What happens if Hitler does not invade the Soviet Union in 1941?

Great Debates
41

“However Germany had virtually no chance of actually forcing the UK to come to terms. Sealion was never more than a pipe dream. Germany lost the Battle of Britain. And by mid '41 Germany had functionally lost the Battle of the Atlantic.”
Actually my understanding is that the peak of the Battle of the Atlantic was in 1942 and that despite American entry into the war the U-boats were still a serious threat till early 1943.

And this despite the fact that the Germans achieved their target of 300 Uboats only in July 1942 and that they were distracted by the East Front

Let’s posit a scenario where:
1)The Germans made Uboat their top priority after the Battle of France and decided to postpone Barbarossa till Britain was beaten. They would have achieved their target of 300 U-boats much earlier probably in the middle of 1941
2)The Germans didn’t declare war against the US which remained merely a hostile neutral

I find it hard to see how Britain would have survived beyond 1942 at best . As it was with just 100 U-boats the Germans came close to defeating Britain in early 1941 when food imports came close to a minimum. How would the Brits have survived against , say 200 Uboats in that period? Or against 300 Uboats later in the year and maybe 400 Uboats in early 1942 without any active American military support.

Since we are both agreed that without the the Brits fighting the US wouldn’t be in the war I won’t discuss your other points.

42

Well to be fair I did engage in a bit of hyperbole there. The 1% figure is very solid. But it does reflect the entire war. And the situation improved very drastically mid '43 just when enormous amounts of material were beginning to cross the Atlantic. Most allied material made the crossing after Donetz withdrew the U-boats.

'42 was the best year for the Germans as they sunk 6,149,473 tons of merchant shipping throughout the year. The next best year was '43 with 2,510,304. But most of this was sunk off the coast of the US. Most of it had nothing to do with the UK. Most of this was ‘local’ shipping only. In fact for the Halifax convoys, '42 was their safest year yet. It was certainly damaging to the allied war effort, but in terms of knocking the UK out of the war it was the worst decision they could have made. The convoys actually crossing the Atlantic and supplying the UK were largely un-molested.

I don’t have the Commonwealth numbers here at work but the US alone almost made all this good with new construction. The US produced 5,479,766 tons of new shipping in '42. Combined with Commonwealth figures the allies were building new shipping faster than the Germans were sinking it. The loss of the material they were carrying was damaging. But it never again became critical. And British stocks never ran as low as they had in Oct. '40.

The point is CyberPundit is proposing that German U-boat operations could have knocked the UK out of the war before the US joined. I disagree. The '42 numbers were an anomaly borne out because the US took far to long to adopt wartime measures such as escorted convoys and blackouts. The Germans never would have had that kind of success without declaring war on the US. The British ships were traveling in well protected convoys. They had already started operating most of the counter-submarine measures that were developed in WWII. Although many of them had not been perfected. Without the DoW on the US, allied shipping losses would almost certainly have been in the 2 - 2.5 million ton range just like in '40, '41, and '43. And Britain had already demonstrated it could deal with that level of losses.

And where are you getting these extra U-boats? Even with Barbarossa U-boats were made pretty much a top priority. Unlike say tanks or planes, shipbuilding is not something you can just switch production to overnight. Here are the production statistics for seagoing (not coastal) submarine production:
1939 15
1940 40
1941 196
1942 244
1943 270
1944 288

Now compare this to total aircraft production:
1939 8,295
1940 10,247
1941 11,776
1942 15,409
1943 24,807
1944 39,807

Despite years of focus on adding additional slipways, German shipbuilding was only able to increase production by roughly 50% between '41 and '44. To contrast aircraft production was increased nearly 340%. It is relatively easy to switch a tractor factor to a tank factory. It is impossible to switch a tank factory to a submarine factory. For Germany to have made a stronger effort to produce submarines it needs to construct the slipways at least a year, and probably more like two, in advance. So even if Germany tried to radically increase submarine production in late '40 (our likely point of departure from the original timeline) this increased production doesn’t begin to hit the water until '42 to '43.

Of course all of this is impossible anyway because submarines require vast amounts of exotic metals, none of which are easily available to the Nazis. And many of these raw metal requirements are largely unique to submarine construction so you can’t make it up by reducing tank or airplane construction. Add to this the great difficulty and precision required in submarine work and you don’t have enough dock workers to make the things anyway, at least not in the short term. None of this allows you to have your 300-400 active boats in '42.

And even if the Germans pull off some miracle and somehow flood the Atlantic with U-boats, they can’t do this without the British knowing about it. And they are at least as capable of upping escort and Merchant production as the Germans are of upping u-boat production. Had it gotten bad enough they even had contingency plans to pull the Far East fleet into the Atlantic as well.

