popular with Congress.
The U.S. used a similar approach with destroyers: They built the big 32+ knot, 1500 to 2000-ton jobs during peacetime, and waited until war hit to build oodles of 25-knot destroyer escorts for the convoy escort work. (25 knots is plenty when the subs you’re hunting do 18 on the surface, 10 submerged, and your convoys are rated “fast” when doing 15 knots. “Slow” was 9 knots.)
These class of ships (CVE, DE) optimised for mass production (with somewhat reduced capabilities) was a feature, not a bug.
The most popular quote is "“I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.”
Perhaps he really said the Japanese equivalent of, “We’ve really screwed the pooch this time.”
John Paul Jones supposedly did not say, “I have not yet begun to fight,” but “Now I’ve got the son of a bitch!”
Whether or not John Paul Jones said, “We owe this victory to the English Public School System”, by God he should have, and that is what matters.
The only known source is a claim by the producer and screenwriters of Tora Tora Tora that they found it in Yamamoto’s diary. It has never been found. Another quote about hitting sleeping enemies makes them angry does seem to exist, but nothing about giants.
Pretty much all of the replies are correct, however, I’d add:
-Japan was essentially TWO countries-the one led by the IJA (which went to war on its own, in Manchuria)
-the civilian government was essentially powerless
-the Navy had limited war aims-they thought that if the US Pacific Fleet were destroyed, the US would conclude a peace treaty with Japan
Adm. Yamamoto knew that Japan could not win an extended war with the USA-the USA was simply too strong. The Army was led by fanatics-they circulated a book to their troops titled “Read This and The War Can Be Won”. Even losing two army divisions (in Marchuria, at the Battle of Khalkin Ghol) did not deter them. In short, Japan took a huge gamble, and failed to accept the tremendous downside of losing.
There were significant differences in the ships. The escort carriers were considerably slower ships, they weren’t as armored and they had less defensive weapons as well, including the critical AA weapons. Significantly, they would have a different Combat Information Center as they were designed for a very different role, which is similar to the point mlees makes about destroyers.
A good summary. I would emphasize that they were fighting for their expected empire first and foremost, and that oil was one part, although a critical part.
I’m always surprised at this type of a response. It’s actually very common for something to be “known” to be true and then debunkedonly much later. Funny thing is that Dope thread is number two if you google in “did Yamamoto say sleeping giant.”
It makes a great line though, and it does capture his more realistic assessment of the US than many of the other military leaders. However, the reality seems to be more complex, and unfortunately much of reality is. Even Yamamoto was counting on the US to quit and by Midway was exuberantly expecting the US the come to terms.
From the military standpoint, it will free the Pacific west of Midway and north of Jakarta for the Japanese navy. Strategically, any US retaliation will have to sneak through from south; stopping at New Zealand and going through Australia. No estimate of have fast the Amercians can push them back (3 years?) but they hoped the US would find a two-ocean war futile.
In an article in MAD, John Paul Jones is shown in the battle between his ship the Bonhomme Richard and the English Serapis. The Bonhomme is taking on way too much water and Jones makes his famous quote.
A sailor standing nearby answers with, “Well, don’t you think it’s about time you did?! The bloomin’ ship’s about had it!”
I presume the “it” here would be a defeat at Pearl Harbor.
I think that the common estimate is another couple of years if Pearl Harbor facilities had been attacked and the carriers also sunk. But the US was building ships and planes fast enough that it could very well have not required that much time.
The Japanese weren’t counting on the US getting involved with Germany. There wasn’t any coordination with the Nazis at any time on which country started war which whom.
They (the Japanese) simply believed they could win on their own.
Hitler to Roosevelt on December 8: “Ach, zose crazy Japanesers! We knew nothing about this foolishness beforehand. What can you expect from zose non-Ayrians! Us? No, no; we are not getting involved with you in the Pacific. You go ahead and smash dose crazy Japanesers. We will deal with the Britishers and Russians and you can devote all your efforts to our FORMER ally.”
Hitler to Tojo, December 9: “Auf wiedersehn, guys, Enjoy your war with the Americans, but don’t look for help from us.”
Not really. It was December 1941. The German army was fighting in the outskirts of Moscow and Hitler expected the war would be over in a few weeks. He was probably more worried that Japan would jump in at the last moment and claim a bunch of the Soviet Union after he had won the war.
Oh yeah, got too careless of time zones . But Japan was definitely in the mind of a couple of European combatants; to the tune of 40 divisions in Siberia waiting for a Japanese attack, and being transferred to Moscow at the crucial instant.
Actually no. The professional solders were the ones which were pushing to not find a diplomatic solution. Overconfidence was not in short supply in either the IJA or IJN.
And they had already fought one undeclared campaign.
The early point I made about the Axis nations
is historical. Hitler’s nonaggression pact with Stalin caught Tokyo by surprise, and became one of the factors in the eventual move by Japan against the US. Hitler did not explain his strategy to the Japanese, nor did he inform them when he did launch a war against the Soviets.
Certainly the fact that the Soviets and the British were is desperate battles of survival against the Nazis were also key factors in the timing of Japan’s attacks on the US, the British and the Dutch.
However, they did not inform Germany prior to the attack, nor did they ask Germany to also join in attacking America. Hitler did that all by himself. The Japanese were fighting under the assumption that they could win the war by themselves.
In contrast, the US and Britain specifically requested and extracted a promise from the Soviets to join forces and attack Japanese holdings after the expected fall of Germany, and offered concessions for this assistance.
. But Japan was definitely in the mind of a couple of European combatants; to the tune of 40 divisions in Siberia waiting for a Japanese attack, and being transferred to Moscow at the crucial instant.