Here’s a what-if: What if the Germans hadn’t invaded Norway in April 1940? They were able to launch a successful invasion across a few hundred miles of open water and conquer Norway, despite resistance from Norway, Britain, and France. But they paid a heavy cost - they pretty much used up their amphibious capability in this operation.
Let’s assume Germany decided to postpone any Scandinavian operations until after France and Britain were dealt with. And let’s say Hitler wasn’t as certain that Britain would negotiate and decided to have a military alternative ready. So the German staff was told to prepare a plan for a cross channel invasion and have it ready for the summer.
The Germans strike west on May 10, 1940 as they historically did and France, Belgium, and the Netherlands are all defeated (and the British evacuate from Dunkirk) by June 22 as historically happened.
And Hitler says “Hot damn! Did you see that! I kicked France’s ass in just six weeks! Kaiser Wilhelm fought them guys for five years and didn’t win! Hey, we’re on a roll and I’m feeling lucky, somebody dig up those plans for invading England!”
Okay, the Royal Navy and the RAF would still be there and they’d still be doing all they could do keep Hitler from crossing the channel. But this time Hitler wouldn’t be trying to invade with river barges. He’d still have all those naval ships and transports he lost in April.
I’m saying if he was able to land troops across a thousand miles of open water to Narvik in April, it’s possible that he could have gotten across fifty miles of open water to Dover in July.
I think people are over-estimating what an unequipped army can do. Half a million men without heavy weapons is just a big bunch of targets. Like I said in a previous post, Poland had a million troops and nobody disputes that they fought bravely. But they didn’t have the equipment to fight a modern war and the Germans did. The result was Poland was overrun in thirty-five days. And the British in July 1940 had less than the Poles had in September 1939.
People talk about Dunkirk but Operation Ariel is often overlooked - over 200,000 more trooops were evacuated, leaving a total of comfortably over 1/2 million: Operation Aerial - Wikipedia
Wiki has this on UK forces in June:
With what transports? The plans you mention were the early and wildly unrealistic plans of the Wehrmacht, which had no idea what the Kriegsmarine could or could not do. The is no way in hell the Germans were going to land thirteen divisions in the first wave with fourteen more immediately following. With two years of planning behind it and the largest amphibious armada ever assembled at the time, the Allies landed five divisions at Normandy in the first wave. The more finalized plans for Sea Lion were much more modest, if still entirely unrealistic. Notably there was to be no heavy equipment landed in the first wave, so the underequipped side was going to be the Germans who would have nothing heavier than light mortars with them.
Regarding a no Norway option to allow the use of the ships lost in Norway, it’s instructive to take a look at what the German invasion force in Norway was:
This is not a force that is going to be landing thirteen divisions; the ‘transports’ were nothing but warships crammed with light infantry with nary a heavy weapon or tank to be found; they were only to be offloaded pier side from merchant ships once intact docks were taken.
No they’re not; I have posted on why a June or July invasion would be even more problematic than a September invasion. It’s almost like you didn’t read any of this thread either. Namely, there being nothing to transport the Germans across the channel in June, not even the hopeless Rhine ferries than a September invasion was naively expected to use and an entirely intact Fighter Command that hadn’t taken losses in the Battle of Britain.
Some over-estimate the under-equipped British on their home turf while some over-estimate the continental German war machine in a (very major) combined sea and air operation. This is like half a Guadalcanal. In Guad, the Americans counted on 1) the remote distance which forced the (superior) Japanese air and sea forces to over-stretch, 2) likewise the remoteness caused the japanese to mis-judge the overall situation and 3) challenge the Japanese to a war of attrition, knowing they have the edge in manpower and production.
So, if in this case the Germans are the “Americans” and they want a foothold in south England sufficient to launch a major drive, they will have to surpass what the Americans achieved in Guadalcanal in just 90 days to wit:
20,000 combat marines were already entrenched,
Henderson airfield now consisted of two air fields and the seabees were building two more.
Henderson already had 200 combat planes protected on the ground by a battalion of 90mm AA guns,
Lunga Point now had a working harbor with 5-inch shore batteries.
the marines already had a tank company, a medium artillery battalion, amtracks, etc.
