One might say, while “morality” is not objective, “pain” certainly is. A great deal of our morality is simply the avoidance of pain (individual and collective.)
That’s all we can get from the nose-punching exercise: most of us don’t enjoy it, and make up rules to try to prevent it.
An alien species that uses pain as a major behavioral motivator would likely have a very different moral code. (“Mama doesn’t love me any more! She hasn’t punched me in the nose for over a week!”)
How so? I know you mention it’s just some moral relativists, but I’d like to know why you suspect they don’t “consistently think that way in practice.” Once you form your basic axioms you’re able to make moral proclamations, and act in a way that is moral.
That argument against Relativism is self-referential. It assumes there is an objective truth, and any statement concerning it is an objective truth. In actuality it is a statement relative only to the proclamation of absolute truth; Making it a relative truth. it’s only true relative to that statement. The statement that “all truth is relative” depends on all other truth; It isn’t true absolutely.
I know some people still believe logic necessitates an absolute truth, so to that I’ll propose, “The only truth is that there is no other truth”.
Really, all of these arguments hinge on the definitions you’re using, and the perspective you’re taking. I find it’s more useful for me to take a relativist perspective, however.
Dillahunty gets his approach pretty much directly from Sam Harris in The Moral Landscape.
I think that’s a good argument for what it covers, but it still doesn’t really address when theists accuse us atheists of not having an objective morality without a god.
The answer to that question is that since morality is what each of us thinks is the proper course of action in any scenario, it’s fundamentally an opinion, and there’s no way it could be absolute. Even if there is a god, his opinion on morality is just one more opinion, and isn’t absolute in any way.
Now, if we start with the assumption that the end goal is to increase well-being of sentient creatures, and if we can reasonably guess at the outcome of actions, then there can be an objective “right” answer, but again, that’s dependent on us first sharing the opinion that increasing well-being is the goal.
Well, sure, if you define morality as “that which is in line with what god wishes”, then addressing mere matters of human want and need is not much of a moral issue. Of course, my argument at that point would be that I find that definition of morality misleading and prone to equivocations. Why should I care whether or not something is “moral” by that definition when it has nothing to do with what is good for me or those I care about it?
And as Dillahunty so succinctly puts it: “Once you stop talking about that, you’ve divorced yourself from any reasonable definition of morality.” You can take an arbitrary set of rules and define them as “moral”, but I don’t see why I should care. I object fervently to defining moral as that; furthermore, if those rules are as defined in the bible, I’d like to make a point of acting quite distinctly immorally on a great number of occasions. For example, not taking my homosexual friends out behind the woodshed for a good spot of stoning.
Well, you could take them out behind the stoneshed for a good spot of wooding.
Let me know if this makes sense…
If our opinion as to the proper course of action is driven by our individual circumstances, then a theist might propose that only one opinion, or perhaps only a certain group of opinions, would be held by people who were not afflicted by sin or the fallen nature or the finite limitations found in humanity. This set of opinions don’t constitute an objective morality, exactly, but rather a recognition or a claim that there exists ways of acting that are inherent to a kind of primordial or untainted humanity, regardless of what people are actually doing at any given time. Choosing to define these ways of acting as “moral”, saying whether they should or should not be followed, and deciding to what extent they should be promoted or enforced on others, would necessarily be a part of this framework.
I don’t really like the Dillahunty/Harris model personally, I was taken with it for a while but I don’t think they address well why anyone should care about following biological imperatives or increasing “well-being” or decreasing pain etc. It’s only persuasive to those who share the assumptions that those things are good, but those assumptions are still arbitrary.
The philosophy you’re referring to sounds like a dumbed down version of Nietzsche. (He wrote a whole book called Beyond Good and Evil, although his later book On the Genealogy of Morals is perhaps more relevant to your question.) As to what happened to it, well, Nietzsche’s been dead for more than a century, and while his work remains influential it did unfortunately and rather unfairly became strongly associated with the Nazi party.
It’s worth pointing out that Nietzsche did not consider all belief systems to be equal or think that we should refrain from judging things. He was fine with good vs. bad, it was good vs. evil that he had a problem with. If that seems like a distinction without a difference, consider the very different meanings of “I heard the Harry Potter books were good, but I read one and it was bad” and “I heard the Harry Potter books were good, but I read one and it was evil.” (The Wikipedia article for On the Genealogy of Morals goes into this distinction in more detail.)
However, the people we’re presumably talking to, when this subject of absoluteness comes up, are people who define their morality by what they think are the wishes of their god.
My point was that any moral system is, at bottom, an opinion. The specifics are built upon an axiom of what you want to accomplish with the system. For you, me, Dillahunty, and Harris, it’s well-being. But the people we’re having this conversation with don’t see it that way.
That’s an interesting way of looking at Christianity from a relativist’s perspective. Of coarse they also have the added burden of convincing us sin exists. That could turn into a whole other discussion itself.
What you’re asking for has never been done in a logically sound way. The “should” can only come after those arbitrary assumptions are made. Any justification of your assumptions will themselves be assumptions, and you’ll just keep infinitely regressing until you contradict logic. I’d cut them a bit of slack for not being able to break logic.
