What do you mean by “off base”? It was perhaps a bit tasteless, perhaps, but it does seem to have gotten your attention. It has never been my position that you can walk up to a person, hold up a faithometer, and declare, "this person has 45.2 kilicredulums of faith about the statement “God exists”. It has never been my position that that faith is “measurable”. (No matter how many times I use generic variables to speak of unknown values.) You seem to assume occasionally that I have, or that such a measuring ability is part of my definition of “faith”. such assumptions on your part are, when they occur, “off base”.
“Unjustified faith” is redundancy for clarity, and habit. A lot of people don’t clearly divide justified beliefs from faith in their understand of the word, so I feel this underlying compulsion to qualify things to specify my usage.
(Note: I define that all faith is unjustified faith. By my definition there is no such thing as justified faith.)
I am a person who assesses reality, and I am also a person who assesses somebody else’s assessment of reality.
–If I see something that is appers blue to me, I say “that’s blue”. That’s me assessing reality.
–If I hear somebody else look at the same thing, and say “that’s red”, then I’ll think “Where’d he get that idea?”, but I’ll probably take a second look, because maybe I somehow got the color wrong. (I’m more confident in the accuracy of my vision than his, but maybe he did see it better than me; I dunno.) That’s me assessing his assessment of reality.
–If I hear somebody else look at the same thing and say “that’s red; I know so because the magical invisible two-headed sky-pixie unicorns told me that belief in blue is heresy”, then I’ll assume he’s a nutbar. That’s me assessing and not being impressed wth his assessment of reality.
And “being impressed” or not is the result of assessing somebody’s thought processess being either rational, or based on wishes and denial. I would have thought that was obvious. (Guess not.)
The reason I don’t provide “an explicit source for that outside assessment”, is because my definiton DOESN’T assume it. My argument doesn’t assume that there’s a standard, universal method for looking at a person and telling how faithy they are. In fact my definition doesn’t even have to assume another person is present for faith to exist! Faith can exist unexamined.
My argument only assumes that a given person is either basing their beliefs on actual evidence, or not. This is not only a reasonable assumption, it must be true.
My definition of faith doesn’t come with a handy way to detect or measure it. I don’t need to provide such a thing in a definition. So how do we detect faith, you might ask? Well, you generally start by asking the person. A lot of people admit to having faith, proudly even. If they don’t admit faith and you still find yourself wondering how they arrived at their odd conclusion, you could ask them why they believe their arbitrary belief X. A lot of times they’ll give you some sort of an explanation. If their reasons seem based in non-evidentiary or contraevidentiary beliefs, you can ask about them, or provide counterevidence. if they can respond reasonably to counterevidence, then they might change your beliefs. If they can’t, they’re in denail. And if they admit faith, then you’re done.
Is this a certain route to detecting faith? No, of course not. The person might not even want to talk to you in the first place; then you can’t tell anything. But even if you can’t detect it, the person certainly arrived at their beliefs somehow. Those methods they used for arriving at beliefs define how much of their belief is faith.
We can’t measure it, but we know it’s there. Unless you propose they arrived at their beliefs through neither reasoned nor nonreasoned means?
Ah, but you don’t have to deliberately distort what I say to get my attention. In fact, what “got my attention” was your explanation later that didn’t require cracking open someone’s head.
Perhaps I need to clarify what I mean by “measure”. How about this (from Merriam-Webster)?
In your definition of faith, the criterion is X on the continuum, and you are appraising how far away the person’s belief is from X.
I’ll to copy and paste, again, but this time I’ll emphasize those parts of your explanation that indicate measurements:
So, are you saying that the words continuum, level, “difference between these two marks”, bigger, more, a lot, and very little don’t imply some type of measurement?
Actually, a “standard, universal method” implies that “another” person is not needed. Also, according to your “continuum definition”, doesn’t faith have to examined?
Okay, so faith is like “happiness” or “sadness” – if someone says that they have faith, then they do. That’s fine.
But, now you’re examining faith, right?
So, if they provide you with evidence that *you * think is compelling, then you’ll accept their claim, right?
Actually, if they can’t, then it just means that they can’t convince you that their beliefs are true. Perhaps they’re bad at debating … or, perhaps, you’re in denial.
Done? I guess you mean that you now know that their belief is based on faith. BTW, do they “admit” faith in the same way that somebody admits guilt?
Well, if you think we can’t measure it, then modify your explanation of faith.
Well, you’d have to get into their head somehow to get a measuring device in there…but whichever. You didn’t like my phrase; I can understand that but don’t feel overly guilty or penitent, and life goes on.
That definition’s fine; but if nobody actually does any estimating or appraising, there’s no measurement then, is there?
I am defining faith as the condition of there being unjustified belief. This condition can occur in the absence of observers and measurement, even if it could be measured. If a tree falls in a forest and there’s nobody to hear it, there’s still a tree and a forest there.
That’s right, I am. The illustrative explanatory device of the continuum and its little metaphorical marks need not be assessed by anyone at all.
