What specifically about the game has changed to make triples so less common?

According to the SABR guys a triple is currently worth about 1/4th of a run more than a double. 100 years ago the difference was closer to 1/3rd of a run, so triples are slightly less valuable than they were in the dead ball era.

Back in the 90s when I went to Fenway a lot there was a rumor that if a ball struck the ladder on the Green Monster it was a ground rule triple. I’m pretty sure that was just an urban legend though made up by season ticket holders during lazy mid-summer games.

If it ever was, apparently not anymore; a ball hitting the ladder and then leaving play is a double.

By my math, the average was 0.32 per game over 1942-1951 versus 0.18 for 2010 through 2018–a decline of 44%. So there is some room for dimensional effects, which makes sense–the loss of Forbes Field, the Polo Grounds, and even old Comiskey Park had to have an effect. In every era, there were more triples in those parks than the league average. So their closure had to be a factor; it just wasn’t the dominant factor–since 1940.

What about further back in time? The Forties already represented a triple decline of about 40% from the Owen Wilson era. The problem is, as you go further back in time, it gets harder to find unchanged ballparks. Most of the old-time parks went through a lot of expansion and remodeling in the early decades. My guess is that if you could do the same kind of analysis for the earlier era you’d see the same combination of dimensional effects and game-strategy changes, but I can’t prove it.

Number 1 doesn’t have to be the predicate for number 2. Once the parks reduced in size the number of triple attempts went down, and could have suppressed triple attempts across the leagues.

In times past there were some lame outfielders who were out there because they were great hitters. That’s certainly rare now, and back then the worst outfielders would be stuck in right field if they were righties, and that’s a great place to hit a triple to. The effect was still the time it took the fielder to get to the ball though, if the ball gets past them that is going to be much more time than the throw takes, and that applies to all fielders, the good ones just don’t let the ball get past them as often.

So better fielding certainly is part of it, but the bigger parks gave more opportunities for a triple no matter how well the fielding was, and IMHO, as the number of those opportunities went away the number of attempts went down across the leagues. The reduction of the overall successful percentage in any category tends to reduce all attempts.

Or maybe I’m wrong, who knows, maybe triples just ain’t as cool as they used to be.

When I started reading this thread, I was convinced that the difference was the geometry of the newer ballparks. But the stats of Wrigley and Fenway certainly shoot down that theory.

So now I think it’s the defense. I believe that outfielders, as a whole, are faster than they used to be, and, as has been mentioned, there are more with ‘cannon’ arms. But I also think there’s another factor: defensive placement. With the advent of advanced analytics, outfielders can be positioned for a particular batter in such a manner so as to prevent singles from turning into doubles and doubles from turning into triples. Much like an infield shift, moving an outfielder just a couple of steps deeper or one direction or the other can prevent a batted ball from plugging the gap and reaching the wall.

I think that’s a good point. We tend to fixate on infielders when talking about shifts, but obviously, outfield positioning has improved as well.

The overall number of hits per game has been on a fairly steady decline since 1993. In fact, hits per game in 2018 and 2019 are the lowest it’s been since 1972. What’s way, way up are strikeouts and home runs. None of this is particularly surprising. But the obvious answer to why triples are down is that teams are willing to trade homers for strikeouts at the expense of non-homers.

If the answer was mostly related to defense and baserunning, wouldn’t we expect doubles to be up? At least slightly. But really they’ve been pretty steady for a decade and down a bit from the mid-2000s.

What’s interesting to me is if you look from 1918 to 1930, home runs increased five fold. But strikeouts during that time were pretty steady, actually deceasing for the most part until 1930.

My WAG is that between 1918-1930 there was an improvement in hitting technique that was taught and led to an overall increase in the number of home runs people were able to achieve, without sacrificing your overall success at the plate.

Lately people just swing for the fences because SABR suggests that is the better way to score. That means you’ll strike out more because you’re going all-or-nothing. You’re not hitting better overall, you’re just emphasizing the slugging aspect.

Again, just my WAG.

I am pretty sure MLB batters don’t take hitting advice from anyone at SABR. They have professional hitting coaches, actually.

That period coincides with the end of the “dead-ball era” (which is generally considered to end in 1919, with the emergence of Babe Ruth as a home run hitter).

There are a number of theories as to why home runs suddenly skyrocketed over the 1920s including:

  • Ruth’s success as a power hitter led others to pursue power-hitting, and trying for home runs, as a technique.
  • After Roy Chapman was killed by a pitch in 1920, the rules were changed to make sure that baseballs were replaced when they became dirty. This meant that balls were more likely to be easier to see, as well as being firmer.
  • Spitballs were outlawed in 1920 (though established spitball pitchers were allowed to continue to use the pitch).
  • Smaller ballparks, with fences closer to home plate.
  • and other theories, as well.

I suspect that it was a confluence of multiple factors leading to the home run explosion in those years.

Beg to disagree. It is with fewer than 2 outs that a triple has a big advantage over a double. With 2 out you are are usually going to need a hit to score and that will usually score a runner from second.

Unless hitting coaches completely ignore analytics, your snark isn’t warranted.