# What do we know about Russian control of nuclear launches? **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Tags:** ukraine-invasion\ **Created:** [February 27, 2022, 4:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-do-we-know-about-russian-control-of-nuclear-launches/960189 "2022-02-27T16:22:04Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 10\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![FlikTheBlue](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/fliktheblue/32/10972_2.png) [@FlikTheBlue](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/FlikTheBlue)\ **Post date:** [February 27, 2022, 4:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-do-we-know-about-russian-control-of-nuclear-launches/960189/1 "2022-02-27T16:22:04Z")
Inspired by the way the Ukraine war is going, and the seeming increasing possibility that Ukraine can win. What if Putin, for whatever reason, orders that nuclear weapons be launched as a first strike? What kind of safeguards do they have in place to prevent that kind of scenario? ---
**Author:** ![Tripler](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tripler/32/21807_2.png) [@Tripler](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tripler)\ **Post date:** [February 27, 2022, 6:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-do-we-know-about-russian-control-of-nuclear-launches/960189/2 "2022-02-27T18:05:44Z")
I don’t think there’s much. . . It’s an “old” book, and it’s been some years since I read it, but IIRC, [_Command and Control_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command_and_Control_(book)) gave me the impression that C2 was maintained by “copper pair” wires. . . _telephone networks_. If the General ordered a launch by phone, with proper challenge/passphrase, you launched. If the General didn’t call, or was incorrect, you didn’t launch. . . it’s that simple. But there was nothing to prevent a rogue launch. I also have a copy of _Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces_ by Podvig, but I haven’t read it yet. Glancing through it, it seems to be more of a discussion on the hardware versus the policies and procedures. There was another book, [_Red Star Rogue_](https://www.amazon.com/Red-Star-Rogue-Submarines-Nuclear-ebook/dp/B001NIT7KC) that told a compelling, yet hypothetical, story about a possible rogue submarine sailing towards Hawaii intending to launch and trigger a war between the US & China, to leave the USSR (relatively) unscathed. This story took place in the 60s, IIRC, and was one of those “plausible explanations” to a lost submarine. Bottom line, is that I don’t think the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, Strategic Aviation, or Naval Strategic Forces are as advanced as Western powers in C2 hardware to _prevent_ launches–certain systemic flexibility is “left in” intentionally. Although “[Dead Hand](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Hand)” is still in effect. FWIW, I swear I have picked up [UVB-76](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UVB-76) on a reciever once. Tripler What’s preventing a rogue launch? Fear. Fear of retaliation. ---
**Author:** ![Elmer\_J.Fudd](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/elmer_j.fudd/32/1211_2.png) [@Elmer\_J.Fudd](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Elmer_J.Fudd)\ **Post date:** [February 28, 2022, 12:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-do-we-know-about-russian-control-of-nuclear-launches/960189/3 "2022-02-28T00:09:07Z")
Is it at least safe to say, it’s not just a big red button on Putin’s desk? ---
**Author:** ![XT](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/xt/32/456_2.png) [@XT](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/XT)\ **Post date:** [February 28, 2022, 12:12am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-do-we-know-about-russian-control-of-nuclear-launches/960189/4 "2022-02-28T00:12:49Z")
> [@Elmer\_J.Fudd](#): > > Is it at least safe to say, it’s not just a big red button on Putin’s desk? Yeah, that’s safe to say. I think there are several layers for Putin to actually order a launch. There is also the fact that we don’t know if those ordered to launch would actually go through with it. In the past, lower level authorization for launch was given due to indications of a western attack, and a mid-level officer basically took it on himself to not forward the information to the Kremlin as well as to not allow the launch. He was, of course vindicated, and that was in the old Soviet system. I’d say there is a chance that any arbitrary order to launch on the part of Putin is going to be ignored or that others in the chain of command are going to step in to prevent it, regardless of what Putin wants. This all assumes Putin really does want to cross this line, which I seriously doubt. ---
**Author:** ![duality72](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/duality72/32/3910_2.png) [@duality72](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/duality72)\ **Post date:** [February 28, 2022, 12:43am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-do-we-know-about-russian-control-of-nuclear-launches/960189/5 "2022-02-28T00:43:34Z")
> [@XT](#): > > In the past, lower level authorization for launch was given due to indications of a western attack, and a mid-level officer basically took it on himself to not forward the information to the Kremlin as well as to not allow the launch. Assuming you’re referring to [Stanislav Petrov](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Soviet_nuclear_false_alarm_incident), there was not a launch authorization but his actions of not reporting what turned out to be false alarms up the chain of command likely prevented such. Gods help us if that’s all that’s standing between us and a nuclear launch again. ---
**Author:** ![XT](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/xt/32/456_2.png) [@XT](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/XT)\ **Post date:** [February 28, 2022, 12:48am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-do-we-know-about-russian-control-of-nuclear-launches/960189/6 "2022-02-28T00:48:48Z")
> [@duality72](#): > > Assuming you’re referring to [Stanislav Petrov](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Soviet_nuclear_false_alarm_incident), there was not a launch authorization but his actions of not reporting what turned out to be false alarms up the chain of command likely prevented such. Gods help us if that’s all that’s standing between us and a nuclear launch again. IIRC, his political officer was urging him to launch, but I might be misremembering. Yes, that’s the incident and man I was thinking of. ---