Further, they need not be possible to be measured for my definition to hold up. There is defined some sort of a difference, but I say nothing about there being available tools or any possible way for an observer to take a measure of that difference. Heck, my definition even only implies comparative difference, not that it’s even theoretically possible to draw evenly-spaced marks on the continuum and make a ruler out of it.
Your comparison below with the happy/sad continuum is apt. We have no way to measure the specific happiness of a person directly. And even the experiencer of happiness is not necessarily able to mark down the number of joyules of happiness they’re experiencing at any given moment. Nonetheless happy is not the same as sad, and there are various discernable levels on the continuum that are orderable and comparable (even if fine differences cannot be detected).
Levels of belief would be the same. You can tell if you believe something more or less than you did a while ago, even if you don’t have a yardstick to set next to your belief.
Nope. It can just be. The tree is in the forest whether you’re listening to it or not.
It’s very much like happiness or sadness in that regard, yes. Though you do have to be aware that they might be lying to you, or (slightly more likely) that they haven’t got the memo that faith doesn’t include justified belief. So if you checked a little further, that “faith” they have that their car isn’t going to explode might actually be based on some fairly convincing evidence. (Previous experience with the vehicle, recent tuneup, whatever.)
You’re examining external evidence to try to determine if faith was an integral component of their decision making process. This is not the same as reading their mind, and it’s not going to give you numerical values for their levels of belief. What you’re looking for is an explicit statement that is admitted as being a faith belief, or can be demonstrated as being denial. Either one of those would tell you that they have a gap between those two marks on the continuum. It would not, however, tell you where those two marks are (except that they’re not both at the same end).
Not what I said, though I admit I was trying to be brief. “Counterevidence” would be evidence that disproves something that they just said was a belief they held. If they can make a reasonable case why they still believe their belief in spite of your counterevidence (options may include demonstrating that your counterevidence is not credible, or that it doesn’t actually contradict their belief) then they have not demonstrated denial. If they stick their fingers in their ears and say “la la la”, then that would be denial. If they demonstrate something in the middle, some claim that you don’t agree with that is not successfully contradicted by your evidence (like, “I don’t buy that counterevidence of yours because I don’t believe that Fox news is a reliable source of facts”) then you have yet another fact to figure out why they believe it or not.
And yes, you have no way of using anybody else’s brain but your own to assess a claim. (Though listening to somebody else assess the argument for you requires only minimal effort.) And yes, if you’re heavy into faith and denial (especially denial) on the subject in question, then you’re not likely to be convinced of anything you don’t like. You can choose note to accept the slightest bit of evidence they propose that ripples your pond. You might even end up convinced that even a rational person has an agenda. (Not that this ever happens in real life, of course. Oh, no.)
Of course, you have the ability to assess your own faith, as well. You can ask yourself why you believe everything you believe, (or at least anything that you expect to be arguing about) and find out if you believe it because of some unsubtantiated notion. Then you can endeavor to correct your denial and/or decide if you like having the faith you do. If you do decide you like your faith, then you certainly may retain belief in it, unless the evidence you were denying before convinces you otherwise against your will.
If you end up ditching the faith beliefs, then you’re certainly going to be able to use the method crudely described above to assess the faith of others with reasonable accuracy.
If you end up retaining faith but ditching denial, you’ll at least recognise your faith as faith, and will still be able to assess the faith of others (while sensibly refraining from trying to present your own faith as counterevidence). As an added bonus you’ll probably be more able to accept that other people have no reason to accept your faith-based conclusions, and that if you disagree with them over some of that stuff, you’re the one without a case, and probably should concede quietly (unless they’re like, messing with your rights to hold and express your belief and stuff).
If you choose to hang onto your denial then please, just don’t debate.
If you’re in denial things are not going to work out well, that’s a fact. Of course you can correct that yourself if you get serious about examining your beliefs.
If you’re not in denail you can still not be convinced of their beliefs but still assess them as rational. A certain degree of optimism or pessimism is allowed when assessing reality. The fellow who insists that there’s a chance of being killed by a meteor, and the fellow who is convinced that the odds of that are vanishingly small and so one need not be overly concerned, may both arrive at their conclusions by reason.
And if they’re bad at debating? It depends how bad. If they resort to ad hominem and strawmen, they’re probably going to convince you right quick that they haven’t got a case, since if they did they’d presumably present it. If they simply don’t have the facts on hand that convinced them, or can’t articulate their thoughts well, or just mumble a lot, then they might indeed convince you that they’re operating on faith when they’re acually not.
But so what? If you ostracize everyone who hold beliefs based on faith then you’re probably pretty lonely already. Hopefully you don’t actively attack everyone who has faith, or you’d be pretty busy. It does mean that you’re not going to change your mind and accept their faith belief, but then, if they can’t even express it to you well enough to convince you they have reason to believe it for themselves, who could expect you to be convinced into accepting their position for your self?
That’s what I mean. I suppose you could stick around and try to destroy their faith, but that’s usually rude unless their faith beliefs make them unhappy or they’re doing bad things due to their faith beliefs (in which case they’re asking for it). Or, of course, if the’re willingly debating you.
