Has it? Why would nothing be in any sense a more natural state of affairs than the existence of something? There’s no reason to believe ‘nothing’ can exist, and moreover, the concept seems logically troubling – existence, at first glance, seems to be a property, but for there to be a property, you need for there to be something that has that property – so if nothing is literally no thing, how can it have the property of existing?
Of course, to think of ‘existence’ as a property in this sense rather oversimplifies the matter, seeing as this would render the sentence ‘x does not exist’ inherently self-contradictory: for any property P, the sentence ‘x is P’ implies that there is such a thing as x, and that it is true that it has the property P; obviously, this can’t be true for the sentence ‘x does not exist’, as this would mean that x both exists and does not exist.
Indeed, as far as every utterance needs content to be meaningful, one can always only speak about things, or even think about things. One cannot speak, or think, about nothing. So how could one say that ‘nothing exists’ – without talking about something, and hence, not about nothing? (Of course, there’s also the matter of what am I talking about when I talk about something that does not exist – the present king of France, say --, but that discussion would lead too far down the rabbit hole right now. Suffice it to say that such non-referring names can still have content, interpreted carefully.)
Anyway, that went off on a bit of a tangent – the point I was trying to make was merely that the assumption that the existence of ‘nothing’ should be a natural state of affairs is at least as problematic as the existence of something. One could even be tempted to say that since nothing is incoherent, there must be something, at least.