**Author:** ![Asuka](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/dec6dc/32.png) [@Asuka](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Asuka)\ **Post date:** [February 28, 2022, 4:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-do-we-know-about-russian-control-of-nuclear-launches/960189/7 "2022-02-28T04:34:58Z")
Russia does have a system in place that can actually launch nuclear missiles automatically in the event a nuclear first strike against Russia that kills off the people in charge of launching the Russian response nukes called “Dead Hand” which apparently uses radiation and ground sensors to detect a nuclear explosion, and will automatically launch missiles back if there’s no input to tell it to not launch. ---
**Author:** ![SunUp](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ea5d25/32.png) [@SunUp](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SunUp)\ **Post date:** [February 28, 2022, 5:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-do-we-know-about-russian-control-of-nuclear-launches/960189/8 "2022-02-28T17:06:41Z")
> [@XT](#): > > IIRC, his political officer was urging him to launch, but I might be misremembering. Yes, that’s the incident and man I was thinking of. You might be conflating him somewhat with [Vasily Arkhipov](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasily_Arkhipov), who, unlike Petrov, was a commander with weapons use authority and who went against his political officer (and the captain of the submarine) to deny use of a nuclear torpedo. ---
**Author:** ![JohnT](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/johnt/32/15048_2.png) [@JohnT](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/JohnT)\ **Post date:** [March 2, 2022, 2:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-do-we-know-about-russian-control-of-nuclear-launches/960189/9 "2022-03-02T14:09:11Z")
> [@Tripler](#): > > It’s an “old” book, and it’s been some years since I read it, but IIRC, [_Command and Control_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command_and_Control_(book)) gave me the impression that C2 was maintained by “copper pair” wires. . . _telephone networks_ . If the General ordered a launch by phone, with proper challenge/passphrase, you launched. If the General didn’t call, or was incorrect, you didn’t launch. . . it’s that simple. Want the phone numbers? > ---
**Author:** ![Stranger\_On\_A\_Train](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/13edae/32.png) [@Stranger\_On\_A\_Train](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Stranger_On_A_Train)\ **Post date:** [March 3, 2022, 6:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/what-do-we-know-about-russian-control-of-nuclear-launches/960189/10 "2022-03-03T18:32:35Z")
> [@duality72](#): > > Assuming you’re referring to [Stanislav Petrov](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Soviet_nuclear_false_alarm_incident), there was not a launch authorization but his actions of not reporting what turned out to be false alarms up the chain of command likely prevented such. Gods help us if that’s all that’s standing between us and a nuclear launch again. What is often neglected in discussing this story is that Petrov was standing in for another officer and was not scheduled to be on duty on that night, and had worked with the team developing the early warning detection system software, which he knew had problems with false launch indiciations. This, the fact that the supposed ‘attach’ was only a handful of launches instead of entire wings of the US ICBM force, and his own credit to his civilian educational background that had him questioning the detection instead of reflexively following orders was all that prevented an alert from being forwarded up the chain of command. Whether and how the launch would have been further verified is unclear, but like the US policy the Soviets had essentially adopted a policy of “Launch on Warning”, e.g. to execute a counterforce strike in the (essentially hopeless) attempt to disable any remaining nuclear attack capability, so it is reasonable to assume that any verification would have been cursory. As for control of the Russian Federation Strategic Missile Forces today, they’ve undergone a modernization program in the last decade, so it would be reasonable to assume that communication to fixed land-based forces is via buried fiber optic cable and by encrypted radio communications to mobile launchers. The details of this system are not public knowledge but given the investment in the modernization effort it can be assumed to be robust against interference. As with the United States, the President of the Russian Federation has plenary authority to authorize and command the use of nuclear weapons subject only to verification of a legitimate order; no review or secondary order is required to deploy and use any strategic weapons, and tactical weapons can be release to battlefield commanders by direction. It has always been a contentious point that the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence boils down to the rational behavior of a handful of leaders and advisors (a fundamental tenet of Assured Destruction which even advocates of deterrent theory admit to be tenuous) but given recent events I question that Vladimir Putin is receptive to rational counsel even if he is receiving it. Large scale incursions rarely make much sense in hindsight even when they accomplish a short term goal, but the Russian deep invasion of Ukraine was such a surprise to observers (myself included) because it is such an ill-advised move that was likely to backfire even notwithstanding how apparently poorly prepared and logistically unsupported the invading troops were; the economy of Russia is so dependent upon energy exports to Europe and manufactured and perishable goods imports that even trying to stockpile non-USD cash reserves would not insulate the country from the international backlash. Even if NATO does nothing other than provide supplies and the Russian Army can manage to occupy major cities, they are going to be tied up there indefinitely at vast expense and to no material gain other than the supposed ‘moral victory’ of ostensible control over Ukraine, which will have missed its planting season to the conflict and won’t even be a good ‘breadbasket’ for grain. In this context, it is hard to say what Putin’s next desperate move will be (try to invade Estonia and Latvia? Try to push through to Moldova?) except that he must right now be feeling even more isolated and paranoid than he did a month ago. Such circumstances are dangerous enough in an ostensible democracy where a leader is accountable to constituents, and Putin is essentially accountable to no one, and certainly not the ministers he publicly browbeat into agreeing with his rationale to invade Ukraine. Stranger