And regarding “admitting” it, are you implying that I, I, could possibly have (gasp!) a bias? Say it ain’t so!! (Though if the worst my bias does is cause me to use a pejorative word now and then, I’m not doing so bad.
Realistically, though, if they didn’t assert their faith right at the start, then how are they going to express it to you? “Oh, why yes, I have faith in god’s existence. No real evidence whatsoever. But that belief of mine that God made the rock? That’s not based on faith in any way. I know that God made the rock, based on the sure fact that he made everything.” :dubious: I think that you’re more likely to get a “I just believe it, okay? Stop interrogating me!” than a late-game proud declaration.
begbert2, did you understand the example in the definition that I offered for measure: “to estimate or appraise by a criterion <measures his skill against his rival>”?
Is it not clear that “skill”, for example, does not consist of discrete units of measurements? If you understand the example, then why do you continue to make comments like this:
Okay, let’s start again.
I understand that a definition doesn’t explain everything about a concept – it’s a starting point. It’s a tool that is used in explaining the concept. Do you agree?
How about this: Does your definition involve any “evaluation”? It seems to me that it does. How else is “unjustified” determined unless it is compared to “justified”? And, how is “justified” determined unless the belief (and the evidence for the belief) is somehow evaluated?
That’s it for now. Please let me know what you think.
Thanks.
Hmm, I missed that you were specifically noting that aspect of the definition. That definition certainly applies to quantifiable comparisons too, of course.
I also now (I think) understand better what this measurement you’re talking about is. When you talk about measurement you’re talking about how the beliefs are justified by the believer, not how somebody other than the thinker can wander in after the justification is complete and figure out how the thought process went. That makes all the difference. The fact that I used the illustrative device of a continuum with marks on it is therefore irrelevant to your concerns about measurement, then.
Anyway, now that we have discussed the process of assessing evidence, a more detailed definition of faith (and its associated words) may be presented:
Faith: Any amount of belief by an individual about a specific proposition that exceeds the degree to which the evidence* has justified* that belief to the individual.
I will note that, “has justified” being past tense, no current measurement is required by my definition of faith. What you’re concerned about, is the definition of “justified” in this context.
But first, evidence. (A slightly variant definition; my discussion of justification should pick up the slack.)
Evidence: Knowledge that is drawn from first hand experience of which the individual is aware. By first hand, we mean, what the person senses, feels, thinks, and emotes, prior to interpretation.
(Note that by this definition, evidence is a specifically subjective thing. However it should be noted that if there is a real world, and if two people are interacting with the same or similar things in the real world, they are likely to have similar experiences, imparting similar evidence to each of them.)
And now:
Justification by evidence: The process by which evidence inspires belief by an individual. Justification is a process carried out by the individual in creating new knowledge or beliefs for himself, and will incorporate evidence, justified knowledge (which is knowledge drawn via reason based on evidence and other justified knowledge), and justified knowledge about the certainty and applicability of other knowledge (including unjustified knowledge), which will modify the amount of belief inspired from that knowledge.
Note that any theory or fact is considered knowledge by this definition; even if you just made it up yourself. What matters here is whether knowledge is justified or not. And how to determine that (hopefully I won’t miss anything or make any grievous errors in this):
All evidence is considered justified knowledge, at the level of the precise things you sensed and specifically what thoughts or feelings you had or experienced.
If an accidental error is made in the process of deducing conclusions, the result is still justified, but it is a “bad” conclusion; voicing incorrect results. Conclusions that are deduced from “bad” conclusions are themselves also “bad” conclusions.
If non-justified beliefs are included in the deduction process, then the result is not justified.
If evidence or justified conclusions most be knowingly ignored to reasonably deduce a conclusion, then the result of the deduction is not justified. If belief is drawn from the evidence anyway, this can be referred to as “being in denial” about the conclusions or evidence you are deliberately ignoring.
If an individual is not aware that their knowledge contains contradictions, then the result is still knowledge, but it is “bad” knowledge.
It is possible to incorporate non-consistent knowledge into a justified non-“bad” results, if those results incorporate the knowledge about the unreliability that is deducible from the inconsistencies. Example: “This is true most, but not all, of the time”.
So, if you have the knowledge “I had an experience that felt like I talked to God”, “Just after this experience, I found myself lying in bed” and “I have been known to dream imaginary things and immediately afterwards find myself lying in bed”, then one cannot be justified in concluding “I talked to God”; one may however justifiedly conclude “I might have talked to God, but it might instead have been a dream.” If one has further justified knowledge about the frequency of God-talks and of dreams, then further conclusions about the belief-inspiring power of this batch of knowledge can be drawn.
Clearly, the process of justification is a sort of measurement, of justified knowledge and experiences. This can be done once and then it’s over, though, and the belief (and faith) may persist long after. At that point, the measurement is done, and the definition of faith continues to apply without mandating measurement at all.
cosmosdan, by the law of excluded middle, if faith makes people have a tendency to do more charitable acts, then the absence of faith makes people have a lesser tendency to do good acts by comparison. If you believe that faith makes people better than they would otherwise be, then you believe that persons without faith are worse than they would be if they too had faith. This is inescapable.