And you still haven’t explained how all this happens without Britain receiving in your words “any active American military support,” when in real life by April '41 the US was already fighting a full scale anti-submarine war.

43

From what I understand, this project was headed by the Nobel prizewinner (W. Heisenburg). Although a briliant man, he made a fatal mistake: he thought that a bomb could be built without the use of enriched uranium. Because of this error, the germans never actually had a working reactor…they built a reactor that was an array of uranium blocks, suspended by chains. This whole array was to be lowered into a bath of heavy water (the moderator). US experts who examined the german site later declared that if the pile had ever reached critical mass, the reactor would have most likely blown up, and fried everybody around it! Which leads us back to Dr. Heisenburg…after the war, he always maintained that he knew of his error, but kept to it TO PREVENT THE GERMANS from achieving the bomb!
I think the guy was a liar!

44

Here’s my take on the OP.

In the Spring of 1941, high level meetings are held in Germany and the decision is made to postpone plans to attack the Soviet Union and the current state of wary neutrality is maintained. With the new “England First” policy in effect, advocates of the Mediterranean policy are able to win their arguments. Gibraltor and Malta fall to airborne and marine assaults and the Axis troops in Africa start receiving significant reinforcements. Egypt falls and the Germans press on into Palestine, Syria, Jordan, Arabia, and Iraq (in many cases with local support). Meanwhile, without the strain of the Eastern front, Germany is able to devote resources to other neglected military areas such as the navy, rocket forces, jets, and strategic bombers.

By October, Britain, faced with slow strangulation by submarines, aerial bombardment, and a long series of defeats on land, has had enough. Churchill is ousted and the new Halifax government opens armistice talks with Berlin. The resulting peace is not unbearable; the UK remains unoccupied and free but has to recognize German superiority over the rest of Europe. The neutrals of Europe see which way the wind is blowing and Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Russia all accomodate their foreign policies accordingly.

In the United States, there has been a prolonged debate between the interventionist and isolationist factions in the government. With the British collapse and European peace, the isolationists win the day and their victory is reflected in the November congressional elections. But there victory is short lived when the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor a month later and then occupy the Philipines, Malaysia, and the East Indies. Britain having just emerged from one war has no heart for another. Troops and ships are sent to India, Burma, and Australia but the United States is told that they will only be used to defend against further attacks. Japan receives even less help from their supposed ally; the Germans tell them that as far as they’re concerned Japan has started its own war and should not expect any direct support from the Reich.

With the passage of a year, the prospect of a strike east is against raised in Berlin. This time, despite the reforms and rebuilding of the Red Army, the prospects are better; there is no second front, Germany has secured its own oil supply in the Middle East, the United States is distracted in the Pacific, and the armed forces have had several months to rest and refit. Early one May morning in 1942, over a million soldiers smash their way across the Soviet frontier (including the borders of Finland and Turkey) in a campaign that will not end until Moscow falls five months later (along with the second and third largest Soviet cities of Leningrad and Kiev). The Soviet government is able to evacuate to Kuibyshev and continue the fight but there will be no foreign support this time. The Wehrmacht’s 1943 Summer offensive sweeps through southern Russia and the Soviets are forced to evacuate again to Magnitogorsk. Stalin himself does not make this trip. Having lost confidence in his leadership it is decided by others that he can best serve the Motherland by dying in combat at the front. The subsequent ruling trioka of Beria, Molotov, and Zhukov negotiate a grim peace that cedes control of everything east of the Urals.

The Japanese fare even worse. With no European front to compete with, the Pacific war receives the full strength of America. The Japanese conquest is stopped in 1942 when American code-breaking enables the USN to ambush the Japanese attack on Panama. 1943 sees the Japanese conquests liberated one by one as the American armed forces reach their full strength. In June of 1944, American troops bring the war to Japan with the invasion of Kyushu. Six more months of bitter fighting across the home islands are required, however, before Japan’s final surrender.

The Germans spend 1944 mopping up resistance forces in their conquered lands, but by New Year’s Day 1945, the world is officially at peace (with the exception of the Indian civil war which breaks out in 1944 and doesn’t end until Subras Bose’s victory in 1949 and the evacuation of the Nehru government to Ceylon). But the reality is a cold war between the two superpowers of the United States and the German Reich. The Americans win the race to build the first atom bomb in 1947 but the threat of retaliation by German jet bombers and rockets (as well as the first German a-bombs which appear in 1950) keep the uneasy peace.

45

Interesting scenario, Little Nemo. But is Hitler capable of imagining and coordinating such a plan? I think his inherent inability to delegate authority and to accept strategic retreats would send him off the rails.

46

Not bad Little Nemo however there are a few points that need to be addressed.

