Or, in the alternative, it must be able of at least some, let me even suggest, any discrimination between valid and invalid conclusions.
Is it a “penetrating” analysis to suggest a reasonable argument must not require one to oppose same-sex marriage if the majority opposes it because they believe same-sex marriage causes outbreaks of velociraptor attacks?
And as I pointed out in response to your global warming example, I think it is quite reasonable to say “I don’t know the answer–so I’ll let the majority decide, and then acquiesce in the decision they make.” That is called not voting.
One can do so and remain agnostic on an issue.
That is quite different from saying “I don’t know the answer–so I’ll let the majority decide, and then agree with the position they choose, and take it to be my own.” That is, I contend, only reasonable if the position our voter adopts is reasonable.
One cannot be agnostic on an issue after doing so–by definition.
Just so I’m clear: Is your argument that our hypothetical voter should not vote, or that they should adopt the majority position?
You see, here is where you lose me: I’m not arguing that deep or meaningful review is necessary.
I am, however, pushing back against an argument that would, by its own terms, support any position the majority takes, whether based on reasonable argument or not, whether based in facts or not. Do you dispute that this is a necessary conclusion of your argument?
To frame it in a hypothetical: 51% of voters think same-sex marriage should not be permitted, because they believe same-sex unions lead to velociraptor attacks. (or, if you prefer, any other patently unreasonable justification).
Whether or not your voter knows that, do you agree that your argument would have him adopt the majority’s position, even though it is not just wrong, but (assuming, as I do, arguendo, that it is the sole argument), simply unsupportable? I think the majority already does do more or less what I suggest: they do some, whether minimal, or complex, review of the majority’s position. They ask “does that make any sense at all?” before endorsing a position.
My next point is that I think that you do, at least implicitly, accept that some evaluation of the majority’s position is necessary. To show why, let’s go back to my evolution example. You posited under your argument:
(1) it would be unreasonable to vote that evolution was incorrect, even if the majority believed so and so voted. That is because the position taken by the majority is factually incorrect.
(2) it would be reasonable to vote to teach creationism in schools if the majority so voted, even if you knew creationism to be factually unsupportable, because it is a policy question.
Where do you get that distinction? I contend it is because the position adopted by the majority in (1) is not supported by reasonable arguments, and the position adopted by the majority in (2), you contend, is at least more debatable. Or is there something magical about a policy question that makes it free of any link to reality?
I think that what you are doing there is exactly what I contend your argument requires to be reasonable—to have some element of testing the position taken by the majority, whether minor, or substantial.
And if you do that, then we’re back where we started–that your argument only works if the position taken by the majority is in some way, reasonable. And so it simply begs the question .