This applies equally to having religion/not having religion, or any other strictly inclusive/exclusive comparison.
Ths only way that the above inescapable fact does not imply that “a belief in the positive effect of faith on people’s behavior = atheists are generally less good than theists” is if you believe that religion tends to attract people who have a tendency to do evil, and then compensates for that tendency, thus making them “merely as good” as the atheists. I doubt you believe this is how it works, though.
Now, suppose, for a purely theoretical example, that theists have a tendency to donate an average of $1000 worth of time, money, etcetera a year.
Then suppose, in this theoretical world, that atheists have a tendency to donate an average of $1500 worth of time, money, etcetera a year.
Every person, in our purely theorietical example, is either an atheist or a theist. Excluded middle and all that.
Is the value of faith that $1000 the theoretical theists donate (on average)? Or is it that extra $500 that they *don't* donate, that they would have donated were they atheists? Since there's no way the $1000 wouldn't have gotten donated, faith or no faith, I say teh value is in the lost $500, in this theoretical example.
It's a thing called opportunity cost - the value of something includes the loss of whatever it's displacing. You *have* to consider this when considering the value of something, or you risk ending up with extremely skewed results. This is why I compare the faith cases against the absence-of-faith cases; I don't want to be flat wrong.
As for the 90-10 thing, I now see where you’re going with it, at least. The flaw in the argument is that you can’t assume that the default (ie: no faith) state of the world is so close to species extinction, that adding a little evil due to faith would push it over the brink. Perhaps in the absence of faith, civilization would have advanced twice as fast, and the overwhelming presence of faith has merely retarded that advancement, rather than reversing it and thereby eliminating the species.
In your mentioning of communism, you unknowingly make a good point: I *haven't* picked examples that are debatable in the manner that [facist] communism is. I've specifically picked examples where faith demonstrably *was* a factor. Any random person giving to charity, sorry to say, cannot claim such a distinction. So I'm not applying a double standard: the standard is: "Things we know for certain were due to faith or the absence of faith, come over to this side of the line! Things we don't know to any reasonable degree either way, go stand over there!".
Which is to say, when you threw the gates wide in an attempt to give faith credit for the whole general set of charitable deeds, you essentially sabotaged your own position. I would have done the same had I tried to blame all murders on faith. Which I notably didn't. So: no double standard; no bias-driven argument. (I'm not saying I don't *have* bias, but I make an effort not to base arguments on it. I don't want to look like an idiot, after all, and arguing from bias is an excellent way to go about doing just that.)
As for facist communism being usable as a reverse example of my argument, if you can show that it required a lack of faith to be present for it to have had its negative effect, then you may indeed use it as an example of the positive value of faith. Not until then, though; if facist communism could have had its negative effects even if it hadn’t been militantly atheistic, then it contributes nothing for or against the argument for faith’s value.
(McCarthyism, though, was definitely caused by faith. Secular faith, but faith nonetheless. If nobody had had faith in McCarthy’s baseless accusations, then nothing would have come of him.)
[QUOTE=cosmosdan]
I really don't have time to devote to these epic posts. I find that you have applied your reasoning completely unequally to the discussion at hand. Thats how you get the slam dunk in your favor. I'll assume you are completely sincere and unaware that you are doing that. However, until you can apply the arguments evenly, and we can deal with one question instead of blurring several. there's no point in us going over this.
Thanks for your efforts and time put in.
[/QUOTE]
I can truly appreciate not having time for this; I have spent numerous hours on this discussion and have frequently wondered why the heck I'm bothering. (A compulsive desire to correct percieved error, I suppose.)
I am entirely aware of my bias; but I do not argue based on it, and I have not applied a double standard. (I have considered mutiple questions at once though. Is that bad?) Regardless, if you do not understand my arguments, and persist in not understanding them regardless of how I explain, then this will go nowhere, and there would indeed be no point in us continuing this discussion.
For my part, thanks for consistently bothering to respond, and your generally high level of politeness; You may not have understood my position, but (aside from that one post) you have been quite nice to deal with, which is no small thing.
No, it’s totally relevant. The “continuum with marks on it” is precisely what I’m disputing in your explanation of your definition.
One more time: measure
to **estimate ** or **appraise ** by a **criterion ** <measures his skill against his rival>
In your definition, the criterion is “the **level ** of certainty that can be reasonably inferred from a rational or otherwise non-faith-based analysis of the evidence”, and you are comparing that criterion to the “the actual **level ** of actual belief the person has”. And, according to you, the **difference ** between the two is the **level ** of faith.
You say:
It’s glaringly obvious to me that the words “amount”, “level”, “exceeds”, and “degree” indicate measurement, and not justification. And you have not provided any method of measurement.
How do you draw knowledge *prior * to interpretation? And is “evidence” something that you “impart” to an experience, or is it the experience itself? And, by first hand, are you excluding *all * testimony of other people’s experiences, or does their testimony become part of *your * experience?
I like that.
