We have a lot of military bases around where I live, so I know something about this just from local news. The Army is really concerned about the decrease in “traditional” war-fighting skills. They’ve been doing a lot of training and fairly large-scale exercises in the last year or so to get some of that back.
Red Flag; I don’t have a specific cite fore the Towering Inferno engagement, but I picked it up on a professional journal serving the Armed Forces, so it’s out there somewhere.
Essentially, that’s the conclusion of most serious observers; the winner will be the one whom can maintain technical superiority over the oponent long enough for the kill/loss ratio to skew. Once one side obtained a substantial technilogical superiority over the enemy, kill rates would soar, and dominance would be achieved - But at the cost of a HUGE amount of extremely violent destruction.
Read General Sir John Hacket - His view is bleak, but is backed by a career in NATO, and reflects a view of senior NATO commanders at the time he wrote the books.
Found it (LARGE PDF) (Page 178):
The point made here is that the most recent (at that time) Sidewinder AAM (AIM 9L) was so lethal that it could kill your opponent after you yourself were dead - And it could be fitted on pretty much a wide variety of platforms, which did NOT have to be latest-and-greatest. The 9-Lima is deadly, but there are other AAMs that are every bit as deadly, owned by people we don’t want to face in a fight unless absolutely necessary.
The Walker class boats
There is the ATACMS (Army TACtical Missile System) fireable from both the MLRS and HIMARS platforms with a range of 300km. It’s not a dedicated system. There are no dedicated launch platforms to compare numerically. It’s got similar capabilities to Russia’s short range ballistic missiles still allowed under INF. China, as a non-signatory is where there’s a gap.
They no longer have an entirely conscript military. Conscripts, in fact, are no longer the majority of their enlisted troops. The transition from a conscript military has been part of their ongoing professionalization efforts. (Cite)
i finished my career in First Army, responsible for helping to maintain training readiness in the Reserve Components and prepare units for deployment. We were a mixed Active and Reserve organization. As the mobilization load slowed we started transitioning to increase focus on the readiness portion and preparing to coach, teach, and mentor on those more traditional skills. As amazing as training levels were on skills relevant to counter-insurgency we sucked at a lot of other things. I found myself at times having to mentor some of our Active Duty trainers, with multiple combat deployments, on things I would have considered basic as a 2LT. They simply hadn’t ever really needed to exercise those tactics or solve those kinds of problems outside of a schoolhouse environment. It showed.
Thank you, I’ve saved that to read offline
That website really is a treasure trove of interesting material, but it can be somewhat hard to look through due to the sheer volume.
Thanks, I’ve read that one but it was some time ago, I actually collect books on the Cold War and its fun and interesting to read those fiction books on a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict as its now history and not a potential future.
A touch off topic, but it was at least originally commissioned as a Canadian manual, is Kenneth Macksey’s First Clash: Combat Close Up in World War III. Technology changes affect the specific techniques, tactics, and procedures but it is still a great look at the details that all need to be addressed in planning and executing decisive action operations.
Also Toshiba, and some German company (Toshiba sold the controlers, the German company sold the milling equipment).
It is not clear, at least in retrospect, why the United States entered into the INF treaty. While it didn’t really impact our stategic response capability and addressed the domestic unrest of our NATO allies (especially then-West Germany) we accepted a penalty than the Soviets who were just preparing to deploy a road-mobile ICBM (NATO: SS-25 ‘Sickle’) that could replace the SS-20 ‘Pioneer’ that despite being ostensibly single RV had sufficient capacity to carry multiple RVs and a maneuvering teargetting for intermediate and low-end intercontinental use. I suspect the belief was that the capability loss could be offset by the B-2 ‘Spirit’ stealth bomber and AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile carried by the B-1B, but both programs had serious problems and suffered large cutbacks at the end of the Cold War, with thr AGM-129 being retired and B-2 procurment curtailed to a tiny fraction of the planned number.
