No, it was not.
Japan’s ground forces were grossly outmatched by basically anybody. They were poorly trained, poorly equipped, outnumbered, and not terribly well led. The USSR and the U.S. could easily have advanced to a air-raid staging point in Asia post-Nazi defeat.
Yes, it was.
The question was how the US was ever going to get a bomber base in Korea.
Here, again, from post #
Got it now?
You do not know what you are talking about. Google Iwo Jima, Saipan
and Okinawa for what it took to subdue Japanese defences.
Japanese ground forces were well trained, well led and everywhere
putting up fanatical resistance.
Their armor was deficient but the insular terrain of most of the Pacific
battlefields was unsuited for defensive use of armor. And it was taking
the US Army and Marines weeks to subdue even small islands like Saipan
and Iwo Jima.
Before Hiroshima the saying in the Pacific thater was “Golden Gate in '48”.
You should be clever enough to figure out what that means about the caliber
of the enemy resistance.
Google it yourself, google Guadacanal while you’re at it. Anywhere the Japanese army met Americans on land in anything approaching an equal footing they were slaughtered. The Americans having been through World War 1 were keenly aware that “fix bayonets and run at the enemy en mass” almost always ends badly against a disciplined, well armed opponent. The Japanese, not so much.
We had a pretty good idea what the caliber of the Japanese resistance would have been after the Red Army wiped out a million Japanese troops in Manchuria in 8 weeks.
The Royal Navy did develop carriers and many of the original ideas came from them. The RN’s problems was getting planes, as the Fleet Air Arm was until 1938 run by the RAF. Indeed in the early part of the Naval War in the Med it was the British Aircraft Carriers which were the decisive factors; see Taranto for instance.
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1 thing I don’t understand was why didn’t we use more naval assets including carriers, in the European theater? A problem that leaps to mind is the long-range bombers having to go unescorted on missions deep into Germany (pre-Mustang). Considering that German naval power was weak and since we seem to have had enough carriers and planes for the Japanese theater, why couldn’t we & the Brits simply sent carriers into the North Sea or Med, carrying fighters to escort the bombers on missions they otherwise wouldn’t have had escorts for? Also, there are incidents of destroyers rescuing soldiers in Sicily & Italy for the landings there, when the regular artillery was still stuck on the ships. Given that Naval guns had a long range, why were they not used as part of the plan as well?
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The Japanese were limited to the number of carriers by the Washington Naval Treaty until they withdrew in 1936. If they rejected it much earlier, would England or the US built more to counter them in the far east? The US may not have, given the deep isolationist sentiments.
Even had the Japanese had a stunning victory at Midway, they were far overextended, and did not have the men or ships for invading Hawaii or the West coast. With the IJN and IJA not talking much to each other, and the IJA deadset on their conquest of China, they did not want to divert assets to Hawaii.
The US plan was to play defensive for a couple of years, while they built up the armed forces, so while losing Midway would have made things more difficult, it still would have been a matter of time before America’s industrial strength won out.
The naval standoff made it difficult to supply Japanese units on Guadalcanal
with reinforcements, food and ammo, and heavy equipment such as artillery
was out of the question. Also, the US position could not be outflanked or taken
from the rear, so US lines could not be overrun except by unsupported frontal
assault. In such conditions, and where quality and quantity are equal the defence
will always prevail.
Later, when the Japanese were on the defensive, the US often enjoyed complete
air and naval dominance, but still had to slug it out in bloody fighting on land against
an isloated, surrounded enemy who seldom gave thought to surrender.
We had had our own experience with Japanese troops, thank you, and lower
end estimates for what it would take to conquer the Japnese home islands
were ~500,000:
Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946
The 1945 Red Army was the greatest army in history up to that point, in both
quality and quantity. Its artillery and armored fighting vehicles were especially
potent, and it possessed local air dominance as well. Finally, they knew where
the attack would occur and the Japanese did not. No defenders in the Japanese’
shoes would have stood a chance.
The thing is that the tactic of just ignoring casualties and attacking often wins battles. The problem with this tactic is that all those casualties mean you lose the ability to fight future battles. You can end up winning battles and losing wars.
So “attack at all costs” tactics work good in the short term when you’ve got a lot of troops to throw away. But “minimize casualties” tactics work better in the long term as both sides begin to realize there’s not a bottomless pool of replacement soldiers.
The Pacific battle was not as critical as you might think.
Although it was important, the most decisive factor was probably the US submarine campaign, as it was this that denied Japan the resources they had originally gone to war to obtain.
The lack of those resources is a very major part of the reason that they were losing the land campaign in Asia. They had the longest advance in history, but once Stillwell and Slim had properly reorganised their forces, the Japanese began the longest retreat in history.
The Japanese gave it a good shot, but they could never counter the absolutely immense resources in terms of fighting men, you are looking at all of China, plus all of Burma and all of India, and more besides.
The forces arraigned against the Japanese in Asia only ever represented a tiny percentage of what could have been available.
The only advantage Japanese forces had was morale and training, and once the training aspect was addressed, then it was all over.
This theatre had been a low priority in terms of air power, however even this was able to wreak havoc to Japanese ambitions. In addition, it had been thought that this environment was not suitable for tanks and this turned out to be completely wrong - the Lee-Grant proved to be excellent and the Japanese simply never had an answer to it.
The Pacific war finished it much much faster, but the end was just as certain.
First off, learn how to punctuate your posts. You do not need random line breaks.