But why are you “restricting” the amount of available evidence? Remember my example of the gun? In response, you said:
So, given only “an experience” then, yes, “one cannot be justified in concluding ‘I talked to God’”. But what if (as you pointed out in another post) we look at “all the evidence”? Which evidence do you exclude in a “rational” analysis? Which experiences are “irrelevant”?
Are you presupposing that it’s impossible that “you talked with God”? And, what if many people that you respect claim to have talked with God? Are appeals to popularity and authority completely without merit?
I’ll leave you with this:
All faith-based beliefs are also based on *some * evidence.
Some people think that the evidence does not justify the beliefs.
All beliefs are based on *some * faith.
Some people think that some of their beliefs are functionally equivalent to beliefs that are “purely rational” and “true”, even if there is an element of faith.
People disagree about the interpretation of the evidence.
People disagree about which evidence is relevant.
People disagree about which evidence is compelling.
[QUOTE]
Now, suppose, for a purely theoretical example, that theists have a tendency to donate an average of $1000 worth of time, money, etcetera a year.
Then suppose, in this theoretical world, that atheists have a tendency to donate an average of $1500 worth of time, money, etcetera a year.
Every person, in our purely theorietical example, is either an atheist or a theist. Excluded middle and all that.
Is the value of faith that $1000 the theoretical theists donate (on average)? Or is it that extra $500 that they *don't* donate, that they would have donated were they atheists? Since there's no way the $1000 wouldn't have gotten donated, faith or no faith, I say teh value is in the lost $500, in this theoretical example.
It's a thing called opportunity cost - the value of something includes the loss of whatever it's displacing. You *have* to consider this when considering the value of something, or you risk ending up with extremely skewed results. This is why I compare the faith cases against the absence-of-faith cases; I don't want to be flat wrong.
[/QUOTE]
Incorrect. In this case you would consider the money they donated {positive actions} compared to the money they withdrew {negative actions} to decide whether their contribution was plus or minus. You wouldn't need to consider atheist donations at all.
Regardless you have provided no way of measuring non believer contributions so your argument is invalid.
Irrelevant speculation. The question is did faith have a more negative or positive effect, based on actual events.
I don’t think you’re an idiot. Just wrong!
I’ve already explained this but one more time. At no time did I state or imply that faith deserved credit for "the whole general set of charitable deeds. I was speaking of believers only , as a group. I was referring to the good deeds just within that group as compared to the bad, also, just within that group.
I have acknowledged that the good deeds done by believers can have motives other than faith. It seems equally obvious that negative deeds can have other motives as well but still you make statements like the one I bolded. That’s not evidence or real argument. It’s just repetition. Your argument isn’t valid until you apply it equally when judging the good and the bad deeds.
[QUOTE]
As for facist communism being usable as a reverse example of my argument, if you can show that it *required* a lack of faith to be present for it to have had its negative effect, then you may indeed use it as an example of the positive value of faith. Not until then, though; if facist communism could have had its negative effects even if it hadn't been militantly atheistic, then it contributes nothing for or against the argument for faith's value.
[/QUOTE]
Once again this is a double standard. You're requiring something of me that you are not requiring of yourself.
[QUOTE]
(McCarthyism, though, was *definitely* caused by faith. Secular faith, but faith nonetheless. If nobody had had faith in *McCarthy's* baseless accusations, then nothing would have come of him.)
[/QUOTE]
Excuse me but this is just nonsense. Weren't we speaking of the positive or negative effect of **religious** faith? To suddenly include secular faith{whatever that is} as supporting your argument renders the discussion pointless. It also strikes me as shifting the goal posts in the middle of the game.
[QUOTE]
I am entirely aware of my bias; but I do not argue based on it, and I have not applied a double standard.
[/QUOTE]
Yes you have and yes you have. IMHO Feel free to get other opinions
[QUOTE]
(I have considered mutiple questions at once though. Is that bad?)
[/QUOTE]
It complicates an already lengthy discussion unnecessarily.
[QUOTE]
Regardless, if you do not understand my arguments, and persist in not understanding them regardless of how I explain, then this will go nowhere, and there would indeed be no point in us continuing this discussion.
[/QUOTE]
I think I do understand your argument. I just think it's pretty inconsistent in how the standards are applied.
[QUOTE]
For my part, thanks for consistently bothering to respond, and your generally high level of politeness; You may not have understood my position, but (aside from that one post) you have been quite nice to deal with, which is no small thing.
[/QUOTE]
I'm glad we were able to overcome some ruffled feathers and discuss things congenially. Peace :)
I’ll start out right now and note that the question is about the value of faith, not the value of religion. They are not the same thing. This is probably a large part of the problem right there.
No, you’re still locked in the box. It’s not a false dillemma for the simple reason that I am not providing two alternative positions and ignoring other options; I am not even providing alternative positions at all. They are the same position. If faith (well, religion) has positive value which makes theists better then they would be if they were atheists, then that same positive value would make current athests better persons than they are now if they instead had the faith (well, religion) they don’t. Simple fact; it’s pretty much just a rearrangment of the words.
