Not really on topic, but my comment about God evolving makes me wonder…
When does the OT end? Do we know the date (or supposed date) of the last thing that happened in the OT? We do know pretty much when the NT starts (somewhere around 4 BCE +/- a few years). I’m wondering how much time passed between the end of the OT and beginning of the NT.
I think the violation of physical laws (as we now understand them) is part and parcel of omnipotence. How we’d explain this depends on what we see - we might posit some sort of “god force” that is additive with normal force to explain him lifting something really heavy. Or we could call it a miracle. But we don’t have to call it anything at the moment, since no one has shown us god doing anything.
Doing the logically impossible is totally different.
The last book is Malachi (my haftorah portion as about half of it) which was quite a bit before the NT began.
Here is a page about dating it - it says about the time of Nehemiah, and thus older then the Maccabees, which never got in officially.
I’m not sure you can say that quite this categorically; entropy increase, for instance, is as much a logical law as a physical one. Only a god capable of doing the logically impossible would be capable of breaking it, and I see no a priori reason why other physical laws should not have the same status.
I think by ‘logically impossible’ we mean things such as making pi 7 or 2 +2 equal to 5.
I’m not sure you can say the an increase in entropy is a logical imperative. You’d probably have to have a universe with a significantly different structure (at the lowest level), or, perhaps the putative god could create some matter at a very low entropic state, allow it to hob-nob with some higher entropy matter and then, once its own entropy has increased, destroy it.
Fundamentally, entropy increase just says ‘more probable states are adopted more often’, which is as tautological as it gets. Going against this means making a necessary truth a falsity, something which is logically impossible at least as far as I can see.
Think of n/2 black and n/2 white balls being distributed across n slots: clearly, there are far more possibilities to have them equidistributed than there are to have, say, the first n/2 slots taken up by the white and the second n/2 slots taken up by the black balls; if you randomly select one state of the system from a grab-bag of all possible states, you will with overwhelming probability get one in which the entropy is close to maximum, simply because there are that many more states for which this is true. Being able to consistently produce low entropy states from this grab bag seems logically impossible.
You’d need to think well outside the envelope.
For example, a universe where there is a fundamentally different way of transferring momentum.
It doesn’t seem very likely that such a scheme could be implemented in this universe unless, as I suggested, a god could actually destroy something in a high entropy state and replace it with something in a lower one.
I don’t see where my reasoning depends on the particulars of the universe at all, sorry.
By definition, no, since God is not a physical entity.
Regarding the OP, there is a sort of continuua of “there’s no way that’s possible” in omnimaxdom.
The most ironclad of the things God can’t do are the things that I call logically impossible, of which 100% of them are along the lines of making pi=7 and 2+2=5. These things can’t be done because the terms “pi”, “=”, “7”, “2”, “+”, and “5” all have arbitrary meanings, and if you try to change those meanings you just end up inventing a new arbitrary system without anybody seriously thinking anything actually changed. Like, I can declare that 1+1=10, but defining a binary system doesn’t change normal mathematics a bit. So god is free to redefine math to his heart’s content and it literally wouldn’t have any effect at all.
This hurdle can be overcome by simply saying that omnipotence doesn’t require God to be able to effect these things.
The next two most difficult hurdles for God to overcome are about tied for difficulty. The first of them is if you decide that his omnipotence requires him to have free will. If it does, then it collides smack with his own ability to predict the future. There are only a few ways to reconcile this: nix the free will (for everyone), or cripple the foresight. Some people try to slip by by saying that god allows free will by choosing not to predict our futures, but this doesn’t work because the problem is that in any universe with free will prediction couldn’t be possible period, which removes God’s choice in the matter. Plus of course there are the predictions that have been attributed to him.
In my opinion the best way to reconcile this situation is to declare that our universe is deterministic but God’s extrauniversal environment is not - or at least, not sufficiently so that he could predict it. This destroys all human free will, but leaves god his, and allows him to make predictions about us.
The second tied-for-second most difficult hurdle for God to overcome is that God is the POE, the Problem Of Evil. Typically the POE is answered with ‘mysterious ways’ and similar incoherent handwaving, but such answers stem from a misunderstanding of the Problem, which is that, by definition, an even halfway omnipotent omniscient god wouldn’t have to get mysterious - and if he were benevolent, he would be morally bound not to, since it’s clearly resulting in a lot of suffering which is, by the definition of omnipotence, completely unnecessary.
If one wants to avoid logical incoherence, there are actually only three main ways to get around the POE, which correspond to nerfing one of the three pillars of omnipotence: The god could be ignorant of our problems, the god could be weak or bound by unbreakable rules that prevent him from aiding us, or the god could actually be indifferent to our suffering or actively evil. Of these, the second option is most preferred in practice, and the first and third are typically dismissed out of hand (despite there being obvious biblical support for the third). Specifically, the god is frequently said to be bound by some peculiar laws of justice or something which restrict him from just forgiving us for free the way Jesus often did. (I wll add that free will is also often cited here, but such arguments are always logically incoherent, without fail.)
The next famous anti-omnipotence argument is the “unliftable rock” argument, but that can easily be sidestepped by noting the difference between things in the universe and things without. One model for a god that gets past the three above critera is the ‘simulation’ god, who can be described as having ultimate power over our universe, but not necessarily having any special power in his own universe that exists outside of it and contains it. The thing to note here is whether you require the god to have omnipotence over the metauniverse of supernature, or if you’re happy if he just has control over the simulation. This matters because if he is omnipotent in the meta universe, he can create a rock he can’t lift - by weakening himself to the point that he is no longer omnipotent, and is unable to either move the rock or restore his strength. He could even weaken himself so much that the unliftable rock could be in the simulation; it could be an Unmodifiable Variable that he has locked himself out of altering. If he can’t remove his own omnipotence, of course, he’s unable to make a rock in the simulation that he can’t move. But on the upside it means he’ll still be omnipotent next week, so choose your preferred outcome, I guess.
