Very likely.
Sorry. My bad. My first post today assumed you were talking about the Normandy landings. Missed the “S” somehow.
You bring up what I was mostly concerned about, the situations that led to Hurtgen Forest & Metz. Really frustrating reading about how these unfolded and how the Americans got into them in the first place.
Well yes, but what’s that got to do with the invasion of France? It’s not like the British were hoping to reclaim Calais for the King.
The British supposedly wanted to invade areas where they could reestablish control of countries they controlled as part of the British Empire.
No he wasn’t, he understood that it needed to be done right, and it was likely a one-shot deal whenever it did happen. Which was the consensus of all senior western Allied people who mattered, eventually.
In Europe? The theatre of war this thread is about?
They didn’t want to land in France, but in the Med and North Eastern Africa.
Where were there any Axis forces in North-Eastern Africa after the general surrender in May, 1943?
After that, the Allies did invade in the Med - in Italy, which ultimately knocked Fascist Italy out of the war.
What British colonies in the Med or North east Africa were under Axis control, that the British supposedly wanted to re-gain?
I don’t understand this. Operation Anvil began on August 15. Marseillis was not taken in the initial landings, it was taken about a week later. By the time Marseilles was captured, Army Group B had already been defeated in the Falaise Gap and Overlord was almost over. France would have fallen to the Allies whether Anvil happened or not.
They wanted to retain Egypt, Palestine and the Sudan. They had other countries in Africa as well. I think their interest in the Med would have been Gibraltar, Minorca and Malta. They were also determined to protect India and approaches to India.
All of which were under British control from 1943.
You agreed with Little Nemo that Churchill didn’t want to invade France, but wanted to attack the Germans in north-east Africa and the Med.
I’m asking: from 1943 onwards, where were there any Germans in North Africa or the Med that Churchill wanted to attack instead of invading France, as you’re suggesting?
Yes, plant, while the British did have an major interest in the Mediterranean, by the time of Overlord it was pretty much a done deal. The major disagreements was the British (Churchill and Alan Brooke) wanting to continue pushing in Italy and with perhaps a associated invasion in the Adriatic, with Vienna being the objective. This was more to position Britain for the post-war world, as Stalin and the Russians were already pressing into the Balkans and Poland at this time. The Americans were against this type of ‘geo-political’ stragety and made Overlord and the defeat of the German Army in France the major focus. Since by 1944 the Americans had become the major power of the Alliance, they got their way.
I believe my latest foray into the subjects was “Masters and Commanders” by Andrew Roberts. The British had secured North Africa and the Med by 194(3) as well, so let the Americans run the show. I think Brooke was portrayed as a nice family guy, but definitely an “American phobe” if that is a legitimate term. A firm British belief that the Americans were too inexperienced was described in the book.
I’m working my way through “The Last Lion: Winston Churchill–Defender of the Realm” which covers this topic and I concur, Alanbrooke wasn’t real fond of American fighting ability (and truth be told, until 1944 there wasn’t much to be said for it), but he did get along with Eisenhower, who got the job Alanbrooke coveted.
Brooke got along well with Marshall and was correct in restraining some of the more far fetched American ideas like a 1942-1943 France Landing.
No idea how that equates with being Anti-American.
I’d like to think Brooke would have stood up to Monty and prevented Operation Market Garden. That was a quite a cluster-fuck.
Bumped.
I just finished a reading some of Alan Brooke’s war diaries, and I wonder…maybe a split SACEUR and CDR land forces might have worked better. Alan Brooke certainly seemed to have been right on the money with his criticisms of Ike’s strategic vision.
Maybe, Ike was too myopic to the task at hand. The again, Brooke was CIGS and had a much wider view than a theatre commander had, and if he had been that, maybe he would have done the same.
Eisenhower’s later career does not show lack of strategic awareness.
AK84, you’re sure you didn’t bump it just because of the recent relevant xkcd?
(the answer to the OP is obviously than Eisenhower would have become God-Emperor of the Missouris)
In my opinion, Eisenhower probably followed the best plan. His plan was cautious but that was its virtue. It was slow and steady and guaranteed to win the war in Europe.
Other generals suggested plans that might have won the war faster - and they were correct. But their plans contained the possibility of a serious defeat as well as a war-winning victory. Eisenhower figured a ten-month plan with a 100% chance of success was better than a ten-week plan with a 90% chance of success.
Eisenhower also right about foregoing the temptation to race to Berlin. For one thing, he probably would have lost the race; the Soviets were much closer to Berlin than the Americans or British were. And taking Berlin wouldn’t have changed anything; the occupation zones had already been set. Eisenhower would have just been spending American and British lives to capture territory that would then be turned over to the Soviets.
And Eisenhower read the military situation on the ground. He could see that the smartest thing the Germans could do was build up a series of fortifications and supply depots in the alps and then fall back on them in a fighting retreat. If the Germans did this, they could have established a strong defensive position in the alps and held out for at least another year. So rather than racing across northern Germany, Eisenhower set the main direction of his advance through southern Germany to cut off this line of withdrawal. Of course, as it turned out, this was unnecessary; while it would have been the smart strategy, it wasn’t what Hitler wanted. He ordered German forces to stand their ground and die in place rather than allow them to withdraw to a better defensive position. But Eisenhower was correct in not basing his own strategy around the possibility that the Germans would screw up.