Interesting supposition. The 1939 U.S. military that Imperial forces had decided to attack was something like 37th or 39th largest in the world. Definately not a worldbeater and hardly a worthy opponent. Congress finally opened it pursestrings and military personal was increased to 500K in 1940. Money, equipment, and manpower increased again in 1941.
The attack on Pearl was intended to prevent the U.S. from interfering with Imperial expansion for 6 to 12 months. At that point in time, it was assumed by some that the U.S. would be willing to sue for peace in the Pacific. Since the intention was only to disable the U.S. fleet at Pearl and not invade, 6 AC’s were more than enough.
The Doolittle raid in April 1942 surprised everyone. B-25’s can’t launch from AC’s and Japan was beyond the range of “conventional” attack. One more impossiblity had proven to be possible.
At Coral Sea, the IJN made several assumptions including that the U.S. only had 2 functional AC’s in the Pacific. They guessed wrong. The IJN may have sent more AC’s to finally destroy the U.S. in their “one big battle strategy” but they underestimated the U.S. forces.
The U.S. also had dependable radar, proximity fuzed shells, plus they were still able to deciper some of the IJM code. These gave the U.S. a considerable advantage.
By the battle of Midway, it was understood that Japanese manufacturing, shipbuilding, and pilot training could not keep up with their losses. Plus natural resources were in short supply. U.S. manufacturing was still increasing and resources were readily available (considering there was a war on).
The battle itself depended on who located who first and the U.S. knew the IJN was coming.
Of course, none of this matters if there weren’t sailors willing to put their lives on the line.
The 3rd strike was discussed by the IJN fleet officers and Nagumo. It was decided at the time that there were too many unknows and the possibility of having to retrieve aircraft at night was dangerous. The original plan had been to conduct two strikes.
IF the fuel bunkers at Pearl were destroyed, the USN would have been forced to refuel from San Diego or another base. The resulting destruction from the fuel bunker fires could have rendered Pearl useless as a Naval base for several months or longer.
One of the things about Midway was that it was an educated guess (as far as the U.S.'s knowledge of Japanese intentions).
The American political leadership was convinced that the cracked codes may be a disinformation campaign, and that the real assault would be on Hawaii or the U.S. West Coast. Some influential politicians were opposed to having the American carriers lurking so far to the west. They wanted them either in Hawaiian waters, or lurking between Hawaii and the mainland.
Ultimately, Nimitz was able to reach a compromise by stationing the Pacific battleships to intercept any thrust towards the U.S. (Without air cover, they would be vulnerable if the Kido Butai sighted them in clear weather.)
Nimitz was risking a lot. The Essex class would not begin to replace war losses until mid to late '43. Wars aren’t won hiding in the basement, though.
What is debatable is whether the 3rd strike was ever proposed at the time, or if it was though up as an what-if after the fact. The evidence that it was discussed and turned down at the time is disputed, and the claim that there was supposed to be a 3rd strike didn’t appear till years afterwards.
Thanks for posting the list but restricting it only to fleet carriers gives a full impression that Japan was not too far behind the United States.
There were also the escort carriers. They weren’t as big (or glamorous) as the fleet carriers and they only held about a third of the amount of airplanes. But the USN had a huge lead in them (122 were built during the war while Japan built 5) and those numbers add up. This meant that the USN could have aircraft coverage all over the place - every convoy and task force and landing force would have at least one escort carrier.
Thank you for the information, and it is always refreshing to have a cite
whose name does not begin with the letters w-i-k-i.
I had never heard of the “neap” tides at Tarawa before, although I do now
recall mention of LC stranding on the reef. No doubt American losses were
subsequently worse.
The question was about building fleet carriers instead of battleships and the possible outcome if that had happened.
During WWII, the U.S. built more of just about every type of weapon and weapons platform than the rest of the combatants combined but that wasn’t the situation before Pearl.