Beyond that, anything regarding the physical laws of the universe is kind of in the ‘liftable rock’ territory - if God can change the fundamental rules of the universe, if he can swap out the constants and variables and algorithms underlying the simlation and do so with localized and controlled effect, then that pretty much throws open the doors - miracles become easy and the physical laws are his plaything. Entropy? No problem! He’ll just reset the variables. He’ll reverse gravity and redefine energy itself if that’s what it takes. Parting the waters is a serious cakewalk; he can as easily move the entire rest of the universe a mile to the left so that the stationary Israelites end up on the other coast without moving.
And in fact, omnibenevolence requires him to do so rather than parting the sea and drowning egyptians in the resulting trap. In many ways, even though the POE is not the most logically ironclad point (that’s reserved for 2+2=5), the POE remains the most argumentively compelling, because there’s a whole lot of concrete real world around providing constant examples that omnibenevolence isn’t hapening. So while in once sense nothing is physically impossible for an omnimax god, in practical terms a whole lot of world is physically impossible for him, because it’s physically real in a way that he could not logically allow if he existed.
That’s OK.
As I said, you need to think well outside the envelope. 
My perception has always been that the most widely referred to answer to the problem of evil is a fourth one, the one Leibniz gave, that this actually is the best (logically) possible world. Whatever you point to as evil may be necessary in the sense that preventing it will cause greater evil down the road; god, being omniscient, obviously knows that, and thus has arranged this world to be as good as is possible.
Try to enlighten me?
This is basically begging the question. It requires you to state that every baby drowned in the tsunami would grow up to do evil on the whole - and that for some reason all these evil babies were conveniently located where the water would get them. This has free will implications also - if God picks off babies in this case, why not other ones, not near the water, who grow up to do evil. How can you say God lets evil happen from people because free will is necessary when he didn’t in this case?
So the “best of all possible worlds” solution is not an answer, it is just an excuse.
Them? Leukemia.
No, it doesn’t require me to state that. Not any single baby would ‘have had’ to grow up evil for a world in which the tsunami killed them to contain less evil than a world in which it didn’t. It could have been in their combined actions, be an irreverent by-product of their actions, have nothing to do with their actions altogether, but rather with actions they inspire, or it could simply have been the case that every possible universe in which the tsunami didn’t happen contained another, worse catastrophe; and innumerable possibilities more.
Consider this as a variational problem: find the trajectory of the universe that minimizes necessary evil.
Er, sorry?
If you wish, add a tag on each baby with the moral value of their life - directly and indirectly. The problem still holds. Assuming no babies who are absolutely morally neutral, each one would have to have a negative value, because if even one with a positive value was killed, the world would no longer be optimally good.
You also get into such fun discussions as explaining why God couldn’t have managed to get Israel founded while killing only 6 million - 1 of us.
The typical excuse for the existence of evil people is that if God prevented them from being mass murders and such he would suppress their free will, which would for some reason be worse. I think this is pretty iffy myself, but I prefer the problem of natural evil because of it, because God stopping earthquakes and floods affects no ones free will. I kind of assumed you were of the free will worshiping school. God wiping out people early kind of clobbers their free will, doesn’t it? I mean, if God can assign a moral value to their lives, as you suggest, then clearly they don’t have free will. If God uses some kind of moral interval arithmetic then we cannot speak of the best of all possible worlds, only a world in a range of goodness. So there are all kinds of problems with this idea - I’ve only scratched the surface.
Not nearly enough of it. Proof - Justin Bieber was allowed to get past infancy. 
It’s completely unnecessary for god to attach a moral value to anyone’s life. You’re thinking too locally: any such value lost due to a ‘good’ kid dying in the tsunami would be offset as much as is consistently possible by other net moral value elsewhere.
Let’s say god just lets the universe run its course, without interfering anywhere. Afterwards, he draws a tally, calculating the Total Evilitude of that particular universe. Then, he rewinds time, and runs it again, leaving everybody to their free choices, if you believe in something like that (I don’t). And again. And infinitely often, since he’s god and doesn’t have anything better to do. When he’s done, one (well, I suppose it could be more than one; then he just selects the one with the better view) universe will have a smallest Total Evilitude. This one, he selects as the ‘actual’ history of the universe. Except, right, he’s god, so he doesn’t have to do any of this post-selection; he can choose the right one from the start.
I’m not gonna argue with Steve. Hell, I thought omnimax was a kinda movie theater.
The fundamental problem is that’s blatantly wrong. Human actions and human nature demonstrate this. If I so much as toss a bit of food to a stray dog, I’ve just reduced the amount of suffering in the world with my own non-omnipotent efforts; a god should be able to do much better. If this was the best of all possible worlds, then we wouldn’t be able to improve it at all, much less with a casual effort. A world that looks exactly like a world created by uncaring, amoral natural forces is nowhere near the “best (logically) possible world”.
And our flawed human nature also disproves the idea that this is the best possible world, as well as the “it interferes with free will” argument. We are simply not built the way a being that wanted a good-as-possible species would build us. We have nasty impulses, poor judgment. We have a capacity for suffering that’s much greater than the minimum needed to survive. We have malice - why would a species designed for good even be built with that emotion is the first place? You wouldn’t need to violate “free will” (whatever that means) to make a morally superior version of humans; you just make them with better judgment and fewer destructive impulses. They’d still be able to do evil if they wanted, but they’d be far less interested. They wouldn’t need to constantly exercise their will to overcome their own design defects.