OK, I’ve read the thread and thought some more about it. Thanks for your contributions, they’ve been good. Almost everyone has shown some forbearance and most have shown a lot. e-logic’s link was most informative.
On reflection, I think this is to some degree me being pedantic (and also seeing things though a framework that thinks the docrine of double effect is pretty dubious). Like a utiliarian, I’m inclined to take “maximize” pretty literally. And you can’t maximize two different functions at once. So “minimize civilian casualties” can’t literally mean optimize - it must mean something like civilian casualties are one argument in the objective function. This would lie between my boundary cases.
I see some people are cynical about the term. Whilst I still don’t think that its always or even mainly mostly used in bad faith, I am leaning towards the view that the term is sufficiently woolly as to be of little use and at worst dangerous. Part of the reason is there in John Mace’s post (and indeed in the WeirdDave quote in my OP):
I think that’s right and if it is, it seems to me that’s not useful. If trade-offs differ in different situations and information is tough to come by or evaluate in the confusion of conflict, how could you possibly measure whether a party was trying to keep civilian casualties low? And if you can’t evaluate it, you’re just left with a statement of (somewhat) good intentions.
I don’t want to undersell the real steps that some militaries have taken that do reduce civilian casualties, and I don’t think this is just military doublespeak. But the vagueness of the term worries me, and for reasons other than it seeming to be unobserveable. Part of the research of Kahneman and Tversky on framing involved examining the choices of Israeli military officers. Preference reversals of the same type seen in that link were exhibited. That’s understandable, because military choices are mind-bendingly and soul-sappingly hard. “Minimizing civilian casualties” is a powerful framing term. It makes one think “we must be the good guys” - particularly if the others are pretty clearly bad guys - when it doesn’t seem to have an operational meaning.
There is already a great psychological temptation to say they are the bad guys, so we must be good guys - when it’s obviously really possible that nobody’s the good guys. A term that dubiously rationalises civilian casualties might exacerbate that tendancy.