Not a greater outrage… just one outrage too many. By late '41 I think most Americans viewed war with the Axis as inevitible. At some point the US was going to have to stand up to the agressors or they would eventually attack the US, at a time and place of their choosing. And the government was scaling up in preperation for that war. They had already held the first peace time draft. They had already placed orders for some 20 odd new carriers, 11 new battleships, 50 new cruisers and 100+ new destroyers. This was a decidedly different posture than they had in '40 when western Europe had been overrun. One does not start building a fleet like that without the intent to use it.
Consider the UK in '38-'39. The average Brit probably thought much more highly of the Czechs than they did of the Poles. Rydz-Śmigły and the Polish government were considered nothing more than fascist thugs. So why was Poland the outrage that brought the UK into the war? I would argue two points: First the British thought they were finally prepared for war with Germany (or at least mostly so), and second the Germans had finally pushed too far. Not because Poland was a greater outrage.
The Dutch East Indies were in a similar position. The US had at that time done everything short of active war to try to prevent Axis aggression and they were also finally getting into the position to do something about it.
I think this article highlights the general feeling the country at the time.
Yes Germany was always going to be the primary opponent. But I highly doubt once at war the US was going to let Japan simply take whatever they wanted in Asia.
I’ll make the same point I’ve made before. Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and the rest of China in 1937. Yet in 1941, the United States had not declared war on Japan. So while the United States didn’t like the Japanese invasion of China, they obviously did not see it as a casus belli.
He makes some points but I’m not convinced overall. I still don’t see how the fall of Saigon and Jakarta would be regarded as more serious than the fall of Paris and Amsterdam. And I don’t see how Japan would be regarded as a more likely target for an American war declaration than Germany.
As for the Life article, it doesn’t represent any turning point. Life was a Luce publication and Luce had been an interventionist for years. Show me an article from the Chicago Tribune arguing for American intervention and I’ll concede there was a major change in public opinion.
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Japan’s “sphere of influance” in China was growing. It was growing to a point where it was going to over lap the US sphere of influance. Japan’s choice was to stop expanding in China or in time Japan’s troups were going to come into conflict with us troups.
In fact the meetings that were being held in Wasington were about Japan’s expansion. Infact the US had given Japan an untimadioum. Stop in China now.
Yamamoto said if they did not beat the US in 12 months they would loose the war.
They could have won the war woth a little better follow through. If they had lonched the third wave they could have done some perminate damage. Or if they had followed with an invasion fleet the next day, they could have denied us acess to the Pacific and cut the lines to Australia.
Also if the US had lost three carriers on Japan none at Midway the war could have turned out different.
War between Japan and the US was going to happen, the attack on Pearl and the way it was done cost the US greatly, but worked to our advantage.
Paris and Amsterdam are in Europe. The United States had a long tradition, dating back to George Washington, of avoiding involvement in European wars. We had violated that tradition once, during World War I, and during the interwar years many came to regard that involvement as a mistake.
Jakarta is in the Pacific. The United States had a counter-tradition, since the Civil War, of being more involved in Pacific affairs (the annexation of Hawaii, the Spanish-American War and the ensuing annexation of Guam and the Philippines, the Open Door Policy with China, the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, and the South China Patrol under which the United States Navy maintained order on Chinese rivers.)
The rise of Japan threatened this growing presence. There was no immediate rush to war–there was no move to declare war, for example, after Japan invaded China in 1937. We weren’t ready yet, and the world situation didn’t require it. But we did respond with an oil embargo, which was about as serious a move as we could make short of war.
By 1941, the world situation had deteriorated–Japan had allied with the Axis, Britain was tied up with Germany, and if anybody were going to oppose Japan taking over the entire western Pacific, it had to be us. I don’t believe American public opinion would have tolerated Japan taking over the European colonies.
Essentially we weren’t ready in 1937, either politically, emotionally or militarily. However that situation was changing by 1941. We spent the late 30’s building up our military after over a decade of drawing it down or ignoring it (always the case with the US until after Vietnam…we never learned), and public opinion had been steadily shifting toward war in the late 30’s and early 40’s.
Also, while the US wasn’t happy with the invasion of China (note the embargo which is a pretty serious move on our part…it was no token gesture), it didn’t have direct strategic implications to the US (just like all those examples in Europe didn’t have direct strategic implications to the US…which is why we didn’t do anything about it), a grab by Japan for the European powers pacific territories WOULD have had direct strategic impact on the US and our position in the Pacific. Which is why Japan hit us first at Pearl and THEN went on the offensive to grab all they could…they knew if they just tried to grab it would have forced our hand and brought us to war with them. And on much more favorable terms to us than if they wiped out our fleet first.
The short answer is that had Japan tried what you posit, it would have meant war with the US regardless…and it would have meant a war with the US fleet and Pacific bases essentially intact and astride their lines of communication. Worst of all worlds that. Even had they managed to wipe out our fleet in open battle they would have taken losses (that they didn’t take sneaking up on us at Pearl), and shortening the war, since we wouldn’t have had to start from scratch.
JAPAN needed oil for its navy-the navy estimated it had a 90 day supply of oil at the time of Pearl Harbor. Once Roosevelt embargoed Japan (the USA was Japan’s major oil supplier) the only outcome was for Japan to end its war (in China), or strike south (and seize the oilfileds of the Dutch east Indies). War with Russia was out of the question-the Russian Army (uner Gen. Zhukov) has annihilated a japanese division at the battle of Khalkin Gol/Nohomon.
If the the Japanese tried to go to war (and not involve the USA), they would have been highly vulnerable to a strike from US bases in the Philippine Islands.
