It should be noted that the concept of MAD came around as accepted nuclear warfare doctrine a long time after Stalin.
The idea of MAD, which can be explained in game theory, predates nuclear weapons; the idea of “we are both so powerful a war would be too destructive to start at all” is an old one. As applied to nukes, though, it was not formal strategy until the 1960s, at least on the part of the USA/NATO.
For most of the time up to that point Western nuclear doctrine was the assumption that the west would used nuclear weapons first; they served as a defense against a CONVENTIONAL attack, a concept known as “massive retaliation” whereby the USA said, in effect, “if your troops enter West Germany we’ll annihilate you with nukes.” This strategy made perfect sense in a situation where the Soviet Union had greater in-theatre conventional force but the West had greater nuclear force. For much of the late 40s and 1950s, the idea of a nuclear war being an unwinnable global holocaust was absolutely NOT how people thought about nuclear war; nuclear war was seen as being a new type of war you could win, if you fought it correctly.
As the USSR caught up in nukes and delivery systems, it stopped making sense, and by the 1960s the volume of nuclear weapons and manner of their delivery made it apparent that nuclear war would result in the annihilation of both parties; MAD became the doctrine of choice, and the purpose of nuclear weapons changed to one of pure deterrence.
That’s what the USA has them, anyway. Other countries with nuclear weapons have difference reasons.
I never got what was so insane about MAD. Both sides are so powerful that neither can start a war. This sounds like the most rational thing I’ve ever heard of.
You have to go back and look at what was said about other weapons. The airplane would make war impossible. The machine gun would make war impossible. Poison gas would make war impossible. Tanks would make war impossible. Every new weapon would be so terrible that it would make war impossible because no sane leaders would ever use it and there could be no defense against it. And then they were used and wars got more horrible.
Military leaders seriously proposed using nuclear weapons every single time there was a problem anywhere. In an ironic way, we should be thankful that the USSR started building its own thousands of bombs. If only a few existed, one would certainly have been used somewhere. Only the prospect of society-level destruction turned out to be too much. And most historians think that was a close thing.
MAD looks much better in hindsight than it did at the time.
That’s really the problem with it–it demands rational actors. It did work rather well with the USSR, which despite their economic incompetence at least understood game theory, but non-rational entities like North Korea are a different story.
Ww2 claimed about 50 million lives BEFORE hiroshima. That is more than triple the total deaths of every conflict of the last seventy years combined. Since then, and mostly because of MAD, large scale warfare is unthinkable. So i would say that nukes prevented WW3. In short, nukes make countries behave themselves when it comes to declaring major war.
Obama’s talked twice about creating a world without nuclear weapons. Surely this is simply saying nice-sounding things and not something he really believes?
You are correct that it is different with North Korea, in that the Assured Destruction isn’t Mutual vis-à-vis most of the Western world. Eventually NK will be able to deliver one, or possibly two, nuclear missiles against South Korea or Japan or Guam or someplace like that. If and when they do that, they will cease to exist. So deterrence will still work, even if it is “hurt us terribly and die” instead of “destroy us and you will not survive”.
Somewhat the same with Iran and Israel and the West.
The real world isn’t a sterile computer simulation. Any mistake, glitch, accident, or the poor decision making of only a fewindividuals could wipe out hundreds of millions of people. The Cold War was filled with proxy wars and brinkmanship, plenty of opportunities for things to go pear shaped. If Pakistan accidentally nukes India it’s kinda hard for them to say “Oops! My bad! We cool?”
For MAD to be stable you have to assumes perfect command and control and knowledge of the opposition’s intentions. That did not hold several times in the Cold War, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Able Archer 83 exercise.
There are other weapons, albeit smaller subcategories, which have barely ever been used since WWII and more so if it’s ‘us’ (meaning the US) using them. Submarines have only torpedoed surface ships twice since WWII (once each in 1971 India-Pakistan War and 1982 Falklands War) compared to thousands of times in the world wars, so relatively speaking have virtually never been used in the last 70+ yrs, and never at all by the USN (submarines to attack surface ships in combat that is, USN subs have launched cruise missiles and conducted intelligence gathering in other countries’ territorial waters). Nor do submarines, those designed and built for combat that is, have any practical peaceable use.
So ‘they’ve never been used and have no peaceable purpose’ is not a relevant line of argument particular to nuclear weapons IMO. Such weapons either have a purpose which has been served in the way they have been ‘used’, as a deterrent, or not, same as submarines.
I disagree that MAD requires perfect C2 or perfect knowledge of intentions. Because, neither has ever been the case, and it is pretty clear that both the US and the USSR deterred each other for several decades. In fact, it’s an indisputable historical fact that this deterrence occurred WITHOUT perfect knowledge of the enemy’s intentions.
Deterrence does not guarantee the lack of mistakes or misperceptions, such as the ones made during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Able Archer, etc. I cannot see how anyone could claim that that deterrence requires the complete abolishment of mistakes.
I agree with you. The deterrence was more of a cause for caution in the face of incomplete information about the adversary’s intentions. Which was all to the good; in each case that there was a breakdown of sorts, the presence of the other side’s arsenal gave the men in control pause, so that they could make a clear decision. And in at least one case, make a decision that could potentially mean their own country’s destruction, but wouldn’t start an inadvertent war if the warning turned out to be false, which it did.