Malta is eminently takeable and probably should be assaulted. Gibraltar is going to be tough nut to crack though. Simply put the RN and RAF forces can easily repulse any seaborne invasion the axis can mount. That leaves only a land based assault through Spain. Historically Hitler tried to get Franco to agree to an assault and Franco refused. Spain imported much of its grain from Commonwealth nations at the time and Franco couldn’t afford to lose that. The option of a German invasion of Spain is possible but unattractive. No one knows exactly what would have happened, but visions of a repeat of the Peninsular War sure spring to mind. Historically Hitler actively pursued this option and eventually decided it was unworkable.

Even if somehow both Malta and Gibraltar are taken this doesn’t greatly improve the Axis position in North Africa though. The biggest issue is one of logistics. When Rommel reached El Alamein, the reason he stopped is that he had outrun his supplies. Tripoli to El Alamein is over a thousand miles of unpaved roads (and no rail service). To deliver a single gallon of fuel required the Axis to use 10 gallons to fuel the transports. In comparison the British are right on a good rail back to Alexandria and Cairo. Simply put the Germans simply don’t have the legs to make it much further than they did historically.

You seem to have skipped a step. Why does any of this cause the Churchill government to fall? No production changes made in the Spring of '41 will greatly change the situation by October '41. Britain will still have the upper hand in the Battle of the Atlantic. They will still have a larger and better trained air force. And slightly heavier losses in the Middle East are in no way going to be more of a morale killer than watching their ally, the Soviets, getting slaughtered. Historically Churchill easily survived a vote of no confidence (only one vote against IIRC) in almost your exact scenario. At the time it was felt that Rommel was going to take Cairo and Singapore had just fallen. Why would the British people be any more tired of war than they were historically?

Except the Soviets will be vastly more prepared than they were historically. The border fortifications will be completed and fully manned. The new weapon systems such as the T-34 tank will be available in (for the Germans) disconcerting numbers. The new post-purge officer cadre will be in place. And the red army will be nearly 1 million men stronger than it was in '41.

Historically the west front didn’t take anything from the east front in '41-'43, so there is no reason to expect the Germans will be any stronger in your scenario than they were historically. In contrast the red army was in shambles in '41. Give them an extra year to prepare and the Germans will advance only a fraction of what they did historically.

All in all not bad. But you have hand waved several important points. The fact of the matter is the Germans were very fortunate to have done as well as they did. In fact if the French had had a viable tactical doctrine the Germans probably would have collapsed by late '43. As it was, by '42 European Axis production was roughly 25% that of the allies, and population was roughly 35%. Even if the Soviets are removed the Germans will be operating at a severe disadvantage. In fact by the time you remove the resources they were able to plunder from the Ukraine and other Soviet territories things don’t look at all good for the Axis.

47

I’ve always felt that both the Anglo-German and the Russo-German wars were a lot closer than most people credit. Too many people seem to automatically assume that because Germany did lose, its defeat was inevitable. In my semi-informed opinion, any number of relatively small decisions could have changed the outcome of either or both conflicts.

Once the war was over, most British people retroactively placed themselves in the Churchill “never surrender” camp. But during the actual war, there were a number of voices speaking otherwise. It wasn’t a black or white case of either defeating Germany or being subject to Nazi occupation. The large gray area in the middle was a recognition of the status quo in early 1941: Britain hasn’t been defeated but has no realistic chance of defeating Germany in the near future without outside help.

As for war between Germany and Russia, it probably would have happened eventually. Conquering Russia was always a cornerstone in Hitler’s plans. But there’s no reason it had to happen in 1941 as opposed to 1940 or 1942. Hitler was capable of being deviously flexible when he saw the advantage of it. As for Stalin, while he was ruthless, he was no risk taker. He wouldn’t have declared war on Germany unless victory was a sure thing; a scenario unlikely to emerge. Nor do I feel the Soviets would have been miraculously able to totally remake their military if given the mere eleven months I posed. Improvements would have been made, but the Germans would have used the same period to improve also and probably done so more effectively.

The United States was always the big shadow over Axis plans for expansion. I fully agree with those who say the US was virtually undefeatable once it committed itself to war. But that commitment was never inevitable. Right up to December 7, 1941 there were many influentional people arguing against a military build-up or confronting the Axis. Ironically, America’s very superiority was one factor used by those arguing against war. Many people said that because Germany and Japan couldn’t really threaten the US itself, there was no need to go to war for the sake of other countries.

So overall, I stand by my post as being plausible except for two area: my passing reference to India was obviously intended as a comment on post-war China and I have to admit in retrospect that there’s little chance the isolationists would have gained many seats in 1941 when there were no Congressional elections that year.