What if the U.S. had avoided the first Gulf War?

[ElvisL1ves]

Fascists the Baath were, but where does the “Islamo-” part figure into it? Is Tony Blair a Christo-Labourite?

[SuaSponte]

Brain Glutton
Quote:
Originally Posted by SuaSponte
Production quotas are not a tangible, nor automatically transferrable asset. OPEC, after an invasion, could simply have told Hussein “no, you don’t get Kuwait’s quotas.”
True, they could have, but SA was scared of Iraq, at that point, for military reasons. They might have acceded to Hussein’s position to appease him, and the rest would have followed suit – SA being the dominant voice in OPEC. Furthermore, refusing to acknowledge the merger of Kuwait’s production quota with Iraq’s would have reduced the total amount of petroleum available on the world market, raising the price. The international oil companies would have rejoiced in that, but many important political factions in the U.S. and Europe and China would have had a serious problem with it.

Nope, doesn’t cut it.

1. If the Saudis were afraid of Iraq’s military (which they probably were), the invasion was an unnecessarily expensive and roundabout way to get more production quotas. Iraq could have just told the Saudis, “give us more quotas, or we attack you.” No muss, no fuss.
2. Refusing to allow the merger of Kuwait’s production quotas with Iraq would have in no way reduced the total amount of petroleum on the market. This was in the early 90s, not today. Saudi Arabia alone, and certainly the rest of OPEC (and non-OPEC producers) had enough spare capacity to make up Kuwait’s lost production.
3. And, of course, Iraq could have just produced over and above its OPEC quotas.

[QUOTE]

Quote:
Originally Posted by SuaSponte
Hussein didn’t need OPEC’s permission to pump more - it ain’t a police or military organization, and almost all OPEC countries have significantly overproduced at one time or another. He could have just turned up Iraq’s spigots, and there would have been nothing OPEC could have done about it.
Not quite that simple. The American neocons thought they could ignore OPEC production quotas (and break the back of OPEC in the process) after taking over Iraq. In the event, Iraq’s oil production infrastructure has been so thoroughly shattered by the invasion and subsequent insurgency that it might be another decade before production there even reaches the OPEC quota; but, even if that had not been so, the neocons would have failed. As Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi-born economist, think-tanker and member of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, explained it to journalist Greg Palast (as recounted in his book Armed Madhouse, Chapter 2, “The Flow”):

[Long Quote deleted]
But, as you have already argued, SA couldn’t act to punitively to Saddam’s Iraq, because SA was afraid of Iraq’s military.

Sua

[BrainGlutton]

@SuaSponte

But, as you have already argued, SA couldn’t act to punitively to Saddam’s Iraq, because SA was afraid of Iraq’s military.

But, unless Hussein was ready to follow up on Kuwait with an immediate invasion of SA, the Sauds still had control of their reserves of cash and oil and still could use them to retaliate against Iraq if it should break the OPEC rules outright.