Do I sound like I’m repeating myself? It’s because I am; it’s hard to put this more simply than I already have. Still, let me try mathematical symbology; maybe that’ll help.
if A+F > A, then A < A+F. Necessarily.
[QUOTE=cosmosdan]
Incorrect. In this case you would consider the money they donated {positive actions} compared to the money they withdrew {negative actions} to decide whether their contribution was plus or minus. You wouldn't need to consider atheist donations at all.
[/QUOTE]
No, this method for assessing value is flawed. You could only reasonably do it this way if the faith *was* the person, if there was nothing to the person besides faith then all; then all the actions of the person would indeed be effects of faith. This is not the case, however. If you magically expunged all faith from the world, then there would still be all the same people left, still doing things. Just somewhat different things. The value of faith is what people did *because* of faith, which is the same as the difference between what the people did, and what the people would have done in the absence of faith.
And I'm not really comparing theists against other people who are atheists. I'm trying to compare people against what they *themselves* would be without faith. (Pretty much necessarily this means they'd be without religion as well.) In my example I explicitly stated what their atheist behavior would have been; in real life it's somewhat tougher to determine. One can look at actual atheists for hints as to what changes there might be; however you can't extrapolate too far, or you're just fantasizing rather than making reasonable extrapolations. So, it behooves us to focus on things that we *know* are creditable to faith. Like the inquisition. Not like generosity.
[QUOTE=cosmosdan]
Regardless you have provided no way of measuring non believer contributions so your argument is invalid.
[/QUOTE]
I don't have to measure them; that's not my argument. (Again. :rolleyes:) My position is that you have failed to demonstrate that when religious people donate, *that they do so **because of** faith or religion*. For all I know most donations by religious people might be done in *spite of* faith or religion. I don't know, and you haven't pointed out any way to figure it out one way or the other.
Persons who wear boxers donate a lot to charity, too. Can we therefore conclude that the boxer-wearers donated *because* they wore boxers? Is this an indication that boxer shorts have positive value?
Erm, this was a reponse to your 90-10 argument that “most people historically have been faithful. If faith were bad, wouldn’t we have ruined the world by now?” I have pointed out that the argument is flawed. I don’t have to provide evidence to do that, any more than you had to provide evidence to present the argument in the first place.
The simple fact is: the 90-10 argument as you present it is flawed. In fact, it’s specifially a false dillema (for real this time). You overlook the case that perhaps the positive value of reason that peeks through past the faith might be stronger than the negative power. Once we realize that that case is a possiblity, we can no longer conclude anything from the 90-10 argument about the value of faith, since it could turn out either way depending on what’s actually going on.
(Personally I believe that religion has in general retarded the advancement of civlization, but you already suspected that. I believe this at least in part because I consider the accepting of homosexuals as humans with equal rights is civilized, and religion is retarding people’s acceptance of that. I also believe that religion prolonged the dark ages by explicitly supporting the feudal system. I furter believe the advancement of science is in general an advancement to civilization, and religion has on many occasion set itself in opposition to science. And finally, I can’t really think of one instance where religion has benefitted society as a whole (not just the part that was of that particular religious sect, at the expense of others). There might be some good example that I’m unaware of, though.)
You can stop explaining it, I understand your position just fine and it’s flawed.
The flaw is that you are calling the inquisition a “negative deed that can have other motives [than faith]”. That’s a hard sell, and if you want to start trying to sell it, now’s the time. Until then, there’s a distinct qualitative difference between my examples and your examples; mine are demonstably the effect of faith, and yours are not demonstrably so.
There’s a single standard; my examples satisfy it, and yours don’t.
[QUOTE=cosmosdan]
Once again this is a double standard. You're requiring something of me that you are not requiring of yourself.
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Requiring? I'm not even requiring you to use communism as an example. And if I were, I would only require you to demonstrate that it had **the same level of certainty of being faith related** as the examples *I* provide. Unfortunately, we're quite certain already that my examples are events that definitely would not have happened in the absence of faith. You have so far presented nothing that can be held up to the same standard.
[QUOTE=cosmosdan]
Excuse me but this is just nonsense. Weren't we speaking of the positive or negative effect of **religious** faith? To suddenly include secular faith{whatever that is} as supporting your argument renders the discussion pointless. It also strikes me as shifting the goal posts in the middle of the game.
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No, as far as I've understood it from the OP onward this thread has been about the value of faith, not religion. I've been holding an ongoing discussion about the definition of faith with **Alwrong** that only peripherally mentioned God or religion (and even then only in example cases). Heck; the posts of **Scylla**'s to which I responded specifically were not about religious faith at all.
Religion is only one type of faith belief; there are others. Religion specifically has been coming up here a lot because it's one of the few cases where the believers *self-proclaim* having faith, and will on occasion specifically state that the reasons for their actions are faith-based. Such examples are easily incorporated into an argument about the value of faith, so they come up a lot.
If your only interest in this is defending religion (and you don't see the value of faith as reflecting on the value of religion), then fine; you're in the wrong discussion. See you around.
