Thanks a lot, Darwin’s Finch. Seen in light of your characterization of inconsistency, I think I understand the problem even better.
You are talking about two observations, A and B that are inconsistent with each other. I maintain that observations are not inconsistent with other observations, they are inconsistent with hypotheses. For instance, if I form a hypothesis after observing A that A and B are both true, and then I observe B, there is no inconsistency. It is only if my hypothesis does not include B that we would call it an inconsistency.
Imagine that we observe A in the bible (or measure it in the lab), and we form a hypothesis, call it H(A) that describes why A. Later, we observe B in the bible (or the lab), which conflicts with H(A). What you (and others) seem to be arguing is: if we are firmly convinced that our hypothesis H(A) is good, we ought to reject the observation B. Something is wrong with it. In fact, since we measured both A and B the same way (reading the bible, measuring with calipers, whatever), then we should also seriously consider whether we are mistaken about A as well. And if A is mistaken, then we should not longer accept H(A), which apparently describes an observation that isn’t even correct.
This is what appears incongrous to me. The reason to reject B was our firm belief that H(A) was true. But rejection of B lead to rejection (or doubt) of A, which led to abandonment of H(A). So we didn’t need to reject B after all!
There is another, quite reasonable way, that one can look at the problem. We observe A and form a hypothesis H(A). Later, we observe B, which conflicts with H(A). If we are firmly convinced that our observations are accurate (we believe that our calipers measure length within a mm, or we believe that the bible is true), then we can’t simply throw out the data that doesn’t fit our hypothesis. That would be completely irresponsible. Our only choice is to reject the hypothesis H(A), in favor of another, say H(A,B). And now, we can explain both A and B.
And you just object to H(A,B) on the grounds that it’s too complicated (or offensive). Perhaps you’re right. Maybe it seems like the equivalent of the geocentric theory, with orbits and epicycles and deferents and all kinds of other complicated junk. It seems kind of silly, actually. It almost seems like people will just make up anything to fit the data. But that’s hypothesizing for you.
Others will insist that throwing out observations because we don’t like them is incorrect. If God kills babies and claims to be loving, there must be a reason. We need a theory to explain this stuff, even a complicated or strange one, since we’re astronomers and the emperor needs to know about eclipses.
At bottom, the entire problem is: what are the sources of correct observations of the divine? If it is a literal interpretation of the OT+NT, you must arrive at a hypothesis that describes at least those observations, and you cannot reject observations no matter how strange. If it is a literal interpretation of the Torah plus commentaries, you arrive at other hypotheses. If it is a allegorical reading of the Quran, you reach a third. If it is none of these, then you arrive at very different ideas.
You might rail against “rationalizing away any inconsistency”, but if one believes that the bible is literally true, one can do no other. Does that make it wrong? No, that does not follow. And if so, then what? Do you have an alternative other than “throw out all the data”? Even the geocentric theory worked pretty well in its day.
And I still think that the tone of most discussions of biblical contradictions strays pretty far from the useful. The game is: here are the contradictions, you must either resolve them or reject the bible, but you’re not allowed to resolve them.
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