Second, we didn’t need any specific islands. We were quite capable of attacking anywhere they were weak, and frankly, they could never be strong anywhere no matter how much shipping they had. Aside from whcih, their shipping was annihilated during the war; American submarines, as casdave mentioned, basically destroyed all Japanese shipping by the time the Atomic bombs were dropped. Midway would not change this.
Likewise, the bloody cost of invading Japan itself was due to the assumption that the entire Japanese population would essentially fight to the death, and that near-genocidal measures woud be required to attain victory, although one an area was cut off and all resistance destroyed, the remaining population would surrender. Their ground forces were, as I explained, poorly led, poorly equipped, and poorly trained. They managed to barely win at a huge and bloody cost against Russia in the last generation, and since then had nto changed much. They were capable of defeating the China, then a backwards country with no modern military, but could not even tightly hold there. They had abslutely no chance whatsoever against the USSR or the United States. And lest you fiorget, the USSR was already knocking against Korea when the Japanese surrendered.
One issue I though with Midway was that the Japanese did not realize the Yorktown was there and were confused at first. They thought they had all the carriers located and were surprised by extra planes and then confused by the extra carrier target.
Meanwhile, they travelled close enough together that extra carriers might have meant more sitting ducks for the US.
If Britain would not negotiate for peace during the battle of Britain, what are the odds that the USA would do so simply because they lost Midway? Or even the territory of Hawaii?
The bit about Yamamoto’s hesitancy is apparently pure fiction made up for “Tora Tora Tora”.
The Japanese locals, especially IIRC Iwo Jima, had apparently been fed the same crap about enemy atrocities and cruely that we fed our people; They were terrified of the invaders and given grenades to do suicide attacks.
Are you referring to the Rape of Nanking and the Bataan Death March?
What would have been more useful to the Japanese than more carrier decks would have been a better plan to train new carrier pilots, which would depend upon getting the experienced ones back in one piece to train new generations of pilots. Japan had possibly the best-trained naval aviators of its day but regarded them as generally expendable; for example, there was little organized effort made by the Japanese to locate and rescue their downed aviators. As the pool of highly trained and experienced aviators dwindled during the war, the Japanese continued to use up most of their experienced pilots on the front lines instead of bringing them home to train the next generation.
This would not have altered the outcome of the war, but could have made the war go on longer and would have been more costly for the Americans in terms of lives and ships lost. The political impact of the latter on US domestic politics would have been important in and of itself.
I’d love to hear more from you about “the same crap…that we fed our people:” especially what, precisely are the sources you’ve encountered which justify your conclusion.
The Japanese civilians were basically told that they would be treated by the US as Japan had treated civilians in areas it had control, so they were scared to death, because they were all quite well aware of just how cruel and evil they were. Unlike the holocaust, it was openly known and celebrated amongst their culture.
Md2000?
What would they have put on them and who would have flown them? The IJN had more carriers than it could use, later in the war. They even used some as decoys.
As gunnergoz sez, the IJN, much like Germany, had a poor system of training their pilots, leaving the best always on the front lines instead of sending some of them home to train other pilots. That did mean, at the early parts, the IJN had better pilots that we did. But later they (and the Luftwaffe) were sending dudes out who had only a handful of hours flying. And in both cases, they had a poorly thought out way to recover those super aces whilst the USN was sending out a Sub just to recover one down aviator.
I would say it was a justified fear considering
Even deathwould not be enough
First off, I will format my posts to please myself.
Eventual US strategy was to bypass as many strongpoint’s as possible (e.g. Rabaul, Truk, Taiwan).
However, the Japanese were only relatively weak elsewhere, as US casualty figures prove.
It might be most informative at this point to mention Betio (Tarawa). There the initial assault
was nearly repulsed, despite extensive naval bombardment. The Japanese had discovered that
slow-burning, non-splintering palm logs, stacked several feet thick, were proof even against battleship guns.
The US suffered 1,000 dead in the first two days of combat on Betio.
Of over 2,000 military defenders only 17 surrendered.
Nonsense addressed above.
Yes, Midway and all other successful defenses and captures island would change it, by allowing
the American combat radius to draw progressively closer to Japanese supply routes, and to create
breaks in them.
The assumption was that the Japanese military would fight to the death.
That assumption was soundly based on past experience on every past encounter
with Japanese ground forces.
The 17 POWs taken at Betio were typical; at Iwo Jima 217 POW were taken out
of a garrison of over 20,000. NB the US lost over 6,000 dead in 35 days on Iwo Jima,
and mind you Iwo Jima is only 8 square miles in area.
In 1942 Japanese ground forces defeated the US in the Philippines, and the UK
in Malaya/Singapore/Burma.
The Japanese PI campaign had heavy going, but it was up against one of the best
Allied generals.
The Malay-Singapore campaign was brilliantly conducted by Gen. Yamashita, who
would show up late in the PI, where he surrendered with 50,000 troops only on 9/2/41,
the same day as the overall surrender.
This is not an issue here.
The insignificance of this has been addressed.
Tis extent of pilot shortage occurred only after 2+ years attrition.
Also, Yamato and Musashi were manned by ~2,500 men each.
Shokaku-class AC carried about 1,000 less, including only ~75 pilots
Neither Germany nor Japan could afford the luxury of rotating pilots.
That is one reason their defeat was assured.
However, it is reasonable to assume Japan could have had 2-3 times more
fully manned AC to begin with, and that the Pacific war would have been
consequently prolonged.