I don’t know if Harris takes it quite this far, but this is the point at which I disagree with Dillahunty. It sounds like he’s trying to Equivocate his system of morality with the definition of morality. He’s saying any system of morality that contradicts his doesn’t fall under the definition of morality. Words can have different meanings, but they can’t mean whatever you want them to mean, and I have yet to find his definition of morality in any dictionary. I understand there’s not much else you can do to argue your morality since all moral systems are either arbitrary or logically flawed, but what he’s saying is just illogical.
Maybe he’s just playing a little fast and loose with his words, and I’m misunderstanding him. If that’s the case; I wish he would stop 
*edit
After considering it; He may be using the word “define” the same way as a computer programmer would while talking about his variables (or assumptions) and not using it in linguistic terms while talking about words. I’ve misunderstood him before, so I wouldn’t be surprised.
I agree. And it’s not just the claim that humans are sinful (or some other terminology) in some way, but that there is such an ideal as a not-flawed “pure” human, and that we can know what that human would do. Still, I think it serves the purpose of moving us away from the coercively prescriptive, “this is what people should do” to a more descriptive, “this is what people would do, if they weren’t all messed up on life’s circumstances.” Even if we can prove something is moral, that we should then act in a particular way doesn’t really follow. What if I don’t want to be moral?
I know, but I don’t really see what the benefit is to them in insisting that objective morality exists, except in that they feel justified in making other people follow their morality if they can prove it’s objective. Even if their argument is right, they still haven’t answered why I should care, or why I should share in their valuing of what is objective.
What he’s doing, as far as I can tell, is pointing out that unless morality has to do with the well-being of humans, there’s not a whole lot of reason to care about it. Sure, you could define it in other ways, but then why should I care about it? Morality, as a term, has a very clear implication that one should do what is moral. And if doing what is moral has nothing to do with anyone’s well-being, then I just don’t see the point. You could call it moral, but in my eyes, it just doesn’t fit the bill. It doesn’t address anything meaningful.
I’m not sure if that’s what he’s saying. I wrote that last post at 4AM after a few drinks, and I’m writing this post at noon with a hangover, so you can take from that that I have a problem. I mean, um, that I might not be the most reliable person to relay complex philosophical concepts. 
Going away from what Dillahunty might mean (I’d rather not mangle my idol’s philosophy; if you’d like to look into it, check out his seminars on youtube, they’re quite interesting), I think that any moral system that doesn’t at some level deal with the well-being of humans cannot carry one of the necessary connotations of a moral system - that it ought to be followed.
Yeah, and what I think is that if it has nothing to do with well-being, then what you want to accomplish with the system carries no “ought”.
Turning it over more in my head, I’m trying to think of how some religious people might feel confident in identifying and promoting an objective morality. I’ve come up with the following thought process:
The belief that diversity of opinion on morality is due to individual circumstances (I know “individual circumstances” is a clumsy phrase, I’m trying to think of a better one that is suitably inclusive. Something like, “the effects of inhabiting a unique and finite space and time in the universe”).
The belief that people not affected by the accretions of individual circumstances, or who have reversed the effects of individual circumstances (e.g. Boddhisatvas or Walis or Jesus) will exhibit a particular system of moral opinions.
The belief that if a person works to reverse the effects of individual circumstances (like by following a religion and becoming e.g. a boddhisatva), they will adopt the system of moral opinions mentioned in (2) to the extent that they are successful in their efforts.
Now, to the extent that a person believes in the exclusive truth of his or her religious claims, it would be consistent for them to conclude that moral opinions contrary to the system discussed above are actually incorrect, not just different opinions. And regardless of whether they hold that conclusion or not, the moral system in (2) could still include the approval of some forms of promoting the method that leads to their moral system, and/or of advocating a society that in some way enforces their moral system.
I think each of these beliefs individually could be strongly argued against, starting with the idea that there is such a thing as people who have reversed the effects of individual circumstances. How do we know who has done that (if we even accept the idea) and do such people actually exhibit a common morality? So clearly this doesn’t actually prove by itself that any form of objective morality exists. But I think this thought process is at least internally logically consistent, and it avoids the idea of a moral system that should be followed (“do it because God says so”) for a moral system that just is followed, if people choose to follow an ideological framework (“if you’re good with God, you’ll choose to do it”). Critiques appreciated.
It gives a whole deeper meaning to the phrase, “What would Jesus do?”.
Let’s make sure we’re getting our terms right. Their use of “objective” is not using the word as meaning something that is outside of human experience. I believe their using it to describe a goal to be achieved; An “objective” to be accomplished. I’ve also heard Matt describe it as objective in the sense that you can observe that morality exists by objectively testing people’s behavior, etc.
I really don’t like the way that they both express themselves. So many people have misunderstood what they’re trying to say. There are much better ways of describing their concepts with less ambiguity than what they’ve used. Also, Matt regularly equivocates the different meanings (unintentionally?) when he’s arguing with theists. He should realize what most people probably mean by using the words “objective morality”, but he doesn’t seem to assume what’s most probable in this case.