The other points made by AK84, Tranquilis, and LSLGuy are all essentially correct; at the height of its powers the Soviets relied on a largely conscript force without a permanent cadre of senior NCOs, and so had junior officers filling the supervisory role, and their equipment was robust but quite maintenance intensive. Modern Russian equipment, particularly avinoics, is every bit as complex and sophisticated as the American counterparts, and while many of their systems are quite capable (sometimes moreso that US and European systems) they have been unable to build up large invventories of advanced weapons and trained personnel. Their involvement in conflicts has been fairly limited in the last couple of decades and the level of practical experience they have to draw on outside of special operations is limited.
In a direct conventional conflict with NATO Russia would be at a significant disadvantage. On the other hand, they’ve been developing new families of nuclear weapons and delivery systems while the United States has forstalled or retired their most modern systems (the LGM-118A ‘Peacekeeper’ and MGM-134 ‘Midgetman’), and has spent much effort improving and deploying ABM systems that are at least with technical parity with US systems (THAAD, GMD, SM-3), as well as working on anti-ship systems and maneuvering reentry vehicles.
Stranger
Stranger, how realistic of an actual threat are things like the Zicron missile. Range of 1000 NM at Mach8 sounds awesome, and deadly, but does it appear to you to be a practical and feasibly technology for the battlefield as opposed to orchestrated tests?
Its an interesting concept. Whether or not its useful in combat, is an open question, I am no expert, but the ones I have read seem divided.
Thing is, Russian Carriers like the Kievs and later the Kuznetsov were not designed for power projection* in mind, but to provide Air Defence to the Fleet in mid-ocean. The US is an isolated nation geographically, while this keeps it highly invulnerable from attack, it also means the US has to build up a lot of infrastructures to project its power overseas.
Russia spans most of the Eurasian landmass. Pretty much every place they need to or want to go to is accessible from bases in Russia or nearby. There is not anyplace on the Planet that they cannot hit (ok outside perhaps S America) with conventional forces if they so feel a need to. So they don’t need large carrier Groups.
Unless Vlad decides he must have the same toys as his friend Don.
*They can be used for such purposes, especially against less capable opposition, as can modern missile-armed surface vessels, but are not designed to do so, unlike USN and RN vessels.
Whether it’s 2017, 1917 or 1817, Lord Palmerston’s two rules of foreign policy remain true:
- Russia is never as strong as she appears
- Russia is never as weak as she appears.
Meaning… in many ways, Russia is a paper tiger. But I still don’t want to fight them, ESPECIALLY on their turf.
Thanks for the thoughtful reply! Can you suggest some reading on the Armata platform?
I’m not generally interested in Russian military tech, but a video game (silly, I know) has me interested in their armored vehicles.
On the topic of Russian population, it’s also worth pointing out their age structure is wildly unbalanced, and the cohort they’re missing a lot of is the 18-28 year olds (due to unusually low fertility during the 1990s, which rebounded after 2000). I.e. They’re missing exactly the same cohort who would be prime age for military recruitment.
Thank you, I’ll check that out
There was an episode of the podcast “War College” a year ago where they talked to an expert on the Russian military (who wrote multiple books on the subject) about the current status of the Russian military, in summary it’s not very good.
Among other points he brings up
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Most of the army is made up of conscripts only serving for a single year. Taking away training time and other time not related to their assignments they only really have 3-4 months of effective use, thus not being of much use at all which severely impacts how units are deployed nowadays.
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Overall in terms of training and effectiveness he compares the Russian Army to the Italian Army which is among the lowest in overall terms of readiness and competence in NATO. In addition Russian special forces also tended to be much more poorly trained than their Western counterparts with the exception of highly specialized groups like “Spetsgruppa A”.
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The military deployments into Ukraine and Syria managed to expose numerous glaring weaknesses in the Russian military to the point that just the Ukraine incursions alone put incredible strain on the Russian military as a whole. An operation on the scale of the American Iraq War for Russia would basically cause a complete collapse of its military under its own weight.
Kongsberg is an “international” company, but headquartered in Norway.
did not know this - thank you.