Fine. If it protects your delicate psyche, then I’ll admit I have no idea how it can be demonstrated to you, Marley23, to your satisfaction.
But in my hypothetical, it is clearly demonstrated that the Snowden leak directly leads to an attack. If it helps you imagine it, think of two scenarios. In one, Snowden doesn’t leak, a terrorist sends an email, the authorities prevent the attack.
In the other, Snowden leaks, terrorists avoid email, an attack takes place and all your loved ones die and you end up a quadriplegic.
I’m still waiting on an answer: how would you feel about Snowden’s leak in that completely hypothetical second scenario?
Well, first, I have to consider the fact that, in the real world, the scenario you describe is absurdly impossible. So, if it actually happened, I imagine it would have to be through some ridiculous series of events that no one could reasonably have foreseen happening, like some sort of weird combination of a Tom Clancy novel and one of those Final Destination movies. Given that, I’d imagine that my stance on Snowden would remain largely unchanged, as there’s no way a person could rationally assume that telling people that the NSA has their phone records would lead to a bomb going off.
How do you reconcile your phrase “no one could reasonably have foreseen” with the fact that large numbers of Snowden detractors use my reasoning for why leaks are bad? Do I have some sort of special foresight?
Since I’ve answered your hypothetical, will you answer mine?
In one scenario, Snowden goes through proper channels, the NSA’s actions come under judicial scrutiny, and are approved. A terrorist later sends an email, which the NSA intercepts, preventing an attack.
In the second scenario, Snowden goes through proper channels, the NSA’s actions come under judicial scrutiny, and the court finds the NSA has overstepped its bounds. The NSA surveillance program is shut down. A terrorist sends an email that is not intercepted, and a bomb goes off, killing dozens of people.
In the second scenario, should the judge that shut down the surveillance program be executed, or simply imprisoned for life without parole?
I guess a counter hypothetical is to ask you how you’d feel if the government were to throw all your loved ones into jail based on spurious data but Snowden’s actions prevented that?
At the risk of fighting the hypothetical, it’s fair to ask how A is supposed to lead to B. It’s common sense, and in a discussion like this it’s just about required in light of the last 12 years of American history.
Again, reality gets in the way: you know terrorists already avoid email, right? Bin Laden spent half a decade living in a house with no internet access and no phone, and his people would turn off their phones when they were dozens of miles away from him. Terrorists have always known that their phones and emails get spied on. What kind of a dumbass terrorist wouldn’t expect that in 2013? It’s worth continuing to do some of that to make their lives harder, but that’s one reason that all of this stuff is such an overreach. The NSA assets the right to spy on anyone if it believes there is a 50.1% chance they’re a foreigner. Meanwhile I’ll point out that the government was doing enough spying to know Tamerlan Tsarnaev was watching Al Qaeda videos online and traveled to a part of the world with a lot of jihad-related activity, and it still didn’t prevent the Boston Marathon bombings. So how much use are they going to get out of bulk data collection?
Yes, absolutely. Thanks for answer, btw. It helps me understand your reasoning, although I’m still not in agreement with you.
In the second scenario, you provided a false dichotomy (aka “false dilemma”) by presenting two spurious choices. I would say, without evidence to the contrary, I don’t see the judge having broken any laws that merit execution or life imprisonment.
But your second scenario highlights an important difference between leaking and not. In your scenario, the genie has not been let out of the bottle, so processes can be reviewed and improved upon. We can learn from our mistakes and there is still an opportunity to prevent future attacks.
The process can still be reviewed and improved upon. Other than the tapping of Merkel’s phone, I don’t think any of this has stopped. However there’s no reason to think the process would have been reviewed, improved, or disclosed to the public if not for Snowden. His leaks were the impetus for that.
I’d feel bad if my loved ones were thrown in jail (although this is impossible due to certain reasons that is outside your hypothetical). If, hypothetically, my loved ones were prevented from being wrongly jailed due to the Snowden leak, then I would feel grateful that he did what he did.
Can you explain why Snowden’s leak leads to my loved ones not being wrongly imprisoned?
I’ve already acknowledged that I cannot convince you A leads to B, because on that you cannot be convinced.
Regarding “dumbass terrorists”, I think there’s plenty of evidence of that.
And as for your example of Bin Laden’s isolation, do you suppose that hindered his activities in any way? I know I’m definitely less productive when my internet’s down.
He would remain a lawbreaker subject to the judicial process. If he were able to convince a jury that they should acquit in spite of his admission that he broke the law, then so it would be.
I’m not really sure how a list of plots that have already been foiled are now less likely to be foiled because of Snowden’s leaks. If you meant that those are the kind of attack that are now less likely to be foiled by Snowden’s leaks, I can’t help but note that all but two of them happened before the NSA established Prism, and yet were still foiled, so it would seem that our terrorist-catching capabilities are not as dependent on my mother’s Verizon bill as you would have led us to believe.
Of the latter two incidents, do you have any evidence that these terrorists were stopped, in whole or in part, due to the Prism program? Because if your argument is just, “Terrorism is a thing,” then I think we can take that point as granted. The issue is whether the NSA’s domestic spying is significant tool in our anti-terrorism activities, and whether Snowden’s revelations in specific have harmed that ability.
Sigh. You still haven’t explained how Snowden’s disclosures make this less likely. And in fact that’s a really good argument against your point of view. These bulk data collection techniques were in place in 2010, but Faisal Shahzad’s bomb only failed because his ignition device didn’t work. That was a guy who had recently spent a lot of time in Pakistan and who was on a watch list for a decade because he’d been bringing a lot of foreign cash into the country. And spying didn’t stop the Tsarnaevs at all. Even Gen. Alexander, after he was caught lying about the matter, admitted that these techniques prevented maybe one or two attempted attacks.
Not only that, but I haven’t met a single person who has a problem with spying on terrorists, Snowden included. The problem is spying on literally everyone else. Get a warrant and spy on terrorists all you want, NSA. That’s your job. Leave the rest of us alone.
That’s the worst part about all of this. It’s not even effective. It’s literally only good for blackmailing your political enemies. Call me paranoid, but I’d bet money the NSA was behind Eliot Spitzer, Herman Cain, David Petraeus, and other scandals from the last few years. Because what the hell else are they doing with all that information?
As for why, I didn’t think it was necessary to go into detail. But since some folks fail to grasp the concept…
Successful terrorist plots tend to require coordination and sharing of information. The plots that fail are either poorly planned, or lacking in key information. You mention the ignition failure. Do you suppose if this guy had better information, perhaps he might have had a more successful attack?
Now consider how the authorities foil plots. If the bad guys try to get better information or better coordination, they must communicate. Each time that happens is a chance to be busted. Without Snowden, we have a higher likelihood of getting an intercept, leading to a foiled plot. This is because people used the internet and phone without giving it a second thought.
As for intercept avoidance, yes proper spycraft can allow end-runs around monitoring. But many terrorists are losers who lack the discipline to follow intercept avoidance methodologies. And when there’s a faster, more convenient option, that can be attractive and alluring.
p.s. There are other foiled plots that aren’t listed because we don’t publicize everything.