The benefit comes from the knowledge that it’s measurable and achievable. I’m not a huge philosophy buff, but I don’t recall anyone ever articulating that concept to the extent Harris does. I doubt there are a majority of adults who would disagree with “well-being” or “the greatest happiness”; At least as long as it’s a circumstance where their religion would call for something different. If some people don’t want to agree to following that, then band together with people who do and fight them with greater numbers.
Do you really want to live in a society that doesn’t follow concepts like these?
Yea, and I got that same impression from him also. It’s just that he phrases things in a way that doesn’t seem intuitive to me so I took him as meaning more than what he probably did.
Why wouldn’t those moral systems have no ought?
But well-being of which humans? All humans? A subgroup of humans? What if the well-being of your relations is at odds with the well-being of all humanity? Which is moral? This is also one of the issues I’ve had with John Rawls - I mean you can talk about the Veil of Ignorance all you want, but why are personal considerations immoral? Why is it immoral to favor your family over your community? Or is it?
IME, this is the line everyone uses when they want to do something shabby.
When they think the other person is doing something shabby, then there are indeed absolute moral imperatives.
I do think there is an “objective” morality - it is based on an intelligent, empathetic application of the ethic of reciprocity (the “Golden Rule”). This isn’t going to be an absolute guide or code that everyone will always agree on - more a recognition that certain things are clearly wrong, a way to judge existing codes.
For example, why do people think that slavery is wrong, even if it happens to be legal and accepted within a culture? The original abolitionists had the best and most direct argument - “Am I not a man and a brother?” - Which is an appeal to empathy and reciprocity: slavery is wrong because slaves are humans, and so worthy of empathy.
More generally, and more universally, the subject of empathy is not human beings per se, but conciousness - so this morality ought to apply whether on Earth or anywhere else.
Thanks for the clarification. I suppose that extensive studies could determine attitudes people are generally inclined toward, but is the morality that that determines just something that crosses time and culture, or is it more of a snapshot? Given that the vast majority of psychological studies are on people from Western industrialized countries, and a huge percentage are specifically on American college students, I’m not sure if evidence exists yet for this either way.
If, hypothetically, I do want to have a society that doesn’t follow the majority consensus, well, in 100 years I’ll be dead anyway. At that point, what does it matter to me what I did when I was alive, or how many people agreed with me? Even if there actually is a God and I get sent to hell, maybe I’m such a spiteful and masochistic jerk that I’ll actually be happy there. Who knows. I’m vary wary of being told what I should value, even though I would bet in real life you and I and Harris have quite similar moral systems and hopes for society.
To me there isn’t anything necessarily wrong with a society choosing to organize itself around principles like promoting certain normative concepts of happiness and well-being, and enforcing that to a degree on the dissenting few, with the knowledge that ultimately the assigned value of those objectives is arbitrary.
Based on your clarification (and please correct me if I’ve misunderstood again), I’m thinking about the difference between these two statements:
“You should follow the rules because that will lead to achieving the objectives that people want to achieve” and
“You can choose to follow the rules or not, but we as a society have determined that we generally want these rules, and are ready to enforce consequences for breaking them.”
The first is closer to what Harris would say, yes? But it is an attempt to persuade, and it doesn’t really work if I don’t value the objectives most people want to achieve. The second one recognizes that it is arbitrary, but it doesn’t attempt to guess what I value or persuade me directly of anything, it just outlines the consequences for possible actions. In a case where a society has norms and laws that I really don’t agree with and want to protest, I would prefer the authorities to be using the second statement, since it reflects an understanding that change is possible.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
For example, why do people think that slavery is wrong, even if it happens to be legal and accepted within a culture? The original abolitionists had the best and most direct argument - “Am I not a man and a brother?” - Which is an appeal to empathy and reciprocity: slavery is wrong because slaves are humans, and so worthy of empathy.
[/QUOTE]
I am not sure that absolute opposition to slavery based on moral argument from non-slaves was necessarily so common, historically. I am vaguely aware of occasional pre-modern attempts to promote slavery abolition in India and China, but I don’t know if they were driven by moral concerns or not. A really interesting figure is the 4th century bishop and theologian Gregory of Nyssa, who took an amazingly strong stance against slavery. From his Wiki:
[QUOTE=Gregory of Nyssa]
“‘I got me slave-girls and slaves.’ For what price, tell me? What did you find in existence worth as much as this human nature? What price did you put on rationality? How many obols did you reckon the equivalent of the likeness of God? How many staters did you get for selling that being shaped by God? God said, Let us make man in our own image and likeness. If he is in the likeness of God, and rules the whole earth, and has been granted authority over everything on earth from God, who is his buyer, tell me? Who is his seller? To God alone belongs this power; or, rather, not even to God himself. For his gracious gifts, it says, are irrevocable. God would not therefore reduce the human race to slavery, since he himself, when we had been enslaved to sin, spontaneously recalled us to freedom. But if God does not enslave what is free, who is he that sets his own power above God’s?”
[/QUOTE]
But his passion on the subject was apparently very unusual for his time and community.