Early on we were talking about various kinds of faith. Since you used Heb 11:1 as a reference point and your examples were the inquisition the crusades and the Salem Witch trials and comments like this one from you
I had good reason to think we were focusing mainly on faith associated with religious belief.
Except I have stated several times that is not the argument. Thats an argument you insist I must be making when in fact I am not making it and never have. I’m not locked in a box. I’ve simply tried to narrow and define the terms of the discussion so we’re not all over the place. Unfortunately it hasn’t worked and you keep insisting I’m making an argument I’m not making even though I’ve stated that I’m not and have repeated my actual argument several times. Your point seems to be that I can’t argue my position without arguing what you describe above. I strongly disagree.
We can see fairly clearly that both believers and non believers are capable of acts of kindness and compassion and great evil.
This is the incorrect way to approach this. It is total speculation and impossible. You have no way of knowing or even making a reasonably accurate guess on how people with faith would act without faith. Thats why I chose to discuss the real world actions of those with religious faith.
We don’t know You don’t know If you’re going to invalidate positive actions by guessing at what their motives might have been then we can apply the same principle to the inquisition and the crusades. A person can call someone a heretic or witch to justify seizing their property. Thats greed not faith. They might do it secure their own position and protect themselves. Thats fear not faith.
Someone might join the crusades for the promise of pay or treasure. A leader might do it for personal glory. There’s any number of reasons that are as valid as the ones you listed to minimize positive acts. When you repeatedly ignore those you are applying your own argument unequally and rendering it invalid.
Okay, then apply your own argument equally. You have also failed to demonstrate that the evil acts you mentioned were done because of faith. For all we know greed and fear and lust for power were the real motivations and religious faith was simply a smokescreen. Since we can’t seem to figure it out one way or the other that would seem to show my original argument was correct.
[QUOTE]
There's a single standard; my examples satisfy it, and yours don't.
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This sums it up I guess. The argument is reduced to you think you're right and I don't. You don't accept my arguments and I don't accept yours. I'd love to have a third party come in and comment but I doubt that will happen.
It’s been about faith within the context of religion for the most part. Most of your post here is about that. For you to now claim McCarthyism as faith based is ludicrous. What are you saying? That people doing what they believe is right is faith? If thats the case almost every action from anybody can be called faith and we have no real discussion.
And once again you seem to ignore my repeated statements of my position to claim I hold one I don’t hold. I’m sure there’s some technical debate term for that too. I have at no time been defending religion.
We obviously can’t agree or even come to terms on what we’re actually discussing. It’s pointless. The end.
Justifiable confusion; entirely understandable. My position is not limited to religious faith, but religion is a handy sourece of examples because there’s a lot of it going around and it has that added bonus of whole-package group-wide justification: people who came into it with the mere idea of believing in a nice friendly god that saves people are then taught various other beliefs that may be less benign as part of the package; is also unifies the group behind these ideas and/or other ideas deliberately inserted by persons with their own goals.
This unifying power of religion is one of the things that distinguishes my examples from yours. People would allow each other to donate to charity even without faith aligning their motivations and beliefs. Other people wouldn’t have let people get away with the witch trials or the inquisition or the crusades without faith bringing them all around to the same viewpoint.
I don’t see how you can avoid this conclusion, but frankly I don’t care about this enough to argue it further. It was always a tangent anyway.
If either side weren’t, this discussion would have been a whole lot lot shorter.
Unfortunately, the only correct way to assess the value of faith is to notice the things that aren’t done because of it as well as the things that are. Otherwise you’re only looking at half of the equation. If faith persuades somebody not to kill his neighbor, then faith should get credit for it, yes? Then similarly if faith persuades somebody not to help his neighbor, then it should also get credit for this.
It is harder and more imprecise to assess this way, but it’s also the only correct way. If you’re going to ignore half of the effects of faith in your analysis, you probably shouldn’t even bother in the first place.
And yeah, we certainly don’t have enough data to definitiely lay out what all the costs and benefits of faith and/or religion have actually been, but we might still be able to deduce enough to draw a reasonable conclusion about the question.
Of course, if not for religion, it would never have occurred to anyone to attack the holy land in the first place. Anybody who just up and said “Hey, let’s all attack someplace hundreds of miles away” would have justifiably been treated like a loon. Which erases the opportunity for others to decide to join the cause for other reasons: there would have been no crusade to join.
Do you believe that persons who might have said, absent faith or religion, “Hey, let’s set up a fund for disaster relief and donate to it” or “Hey, let’s set up a fund to assist the poor and donate to it” would have been treated like a loon? Would have been chronically unable to muster the support and popular acceptance for his idea in a totally faithless and religionless world?
[QUOTE=cosmosdan]
This sums it up I guess. The argument is reduced to you think you're right and I don't. You don't accept my arguments and I don't accept yours. I'd love to have a third party come in and comment but I doubt that will happen.
[/QUOTE]
Pretty much; I think we're down to saying "no, your argument is wrong". "No *your* argument is wrong." "No ***your*** argument is wrong." Much better than "No, you're *biased*", but after a certain point, equally unproductive.