#1-5 merely points out the fact that by November 1942, things were pretty much hopeless for the Japanese side. Now if you segui to south England, imagine what you have to accomplish in one month to eventually land 16 divisions. This, even if Norway didn’t happen, even if they captured/annihilated all 320,000 at Dunkirk, even if they won the Battle of Britain.
I agree. It was never going to happen historically. The British naval superiority in the summer of 1940 was as overwhelming as the German ground superiority. And I’ve said so: “the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force made it impossible for the Germans to get their troops across the Channel”. But the OP asked “hypothetically speaking, what would happen if the German forces managed to get their armies across the channel”.
People also over-estimate the effectiveness of simple numbers of divisions. So the most likely counterfactual scenario is that the Germans manage to land several divisions across the channel and then immediately lose the barges to naval and air forces. So technically the German armies are across the channel but still do not have artillery (and their “airborne artillery” is being used to defend against the remnants of the RAF), or resupply or reinforcements. They don’t even have a lot of trucks (but do have quite a few horses.)
So at the point of landing one could even argue if the British were underequipped. Because they at least have some artillery and heavy equipment.
Exactly so. Without supplies, the soldiers are useless. They need ammo, food, fuel, spare parts, replacement weapons, and on and on, by the ton.
Yes, starving Japanese soldiers with no resupply were able to fight back ferociously in the Pacific. But they weren’t advancing. They used up all their ammunition, then fixed bayonets and committed suicide by charging.
You can’t teleport the German army across the channel and leave them on the beach and expect them to do anything unless you’re also prepared to keep teleporting the required logistical support.
Yes, France was captured in five weeks, then they surrendered because the situation was hopeless. A German expeditionary force that magically got across the channel could take London, but the British situation would still not be hopeless, because that German force would be supported by the thinnest of logistical threads. German forces in France could be resupplied by trains and trucks and horse drawn wagons, and nothing the French did could stop them. German forces in Britain would be resupplied by—well, nothing.
You’re rather missing the point; if the RN and the RAF are both poofed away in a wisp of smoke from a magic wand, it still does nothing to change the fact that the Germans don’t have the transports to put anything like the size of the force you describe ashore. They had nothing to cross with in June, and in September the bulk of what they had was Rhine ferries and all of the problems associated with them. Landing 14 fully equipped divisions in the first wave is in the realms of science fiction. The later, if still unrealistic plans for Sea Lion called for landing 10 infantry regiments less all of their heavy equipment. The absence of the RN and RAF wasn’t going to make the Germans able to disgorge panzer divisions and infantry divisions with all of their artillery and heavy equipment onto the beaches.
Fuck! I need to watch that movie. I watched the rare videos of it on Youtube, and they’re great. Especially considering that it’s a movie made entirely by amateurs (directors as much as actors), with borrowed material and such. The scenes look like real war footage, be it the German soldiers fraternizing with Londoners or combat scenes (displaying as much heavy weapons as summary executions). And if the concept of the UK being conquered, as per this thread, seems far-etched, the consequences depicted seem credible.
I could see only one scene of the plot with real dialogues (fortunately subtitled in Spanish, since I’m really bad at understanding spoken English. I had to add what English I could understand and what Spanish I could read) and even that appeared well acted.
How on Earth could have amateurs done that?
Now, I regret having read the plot on Wikipedia. I really want to watch this, but I don’t know how I’m going to get in France a copy of an old obsucre foreign movie (let alone preferably subtitled). I doubt it was ever realeased on DVD or even VCR.
By crossing the Atlantic? :dubious: With what troop transports, air cover, heavy weapons, or even men? This scenario seems even more implausible than Sealion.
But if the Royal Navy is still intact, they can blockade occupied Britain. And then the occupation force withers on the vine, they can’t resupply or reinforce. Eventually you can put troops back in Britain unopposed.
Giant seahorses. The Germans rode across the Channel on giant seahorses, just like Aquaman.
The OP didn’t say “Was it possible under realistic conditions for the Germans to have successfully crossed the Channel?” He asked what would happen if they did manage it. So just assume the landing force has arrived in England, via ships, teleportation, or giant seahorses, and take it from there.
As for the size of the landing force, I went by the official German plans (which was twenty-seven divisions not fourteen). Again, this is what the OP specified - and I agree that using the German plans to define what the landing force would have been is a reasonable assumption.