So, no good choices for Japan-their only hope was to inflick a devastating blow on the USA (which they failed to do). Adm. Yamamoto sad it best “I fear we have wakened a sleeping gint”:smack:
This might have won the War for the Axis. Sue the USA would have becoem more and more belligerant, until finally some Axis power did something that allowed the USA to use it as a *Casus belli *. But that might have been too late.
Having played this over and over (in many games and simulations), the whole war hinges on Russia falling.
Yes, the Japanese Army wasn’t well suited to fight the Russian Army. But it didn’t matter- all the Japanese had to do is make sure Stalin couldn’t pull forces from the Manchurian border. wiki"*At the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942–43, after losing an estimated 1 million men in the bloodiest fighting in history, the Red Army was able to regain the initiative of the war. Due to the unwillingness of the Japanese to open a second front in Manchuria, the Soviets were able to call dozens of Red Army divisions back from eastern Russia. These units were instrumental in turning the tide, because most of their officer corps had escaped Stalin’s purges. The Soviet forces soon launched massive counter attacks along the entire German line. *
With any Japanese pressure, no forces from Manchuria, thus Stalingrad falls, thus Russia collapses, thus the Axis wins. And, if the Japanese had more forces to push into the British Empire, that could have meant that GB woudl not have been able to keep Rommel from winning in North Africa.
The thing is- the Axis did not fight as allies, but the Allies* did*.
Sure, America could still protect Britian, so it would not be a complete victory.
I disagree. Once the war started, Japan’s only hope was that America would give up. Japan never had a chance to defeat the United States. Japan wasn’t capable of inflicting any amount of damage that America couldn’t rebuild.
For example, losing three carriers at Midway would have just been a temporary setback. The United States launched twenty-two new carriers (and 141 escort carriers) during the forty five months it was at war.
Japan never intended to defeat the US…at least not in the initial conflict. Their plan was to hurt the US enough that we would be set back on our heals why they ran wild in the Pacific. They they would entrench and make the cost to us too high so that we would cede most of the territory they had captured and re-establish normal relations with the newly expanded Japanese empire. This was all predicated on a miscalculation/misinterpretation of the US, it’s citizens and our supposed response to such an attack. The attack at Pearl Harbor was probably the worst possible thing Japan could have done as it galvanized US opinion wrt Japan and forged an attitude that only unconditional surrender would suffice.
I think had the war started in other ways (like if the Japanese had tried something along the OP’s ‘what if’) the public would have been willing and perhaps even eager to settle for lesser terms than the complete destruction of Japan…in fact as the war dragged on I think there would have been something similar to what we saw in Vietnam and even in Iraq. I doubt the public would have been willing to pour the kind of treasure and suffer the high casualties we ended up taking in the Pacific.
I don’t think Roosevelt wanted war with Japan while the Nazis were still in power. In 1941 Germany was kicking major bootie in Europe and the last thing the US wanted was a two-front war. Germany was only required to enter a American-Japanese war if the US attacked first, something that was unlikely given American sentiment.
Didn’t Yamamoto describe the potential war as starting on the west coast and then proceeding across 3000 miles of expanding nothing to Washington DC and then denigrate the possibility of such an assault with geometrically declining forces before deferring to his bosses because he was a “good soldier”?
They coulda tried, but at the time American backwoodsmen (the same ones who supposedly beat the British, but with better arms) were equally armed and willing to fight. And then there were the rest of us something-millions. They should’ve turned the toaster to “fucked.”
Right. The War would have been unpopular, and people would have been muttering about “our boys home for Christmas” and “the suckered us into WWI” (which is true), and so forth. Sure, the USA still could have won, but we could have won in Viet-nam.
But if Japan won the battle of Midway and the US lost the three carriers then the us would of had no carriers in the Pacific. and the Essex class carrier was commissioneed in 1942, the 2nd in 1943. So after Midway fell Hawaii would have been next would have been Australia. that would have forced counter attacks to be launched from California. And any ships dammaged needing repair would have returned to CAlifornia.
Hawaii is 3 days steaming at 15 knotts from California. that is a long supply line. If the US recovered from the loss of forward bases it would have taken years longer to end the war.
No the attempt was not to invade the US to achieve victory but to make too expensive in lives to continue. This tatic was used through out the was. Thats what the fight to the last man on Islands was all about. Make the US want to end the war.
No way Japan could have taken Hawaii in either 42 and probably not in 43 either. They didn’t have near the logistics assets to stage a major invasion so far from their home shores. Though could have (perhaps) launched further raids on the islands if there was no fleet to cover it, but that would have been the extent of what they could do. Consider all the other stuff they had on their plate to do in (to paraphrase) Yamamoto’s two years of running wild before the US got back on it’s feet and started to seriously fight back.
Besides, taking Hawaii would have escalated the conflict beyond where the Japanese wanted it to go. Even if they could have taken it (:dubious:) they wouldn’t have…because by doing so they would have upped things a notch and it would have been that much harder for the US to back down later on (unless they tried to use it as a bargaining chip I suppose).
What people forget is that most of Australia is uninhabitable desert. The plan, should the Japanese take New Guinea, was to simply make a fighting withdrawl from Northern Australia until the Japanese gave up on the idea.
For what it’s worth, even the Japanese Army thought invading Australia would be an exercise in futility, and Tojo himself said it just wasn’t going to happen. The best they could hope for was that Australia would stop fighting the Japanese and the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and Australia/NZ would sort of co-exist in a sort of perpetual cease-fire (or state of non-aggression, at best).