I define not-reasonably-justified belief of any type, religious or not, as faith. Based on that, McCarthy obviously relied on faith for the support that allowed him to continue.
It is now pretty clear why discussions with you have focussed primarily on religious examples though; that’s what you were serving so I generally volleyed in kind. My position (or the overall discussion) is not limited to religion though; never has been.
Ignoring your position? That was a speculative conditional; I wasn’t even making a statement as to what you position might be. But whichever. If you’re done, that’s fine. 'Bye.
(Out of time; I’ll try to get to Alwrong’s post at lunchtime.)
What’s obvious to people may vary; what’s obvious to me is that the words “amount”, “level”, “exceeds”, and “degree” indicate measurability, and even then only if the putative measurer has access to the thing he’s trying to measure.
It’s certainly possible for a person not to do a meta-assessment of their decision-making process as they decide whether or not to believe something, and it’s entirely possible that nobody will even ask them how they came to their decision, much less find some way of assessing the now-complete thought processes directly. Such a person’s levels of justified and unjustified belief are completely unassessed; yet by my definition there still is a certain specific amount of justification for the belief (possibly none), and a certain amount of faith (possibly none). Actual assessment, that is to say a “measurement” need not ever actually occur.
Out of curiousity, why would it be so bad for my definition if faith could be measured anyway? There are even a lot of religious folk believe that if you happen to have complete knowledge of a person’s past and present thought processess (like, if you’re god), then you’d be able to know how much faith they have. My definition asserts no different. It’s just those of use who can’t read people’s minds for their present and past thought processess that are left guessing.
By my definition, evidence is restricted only to uninterpreted information. That is, the raw visual information your eyes are sending your brain, the raw sound information from your ears, (smell/nose, taste/tongue, balance-inner ear, etcetera), and the direct metainformation about your mental and emotional state that your brain feeds you.
How you interpret this information (such as recognizing that rectangle of colors as a computer monitor, those patterns of dots on it as text characters, those text characters as words, those words as having meaning) is a learned process, that babies and children go through. I’m not expert in child development, but it’s my understanding that the learning process is a very rationally-acceptible one, mostly based on recognizing the reliable consistency of things over many, many repeated occurences of them.
As for second-hand information, first it comes in as visual (of read) or auditory (heard) information. Then it is interpreted by all your low-level rational justification processess, which most of us justifiably put high confidence in (though, if something I hear makes no sense, I have less confidence I didn’t mishear it).
Then we process that through standard rational assessment, based on our (hopefully justified) beliefs about that person’s credibility, and that person’s ability to speak knowledgeably and accurately on the subject they’re speaking about. If you assess that they are able to speak knowledgeably on the subject, then you can take their testimony as convincing to the degree you assess they’re likely to be correct.
If your belief in the speaker’s ability to assert on the subject is not justified, then your acceptance of their testimony, and any belief you derive from it, isn’t either.
I’m restricting for the sake of example, because writing down the complete set of knowlege a person assessing this evidence (well, knowledge derived directly from evidence) might have would take a heck of a lot of time and space. It might even kill the hamsters. In these examples I believe I’m also specifically talking about the knowledge that can be derived from the other limited knowledge presented. In the example with the gun, the knowledge that could be derived from what was stated was zero.
In a rational analysis you exclude all evidence that you can rationally conclude is very unlikely to be relevent. (As with all rational assessments, you have to be aware of denial here.)
Technically no knowledge is irrelevent, but it takes too long to assess all knowledge, so we rationally assess which knowledge shoudl be assessed. We could in theory miss something and be rationally wrong. If someone points out your error and you reject that information in order to cling to your beliefs, you are then operating in denail and beliveing on faith.
“All faith-based beliefs are also based on *some * evidence.”
Not necessarily; you can believe in invisible pink unicorns if you like. Also being based on evidence does not mean that the evidence justifies your knowledge, because if you have to ignore some evidence and evidence-derived knowledge to support your beliefs (ie: denail), then your beliefs are not justified.
“Some people think that the evidence does not justify the beliefs.”
And sometimes those people are right.
“All beliefs are based on *some * faith.”
No. Sometimes people only have confidence in their beliefs to the degree that the evidence and reason indicates they should. Like “I think it’s possible that that coin will be flipped to heads. I don’t think it’s at all certain, though.”
“Some people think that some of their beliefs are functionally equivalent to beliefs that are “purely rational” and “true”, even if there is an element of faith.”
Sure. They’re wrong. (Note that if their beliefs are based in justified beliefs, then there’s no faith.)
“People disagree about the interpretation of the evidence.”
Yes.
“People disagree about which evidence is relevant.”
Yes.
“People disagree about which evidence is compelling.”
Yes.
And some people have these disagreements for rational reasons, such as a differing experiences and differing knowledge bases. However a lot of the time when people are believing on faith they have to go into denial regarding their opponents credibility, their opponent’s statement’s reasonability, and the credibility of their sources, in order to maintain those faith-based beliefs. In this case, they are not right. Of course.